East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies

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Asian Studies Development Program

In 1990, the Asian Studies Development Program was established by the East-West Center and University of Hawai`i to assist two and four-year colleges and universities incorporate Asian studies into the undergraduate curriculum.

As part of its goal of improving the long-term capacity of American higher education to teach about Asia, ASDP offers a variety of programs aimed at faculty, curriculum and institutional development, including summer residential institutes in Hawai`i, field seminars in Asia, and U.S. mainland workshops. ASDP provides ongoing support for its alumni and other interested educators including the annual ASDP Conference. ASDP works collaboratively with institutions committed to developing and sustaining Asian studies programs by advising on strategies for developing Asian studies programs that include building faculty expertise, sources of funding and support from private foundations and government agencies, and the development of library and other resources. Close to 500 colleges and universities throughout the U.S. are involved in the ASDP network.

ASDP has received funding and support for its programs from the Freeman Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation, National Endowment for the Humanities, Korea Foundation, Fulbright Group Travel Abroad Program, and ASDP alumni, as well as the East-West Center and University of Hawai`i. Many ASDP alumni are actively involved in ASDP and are integral to its activities and accomplishments.

Peter Hershock and Edward J. Shultz are Co-Directors of the Asian Studies Development Program.

Association of Regional Centers for Asian Studies

The Association of Regional Centers for Asian Studies (ARCAS) is composed of the 20 regional centers associated with the Asian Studies Development Program. ARCAS is a non-profit organization affiliated with and works closely with ASDP in such initiatives as the development and delivery of faculty development workshops and ASDP’s national conferences. As an independent non-profit organization, ARCAS is operated and financed cooperatively by
its member institutions of the regional centers of ASDP. ARCAS is committed to promoting the study of Asia and Asian cultures in undergraduate programs at colleges and universities throughout the United States by providing high quality programs for faculty, administrators, staff, and students at member institutions as well as other institutions served by the ASDP regional centers. The purpose of these programs is to enhance teaching, learning, and research in Asian studies.

Joseph L. Overton is the Executive Director of the Association of Regional Centers for Asian Studies.

**East-West Center**

The East-West Center is an education and research organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen relations and understanding among the peoples and nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. The Center contributes to a peaceful, prosperous, and just Asia Pacific community by serving as a vigorous hub for cooperative research, education, and dialogue on critical issues of common concern to the Asia Pacific region and the United States. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. government, with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, foundations, corporations, and the governments of the region.

Charles E. Morrison is President of the East-West Center.

**The University of Hawai`i**

The School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies (SHAPS) represents the University of Hawai`i’s commitment to education and research on Asia and the Pacific. SHAPS has the largest resource facility for Asian and Pacific studies in the world. Established in 1987, SHAPS offers academic programs in Asian Studies, Hawaiian Studies, and Pacific Islands Studies. SHAPS helps to coordinate the efforts of some 300 UH faculty who offer more than 600 courses related to Hawai`i, Asia, and the Pacific. The Asian Studies Development Program works primarily with the centers for Chinese Studies, Japanese Studies, Korean Studies, South Asian Studies and Southeast Asian Studies.

M.R.C. Greenwood is President of the University of Hawai`i.
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Editor’s Note:

Welcome to the eleventh volume of *East-West Connections*. From its inception, *Connections* has offered scholarly articles on content and pedagogical topics. In this issue, our articles reflect that practice and exhibit the regional range of Asia that includes India, China, Japan, and Myanmar.

This issue is divided thematically into three sections: *Development, Global Shaping, and the City; Film and Politics;* and *Literary Responses to Colonialism*. In the first section we are pleased to kick off with “The Impact of the Great Western Development Strategy on Three Provinces of Northwestern China” by Isa Harrison, Meredith Houck, Naushin Jiwani, Richard Mack, and Jennie Welch. This study was overseen by Richard Mack and made possible by a National Science Foundation’s “Research Experience for Undergraduates Program.” Our next article, “The Canon and the Reflexes: Narrating a Modern City in South Asia” is by Ashish Nangia. Using Chandigarh, the first planned city of India, he addresses how architecture and the building of cities require the praxis of discourse and text as invaluable supplements in understanding urban dynamics. In their “Resistance, Adaptation, and Transformation: How Global Forces Shaped Religion in South Asia,” Koushik Ghosh, Dipankar Purkayastha, and Thomas Tenerelli investigate the outcomes of religious cultural clashes and their subsequent adaptions by applying principles from economics.

In the next section, *Film and Politics*, Julia Quincy considers how films can have an astute philosophical relevance to the global context of law in her “Visualizing War; Affirming Peace Provisions.” She focuses on how Japan and the U.S. have been inextricably inter-
twined since the Treaty of Amity in 1858. In “Critical and Popular Reception in China of the Films on the Nanjing Massacre,” Li Pu shifts the conversation to China and Japanese relations as she explores the press discourse and audience reception of three Chinese films about Japanese wartime atrocities. She concludes that films about Japanese war-time atrocities play an important role in replicating, perpetuating, and reinforcing negative historical memories of Japan in Chinese society.

Our final section, Literary Responses to Colonialism, picks up on the themes of the first two sections with “Imagery and Interiority of the ‘Real’ Chinese: A Feminist Postcolonial Reading of Eileen Chang’s ‘Love in a Fallen City’” by Bi-Ling Chen. In this article Chen draws upon Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s feminist theory of palimpsest and parody, as well as Homi Bhabha’s postcolonial concept of hybridity and Edward Said’s Orientalism, to understand how Chang employs culturally specific Chinese images to delineate her protagonists’ interiority and negotiate their identities. Our concluding article is “Connecting East and West: Shway Yoe’s Burman” by Stephen Keck. In this article Keck makes the case that Shway Yoe’s (Sir George Scott) The Burman: His Life and Notions is a good example of attempting to create a deliberate hybrid text. This sense of hybridity is the emergent possibility arising from cultural interfacing and is a thread running through the articles of this issue. Specifically, Keck sees that Scott’s efforts should be understood in the broader context of writers who were discontented with their own intellectual traditions and practices. The pseudonym “Shway Yoe,” which in Burmese means “Golden Truth,” becomes a metaphor for the interaction between cultures. Wherein lies the truth of culture when it interacts with another either through war, trade, or cultural exchange? The “Golden Truth” of this interaction is an emerging theme in this eleventh issue of East-West Connections.

Book reviews remain an integral component of Connections and fall under the guidance of Ronnie Littlejohn. In this issue we feature a review by Rachana Sachdev of Raymond-Jean Frontain and Basudeb Chakraborti’s A Talent for the Particular: Critical Essays on R. K. Narayan.
Editor’s Note:

We at *East-West Connections* and the Association of Regional Centers of Asian Studies are pleased to bring *Connections* to you. *East-West Connections* enjoys ongoing support from its contributors, generosity from its editors, and support from patrons. We continue to appreciate moral support from Terry Bigalke (Director of Education at the East-West Center), the East-West Center Alumni Office, and Charles Morrison (President of the East-West Center). We also value the foundation from the Asian Studies Development Program current co-directors, Peter Hershock (East-West Center) and Ned Shultz (University of Hawai‘i) and the ASDP staff of Grant Otoshi, and Sandy Osaka. Recently, Betty Buck, former co-director of ASDP, announced her retirement. We thank Betty and former ASDP co-director, Roger T. Ames, for their longtime service to ASDP. *East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies* is endorsed by the Association of Regional Centers of Asian Studies.

I remain grateful to the *Connections* editorial staff of Michele Marion, Ronnie Littlejohn, Jeffrey Dippmann, and Harriette Grissom. John L. Crow, our production editor, has taken us once again from electronic text to a quality journal design. We give a special thanks to Warren Houghtailing of Kapio‘lani Community College for his outstanding cover image.

*East-West Connections* continues in its commitment to cultivate a special place for publishing in Asian studies. We thank you for your continued support.

—David Jones
The Impact of the Great Western Development Strategy on Three Provinces of Northwestern China

Isa Harrison, Central Washington University
Meredith Houck, University of North Carolina-Ashville
Naushin Jiwani, New College of Florida
Richard Mack, Central Washington University
Jennie Welch, Bucknell University

Abstract

The purpose of this research was to examine the impact of the Great Western Development Strategy on the economic, social, and environmental conditions of the northwest provinces of Shaanxi, Ningxia, and Gansu. We conducted a regional comparative analysis using cross-sectional data to assess the impact of the policy during its initial implementation phase. Relying upon both quantitative data and field observations, we found that overall the GWDS has had a positive impact on these northwestern provinces, specifically on education, standards of living, rural household incomes, and the structural changes from primary to secondary industries. However, our research also revealed deficiencies in water resource management, disparities in the allocation of investment across and within provinces, as well as other shortcomings of the GWDS.

Introduction

Over the past three decades, the People’s Republic of China has experienced extraordinary and transformative economic growth.

1 We thank the National Science Foundation for making our research possible through its Research Experience for Undergraduates Program.
However, this prosperity and increased welfare has not been evenly distributed throughout the country. A 1999 evaluation of the Human Development Index (HDI) in China revealed that all eastern provinces in China had a high level of .711 to .853, central provinces had a ranking of .673 to .732, and western provinces had the lowest ranking of .521 to .751 on the HDI scale (Hu 2007). In part, this is due to the post-Maoist development strategy which focused preferential policies on the eastern coastal region (Fan 1997). The eastern provinces were given priority due to perceived geographical comparative advantages, notably their proximity to ocean trade routes.

In 1999 Chinese policymakers signaled a significant departure from prior regional development policies by announcing *Xibu Da Kaifa*, also known as the Great Western Development Strategy (GWDS). The strategy was designed to confront economic and ecological concerns as well as issues of human capital in the western provinces. Specifically, policymakers sought to cultivate a good investment environment, develop a strong labor force, and promote conservation policies. The Great Western Development Strategy aimed to resolve regional disparities through investment in infrastructure, conservation programs, and health and social institutions. Encompassing over seventeen provinces and totaling over a trillion yuan in expenditures, this strategy reflects both depth of application and breadth of focus (Goodman 2004).

The correlation between infrastructure and development has been well-established in previous economic literature, and has played a key role in the rationale behind the GWDS (Zou, Zhang, Zhuang, and Song 2008). However, the impacts of infrastructure on the environment and specifically on northwestern China’s provinces are not fully understood (Fleisher, Li, and Zhao 2010). Therefore, the purpose of this study was to examine the effectiveness of the GWDS investment in infrastructure and its ramifications for the environment, social well-being, and the economy of the northwest. Our research encompassed qualitative as well as quantitative analysis in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of infrastructure’s role in promoting sustainable development.
The following section will present background information on the northwest provinces as well as a brief review of the literature that relates to our topic. The second segment of this paper will explain our hypotheses and quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Finally, we will reveal our findings, present our interpretations of the results, and draw conclusions.

Background

Our research focused on comparative development in three provinces of China’s northwest in relation to conditions throughout the country. This section will provide an important context for understanding China’s three northwestern provinces: Gansu, Shaanxi, and Ningxia Autonomous Region.

Gansu is one of China’s slowest growing provinces, but paradoxically it has received one of the largest amounts of investment from the GWDS (Wei et al. 2006). The main reason behind Gansu’s low growth rate is the economic domination of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE’s), which represent Gansu’s largest economic sector and which have a very low growth rate of 2.94 percent (Wei et al. 2006). In addition, Gansu’s isolated location in China’s interior limits potential for foreign investment and is the reason why Gansu has the fifth lowest amount of Foreign Direct Investment (Wei et al. 2006). Gansu is also troubled by a lack of human capital, a shortage of high-skilled jobs for educated individuals, and high levels of inequality (Wei et al. 2006).

Like Gansu and other western provinces, Shaanxi was left behind in the 1970’s, when China’s growth first accelerated (Vermeer 2004). However, Shaanxi is rich in natural resources such as coal and natural gas, and this comparative advantage allowed the energy industry in Shaanxi to become one of the province’s main instigators of growth. In addition to extractive industries, Shaanxi is quickly developing tertiary tourism and information technology industries. Government investment in infrastructure, subsidies, irrigation, and development of high-value-added crops has helped improve agriculture in Shaanxi, but inequalities continue to exist within the province between rural and urban areas (Vermeer 2004).
Unlike the other northwestern provinces, the Ningxia Autonomous Region contains a large minority population, the Hui Muslims. Historically, the Hui have been both economically and socially disadvantaged in comparison to the majority Han population; currently, the majority of the Hui people live in the poorest areas of the autonomous region and generally have low literacy rates, especially among the female population (Ho 2003). Ningxia faces many environmental challenges including soil erosion, desertification, and salinization. As a result, arable land is of poor quality and agricultural returns are low (Merkle 2003). Even with its salient environmental concerns, Ningxia has seen a dramatic rise in the standard of living since the establishment of GWDS. Rural income more than doubled between 1999 and 2007. In addition, Ningxia experienced increases in employment and output growth in manufacturing and service industries. Even though Ningxia is moving away from primary industry, a majority of the population continues to be employed in that sector.

Trends across time for several critical variables can be illustrated by using location quotients to compare these northwestern provinces with national statistics before and after GWDS. A location quotient is a measure of inequality between a region and the nation as a whole that designates the national variable as 100. If the location quotient is above 100, then the region is performing better than the national level; if it is lower than 100, the region is performing worse than the national level; and if it is equal to 100, then the region is at the same level as the nation. As an overview of relationships that are later tested for statistical significance, location quotients were calculated for 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2008 to portray trends across several illustrative variables that have occurred during the GWDS period.²

² All national figures were summed from the data of each individual province, excluding Tibet, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing and Hainan. Aggregate location quotients were calculated treating a sum of the three provinces’ values of the variable as a single region to be compared to the national level.
Figure 1 shows that beginning in 1999, employment in primary industries (Agriculture, Forestry, and Mining) in the aggregation of our three northwestern provinces was significantly higher than national averages.

Between 1999 and 2002 there was a significant decline in employment in primary industries; as employment in primary industries declined there was a rapid rise in secondary industry (manufacturing) employment, which began well below national levels in 1999. While the northwestern employment rate for secondary industries remains slightly below national levels, it is evident that there has been a structural shift from primary to secondary industries in the three province aggregation. Although the structural shift lagged that of the nation in the earlier period, the three provinces have, in aggregate, begun to track the nation in the transition towards secondary industries.

Figure 2 illustrates that Gansu has experienced the least structural change among the northwest provinces, as its primary output continues to increase relative to national averages.
The location quotient on road density is represented in Figure 3.

While road density in Shaanxi and Gansu has increased substantially in relation to national levels, Ningxia has experienced a lower level of change. Road density in Shaanxi Province has consistently
remained above the national mean because of its role as the transportation hub to the west.

Figure 4 illustrates that in 1999 student enrollment in Ningxia’s and Gansu’s secondary schools was below national averages, but has improved measurably.

![Location Quotient for Student Enrollment in Secondary Schools of Ningxia, Gansu, and Shaanxi Provinces](image)

**Infrastructure Literature**

David Allen Ashauer investigated the association between infrastructure and growth by examining the relationship between productivity and stock and flow government spending variables. He found that core infrastructure is the largest contributing factor to productivity and accordingly leads economic growth (Ashauer 1989). More recent research observed a strong positive correlation between economic growth and infrastructure development (Barrios 2008, Fan et al. 2004, He et al. 2009). Their research concluded that “rural roads generate the largest impact in terms of the rural development index and income growth” (2008). Other studies supported this finding as it applies to China specifically and found that disparities in infrastructure play a significant role in the manifestation of regional inequalities and that infrastructure development would help reduce those inequalities (Fan et al. 2004, He et al. 2009). In
addition, public investment in transport infrastructure, specifically, road construction in poor areas, has been found to lead to increases in growth and poverty alleviation (Zou et al. 2008). Furthermore, the research suggests that infrastructure development may have significant impacts on other areas of human society, namely human capital (Barrios 2008, Bryceson et al. 2008). Their previous studies concluded that infrastructure can also increase the accessibility of health, education, and social services (Barrios 2008, Bryceson et al. 2008).

However, there are also numerous studies that have revealed the deficiencies of infrastructure in promoting growth. Belton Fleisher’s research on human capital in China indicated that investments in education served to reduce regional inequalities much more effectively than telecommunications and road infrastructure (2010). Telecommunications infrastructure was found to have a higher rate of return in developed—not developing—regions, and roads did not have a positive or significant impact on total factor productivity growth (Fleisher et al. 2010). In addition, several investigations into the correlation between infrastructure investment and private productivity revealed that there was little correlation and no significant evidence of causation (Garcia-Mila et al. 1996; Holtz-Eaken 1994). As for China-specific studies, the relationship between infrastructure and development is not treated in the available literature to any degree of statistical significance.

Objective

The objective of the study was to assess the various impacts of infrastructure improvement in China’s northwestern provinces. In our study, infrastructure is defined as roads, electricity, and water infrastructure. Water infrastructure includes methods of both transporting and storing water. Specifically, we analyzed the economic, social, and environmental ramifications of the policy in the three provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia, using both quantitative data and qualitative field observations. A regional comparison analysis using cross-sectional data was conducted to test the role of GWDS infrastructure investment.
In this study, economic, social and environmental changes were assessed using certain key variables. These included: income per capita, industry shifts from primary to secondary, exports, crop shifts from low-value-added crops to high-value-added crops, secondary education, and afforestation. The intent was to understand the magnitude of the relationship that exists between income levels and each of the above listed variables. Possible hypotheses about the role of infrastructure in the three provinces were developed and tested.

**Quantitative Hypotheses**

Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses that were addressed in the quantitative testing.

<table>
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<th>Table 1: Quantitative Hypotheses</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1999 (base year control variable)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Income per Capita</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Income per Capita</td>
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<td>Length of Highways</td>
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<td>Secondary Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural Loans</td>
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<td>Primary Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fixed Asset Investment</td>
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</table>

We hypothesized that there would be a negative relationship between our 1999 control variable and the majority of our dependent variables. We based this upon the concept that the lower the initial starting point, the greater the potential for increases. For example, the lower the initial income, the higher the potential for income to increase. Therefore there should be a negative relationship between income and the control variable. The exceptions to this negative relationship would be secondary education, primary industry, and
agricultural loans, because there must be a certain threshold level of these variables in order for increases to occur. In order for agricultural loans to increase, there must be a certain level of credit, which is established by agricultural loans. Therefore the relationship would be positive for agricultural loans. In contrast, we hypothesized that the relationships between GWDS and the majority of our dependent variables would be positive. This is because we believe our dependent variables are indicators of growth, which would be augmented by the GWDS. Primary industry and agricultural loans were an exception, because we predicted an overall decrease in primary industry and agriculture as structural change occurs and industries shift from primary to secondary and tertiary industries. The variable for irrigated areas was also an exception due to the Grain for Green afforestation program; the predicted shift from high water-intensive to low water-intensive crops; and the shift from agricultural production as a primary industry to secondary and tertiary industries which do not irrigate land.

Methodology

Quantitative Methodology

To test our hypotheses quantitatively, we developed a formal econometric model and used provincial data from the China Statistical Yearbooks. GWDS was the identifier to distinguish between provinces affected by the strategy and those that were not. The primary investment in GWDS is infrastructure. We analyzed the relationship between GWDS, our independent variable, and the several dependent variables that were listed previously. An ordinary least squares regression model was used to test for statistical validity and significance. Additionally, regional comparative analysis was conducted by comparing Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia Autonomous Region with the rest of the western, central and coastal provinces.

Equations and variables are shown in Table 2, as follows:
These equations were formulated in such a way as to minimize multicollinearity. We selected 1999 as a base year, because it preceded the implementation of GWDS. This allowed us to control for the short-term high growth rates that occur in the initial stages of development. We also used population density as our control variable to take into account the impact that population can have on development indicators since some provinces may indicate higher levels of growth due more to population growth than to the variables we tested.

Aggregate dependent variables were parameterized in order to take into account differences between provinces. This was achieved through the use of aggregate dependent variables parameterized in order to take into account differences between provinces.
by dividing the dependent variable by the total population, land area, or, in the case of aggregate loans, by total loans. The parameterizations are:

- Secondary Education / Total Population (%)
- Primary Industry / Total # Employed
- Secondary Industry / Total # Employed
- Irrigated Areas / Total Area
- Secondary Education / Total Population
- Agricultural Loans / Total Loans
- Population / Land Area

* The design of the model is intended to highlight changes that have resulted due to the implementation of GWDS.

**Qualitative Methodology**

In addition to our quantitative analysis, we also conducted observational research in western China. We began by attending the 7th Annual Conference of the Consortium for Western China Development Studies in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province. After the conference, we began the field research portion of our analysis, which consisted of a three weeks of travel through a variety of villages in Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia provinces. In these villages we conducted interviews with business leaders, government officials, farmers, and residents. Our interviews were designed to assess the intensity and diversity of impacts of infrastructure and the Great Western Development Strategy on their community.

**Qualitative Hypotheses**

Table 3 summarizes the hypotheses addressed by our qualitative research.

**Data Sources:**

For our quantitative analysis, we relied on the China Data Online database of the University of Michigan, using the annual macro-economic statistics at the provincial level. We extracted data for every Chinese province and autonomous region excluding Beijing, Tibet, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, and Hainan. The data encompassed
Table 3: Qualitative Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Affects</th>
<th>Exports; Positively</th>
<th>Industry Shifts; Positively</th>
<th>Crop Shifts; Positively</th>
<th>Education; Positively</th>
<th>Afforestation; Negatively</th>
<th>Water Infrastructure; Positively</th>
<th>Migration; Minimum Income Required</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microcredit</td>
<td>Affects</td>
<td>Income; Positively</td>
<td>Exports; Positively</td>
<td>Industry Shifts; Positively</td>
<td>Crop Shifts; Positively</td>
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<td>Crop Shifts; Positively</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Affects</td>
<td>Income; Positively</td>
<td>Exports; Positively</td>
<td>Industry Shifts; Positively</td>
<td>Crop Shifts; Positively</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Migration; Positively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Infrastructure</td>
<td>Affects</td>
<td>Income; Positively</td>
<td>Exports; Positively</td>
<td>Industry Shifts; Positively</td>
<td>Crop Shifts; Positively</td>
<td>Education; Positively</td>
<td>Health Services; Positively</td>
<td>Migration; Positively</td>
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<td>Industry Shifts</td>
<td>Affects</td>
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<td>Exports; Positively</td>
<td>Education; Positively</td>
<td>Water Infrastructure; Positively</td>
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<td>Migration; Positively</td>
<td>Road Infrastructure; Positively</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electrical Infrastructure</td>
<td>Affects</td>
<td>Income; Positively</td>
<td>Exports; Positively</td>
<td>Industry Shifts; Positively</td>
<td>Crop Shifts; Positively</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Water Infrastructure; Positively</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water Infrastructure</td>
<td>Affects</td>
<td>Income; Positively</td>
<td>Exports; Positively</td>
<td>Industry Shifts; Negatively</td>
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<td>Crop Shifts; Positively</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
the years 1999, 2003, and 2007, and covered the wide range of economic, social, and environmental variables that were appropriate to the hypotheses.

Findings

Quantitative Findings:

Table 4 illustrates the statistical findings of the regression analysis. Overall, these findings indicate that the GWDS had a positive impact on development. However, the findings are partially clouded by a lack of statistical significance to many of the hypotheses. This was due mainly to the limited number of data points, the inaccuracy of the data, and the time lags associated with implementation of GWDS investments and policies. The quantitative findings confirmed our predictions that the relationship between income per capita and the GWDS was positive, as was the correlation between length of highways and the GWDS. We also found that secondary education and the GWDS share a positive correlation, as we had hypothesized. The data also indicated the predicted structural changes away from primary industries, as agricultural loans, primary industry, and irrigated land share a negative relationship with the GWDS.

While many of our hypotheses were confirmed by the regression analysis, the results did contradict several of our predictions. Our findings revealed three unexpected relationships between the GWDS and the dependent variables. The hypotheses that rural income, secondary industry, and fixed asset investments would share a positive relationship with the GWDS were invalidated. The development emphasis on urban, rather than rural, growth explains the negative correlation between GWDS and rural income. The negative relationship between secondary industry and the GWDS may be explained by the time-consuming nature of policy implementation and the construction of infrastructure, which is important for developing secondary industries. Fixed-asset investments and the GWDS may share a negative relationship as a result of time lags in policy implementation and in the development of fixed-asset investments. With only a few exceptions, our quantitative analysis dem-
Table 4: Empirical Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>Adjusted R²</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Income Per Capita</td>
<td>Income / Capita - 1999</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>55.682</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population - 1999</td>
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<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.294</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GWDS Presence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.639</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Rural Income/ Household</td>
<td>Rural Income / Household - 1999**</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>21.585</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-2.175</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GWDS Presence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>1.332</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Highway Length</td>
<td>Highway Length - 1999</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>77.499</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population - 1999</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.157</td>
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<td>GWDS Presence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>43.415</td>
<td>26.233</td>
<td>0.604</td>
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<td>4) Secondary Education</td>
<td>Population - 1999*</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>23.105</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GWDS Presence**</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>1.755</td>
</tr>
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<td>5) Agricultural Loans</td>
<td>Agricultural Loans - 1999</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>72.209</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population - 1999</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>-0.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GWDS Presence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41.622</td>
<td>-48.482</td>
<td>-1.165</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) Primary Industry</td>
<td>Primary Industry - 1999**</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>9.804</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population - 1999**</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GWDS Presence</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.389</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7) Secondary Industry</td>
<td>Secondary Industry - 1999**</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>23.837</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population - 1999**</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>3.204</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GWDS Presence</td>
<td>14.088</td>
<td>-2.751</td>
<td>-0.196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Irrigated Area</td>
<td>Irrigated Area - 1999</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>1.1207</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population - 1999**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GWDS Presence</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.754</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Fixed Asset Investment</td>
<td>F.A. Investment - 1999**</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>194.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population - 1999</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>-1.939</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GWDS Presence</td>
<td>107.665</td>
<td>-24.068</td>
<td>-0.224</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Significant at the 90th percentile, ** = Significant at the 95th percentile, *** = Significant at the 99th percentile
onstrated that the GWDS has had a positive impact overall on these various indicators of development; however, the strength of this correlation was limited by the lack of data points, the delay in policy implementation, and the lack of completely reliable data.

Comparative Regional Statistics

Table 5 illustrates several noteworthy statistical trends. It is clear from these data that the western region has experienced rapid economic, social, and environmental changes during the period of implementation of the GWDS. In particular, GDP per capita and secondary education experienced the greatest rate of change in the west compared with the rest of the country. However, great disparities exist even within the western region, and more specifically within the northwest.

While Shaanxi province and Ningxia Autonomous Region experienced significant economic growth, Gansu continued to lag behind most other western provinces in terms of many indicators of development. As for structural change, Gansu’s rate of change from primary to secondary industries was the lowest by far among the northwestern provinces, the western region, and China as a whole. In almost ten years, Gansu’s rate of change towards secondary industries was only about 1 percent, and its rate of change away from primary industries was only about 7.6 percent, both well below all other regions. In addition, while Shaanxi’s GDP per capita percentage change was the highest in the west and was above national averages, Gansu experienced a much slower rate of change, below that of other regions and the country as a whole. For the 1999 base year, Gansu was the least-developed province in the northwest; therefore, we had expected to see the greatest amount of change in Gansu.

Qualitative Findings:

Between July 8th and July 21st, our team traveled through rural villages in the provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, and the Ningxia autonomous region to collect observations pertaining to the impact of the GWDS in these areas. We observed numerous trends, some reflect-
Table 5: Regional Percentage Changes (1999-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td></td>
<td>189.6</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>-33.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td></td>
<td>191.1</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>-17.0</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td></td>
<td>212.4</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>-16.4</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>182.1</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ningxia</td>
<td>238.5</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>-21.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>151.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>275.1</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>199.3</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>-20.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
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<td>378.8</td>
<td>591.3</td>
<td>148.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Central</td>
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<td>453.6</td>
<td>556.9</td>
<td>203.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td></td>
<td>429.7</td>
<td>419.1</td>
<td>151.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>266.8</td>
<td>423.4</td>
<td>170.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ningxia</td>
<td>426.2</td>
<td>678.3</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>1287.4</td>
<td>654.6</td>
<td>171.0</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>427.9</td>
<td>510.1</td>
<td>151.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Economic Trends

While developing our proposal for this research project, we hypothesized that there would be a shift from low-value-added crops to high-value-added crops as a result of GWDS policies. During interviews conducted with rural farmers and industry leaders, we found that there has been heavy government encouragement in the form of technology transfers, subsidies, and special technical training courses for farmers to transition from subsistence to cash crop farming. This transition correlated with a significant increase in income for many farmers and industries. In addition, government support was tailored to a region’s specific geographical characteristics, such as support for developing arid-resistant crops in drier areas of the northwest.

Microcredit is a form of infrastructure that we had not considered in our proposal, and one that has proven to be a key part of development in many rural areas. Microcredit associations, which may be private or public entities, provide rural residents with convenient and expedient access to small-scale loans. Many rural residents do not have the credit to apply and receive loans from most state banks, so these microcredit institutions are often the only means for residents to acquire loans. We found that microcredit associations throughout the northwest had very different experiences and success rates; overall, microcredit was revealed to be an important aspect of development.

Social Trends

In addition to investment in infrastructure, the GWDS has placed emphasis on developing educational institutions and resources. Every village that we visited in the northwest provinces had both a pre-school and elementary school, whereas middle schools were located in the county seats and high schools in larger cities. Due to improvements in transportation infrastructure, even schools located outside of villages were now accessible to rural students. However, few universities and colleges are located in the west, and virtually
none are in proximity to rural areas. Therefore, while primary school attendance is very high, only 20% of students continued onto high school and only 1% of students enrolled in a university or college. Consequently, education remains an area in need of greater investment and reform.

Those students who did continue on to college rarely returned to their hometowns; rather, they became part of a growing migrant population streaming out of rural areas. In many villages, migrant labor comprised an important part of household and village income. Wages from migrant labor represented a form of diversification of income and was beneficial for many families; however it resulted in significant demographic issues. Permanent village populations were composed mostly of elderly parents and their grandchildren; parents, spouses, and older children separated from their families to live and work in cities.

For some villages, migration has increased due to the construction of roads which facilitate travel to bigger cities. While many western provinces benefited from large labor populations, lack of available jobs motivated potential employees to separate from their families and work elsewhere. However, in other regions, migration has decreased due to the creation of new local industries which can provide employment opportunities.

Environmental Trends

One of the most pressing challenges facing northwest provinces is the issue of water quantity, which threatens agricultural and industrial production as well as access to drinking water. When asked how they expect to confront issues of water quantity, rural residents placed their faith in the government to develop a solution. While there is significant government investment in water infrastructure such as reservoirs and wells, there is also a lack of policies that could benefit water conservation.

In the northwestern provinces, there is currently no established system of water rights or water management. Urban residents rely mostly on tap water and pay little if anything for consumption. The development of a system to allocate water more effectively, and
hopefully conserve it, would promote sustainability but may also lead to restrictions on growth. Over the next 10 years we expect to see the development of water rights systems to address the current shortage of means to allocate effectively and conserve limited water resources.

**Political Trends**

It should be noted that in the course of our observational research, we found that villages throughout the counties we visited had a wide range of experiences with the GWDS. In particular, we noticed great dissimilarities between majority ethnic Han villages and those villages dominated by the Hui Muslim minorities in Ningxia. In several Hui villages, residents reported to us that they were receiving little, if any, government support. While the same policies were supposed to be implemented across Han and Hui villages, some Hui villages were receiving much more limited government infrastructure investment, subsidies, and other forms of support.

In summary, our observations and interviews indicated improvements in the standard of living and overall economic growth. However, we also became aware of the lack of local employment opportunities, disparities within provinces, lack of human capital, water resource concerns, and lack of industries.

**Conclusion and Policy Recommendations**

In researching the impacts of the GWDS in Gansu, Shaanxi, and Ningxia, we observed numerous economic, social, and environmental trends. Overall we found that infrastructure development has had a positive impact on the rural villages we visited. Roads led to more regional and international trade, opened up access to and created new markets, and as a result led to an increase in incomes and production. Electrical, water, and telecommunications infrastructure helped to improve dramatically residents’ standard of living. All types of infrastructure development created better environments for enterprises and industries. However, in recognizing the many positive impacts of the GWDS, we also became aware of several issues that should be addressed by Chinese policymakers in the second phase of this strategy’s implementation.
Western China in general suffers from a lack of human capital investment and a shortage of higher education resources. This deficiency impacts employment opportunities, the willingness and ability of high-tech industries to move into the west, and migration patterns. The irony of migration is that while it adds to individual village and household incomes, it significantly limits the potential of a village to develop, because of the loss of educated and skilled labor. In addition to having a greatly untapped labor population, the west enjoys rich natural resources that could be utilized more efficiently to stimulate growth. As opposed to extracting and exporting these resources to be processed elsewhere, there is great potential for secondary industries to prosper in the west and make use of this abundance of natural resources and better utilize the large low-wage labor population. While the west enjoys the comparative advantages of natural resources, it also suffers from the geographical disadvantages of being a mostly arid region. Therefore, future development must take into consideration how water resource issues will be managed and overcome. Given the fragile nature of the northwestern ecology, sustainability and the quality of growth must become priorities in the next phase of the west’s regional development.

As illustrated by our descriptive statistics, the western region has experienced great change, especially in terms of economic growth. However, the data also reveal sizeable disparities even within the west and more specifically among the three northwestern provinces. While Shaanxi and Ningxia are leading western provinces, Gansu continues to lag behind in terms of economic development and social qualities. Furthermore, our statistical analysis demonstrated that growth has been unequal within provinces, specifically between urban and rural areas. Our quantitative findings illustrated that while growth has been achieved in many indicators of development, rates of change have not always been significant. This is likely due to the fact that the GWDS promotes policies and changes that have long-term impacts, rather than quickly-realized effects. Therefore, we expect to see more significant levels of growth in the next ten years of the GWDS.
The Great Western Development Strategy will face numerous challenges in the next ten years of the program. However, there have also been many noteworthy successes. Living standards have increased markedly since the 1990’s for millions of villagers. Entrepreneurship is now a possibility for even poor rural families. The Great Western Development Strategy is a massive program, totaling trillions of RMB in investments, affecting millions of people, and covering thousands of miles. As a result, there is still much to be learned about the policy’s diversity of impacts on rural societies. We believe that our findings have helped expand the understanding of China’s ever-evolving regional development strategy and have highlighted the significant role the GWDS is playing in encouraging China’s overall growth.

References


The Canon and the Reﬂ(cts)x:
Narrating a Modern City in South Asia

Ashish Nangia, Indo Global Education Foundation

Abstract

Architecture and city-building are seldom a construct of built form alone: rather, the building of monumental architecture and cities requires the praxis of discourse and text as an invaluable accompaniment. Herein lies a paradox: the use of text and discourse generates in its process several binaries, not all of which are evident in architectural form. In 1950, postcolonial India engaged French and British architects to build the town of Chandigarh, noted for its rational town plan and monumental modern architecture. While the built form of this town has been discussed at length, rarely have the discursive myths the town has generated been analyzed. And yet, in the town’s building, there are opposing cultural paradigms at play: those of the textual “canon” describing the town, and those that narrate the town from within – indigenous voices and texts emanating from within the terrain. This article argues that for a complete understanding of the iconicity of Chandigarh, an analysis of its discursive representation in text is essential. Further, it is also vital that such an analysis take into account not only the “canonic” production of text, but also voices from within the site of architecture and town planning. Such an intersection of discourse will help us situate the town within a non-Eurocentric space and is a valid methodology to study other postcolonial cities that proliferated in Asia and Africa within the same period.

Introduction

The state architecture of postcolonial nations in Asia and Africa is often an effort to assert their independence from the former metropoles, as well as an indication of power and identity in the new nations (Vale 12). While architecture and town planning, as physi-
cal constructs, are the subject of much debate and discussion, the same cannot be said of the discursive representations of these same objects. Indeed, much of the textual production that accompanies building is relegated as a secondary source compared to the buildings and monuments themselves (Lefebvre 24).

However, as Roland Barthes and Henri Lefebvre have shown, spatial production is in itself not related only to built form, but also carries within itself the all-important production of texts and the myths that accompany the written and spoken word (Barthes 72). Within this discourse is combined the discourse of post-colonialism, in which former colonies and their peoples attempt to “write back,” thus aspiring to be at the level of their colonial metropoles, as well as reaching out for symbols of power as a shortcut to power itself (Prakash 15).

Architecture, thus, for a postcolonial state, is intensely involved in these processes of “writing back.” While much has been said about the architecture and monumentality of postcolonial states, little has been written about the textual production that accompanies architecture (Vale 65). The case becomes even more gripping when architecture itself is the result of a convoluted process of borrowing from former colonial powers in terms of utilizing expertise, architects and matériel, and deploying these on the sites of the so-called third world.

A historic experiment in the building of a new and modern postcolonial town was carried out in India in 1950, when the independent state of India built a new capital city for the region of the Punjab, to replace the historic capital of Lahore, “lost” to Pakistan. Here, at Chandigarh, a French architect and town-planner, coupled with a British team of subordinates and Indian engineers, built a town that came to be renowned for its monumentality, its visionary and modernist town planning, and its potentially polemic architecture and built form (Joshi 15). As is the case with other such town planning schemes, a substantial amount of textual documentation accompanied this experiment. It is the intention of this paper to explore a canonical discourse that contributed to creating the iconicity of Chandigarh, and to problematize the myths inherent in such a key
textual discourse that buttress the underlying dominance of the ex-colonial power, and that inherently suppress possible “native” voices that might challenge the canon.

**Context: Le Corbusier and Chandigarh**

In the history of modern architecture, the figure of Le Corbusier (*né* Charles Edouard Jeanneret) is widely acknowledged to be seminal (Curtis 105). Though criticisms abound about the dehumanizing philosophy of Modernism in architecture, it is valid to say that Le Corbusier’s and his contemporaries’ theories about the role of architecture as a tool to further human moral and material development are well-documented (Frampton 2007). Through several path-breaking projects, such as the *Plan Voisin*, the chapel at Ronchamp, and the monastery at La Tourette, as well as the publication of several illuminating books on architecture, Le Corbusier had cemented his position by the middle of the 20th century as one of the leading lights of modern construction. It was thus, for the Indians, a happy coincidence that an Indian team of administrators and engineers chanced upon Le Corbusier to give shape to Punjab’s new capital city.

Constructed over a period of twenty years from 1950 to 1970, Chandigarh marked the rallying point of Le Corbusier’s *œuvre*, a new city that was free from overt postcolonial associations and yet could hold its own, in terms of its architecture and monumentality, with Brazil’s new capital and the Baroque planning of Washington, DC. Its culminating focus was the Capitol, a synergy of administrative, legislative and judicial buildings set in a mystical landscape of mountains, concrete memorials and vast landscaping elements. Le Corbusier’s personal friendship with India’s Prime Minister and the engineers involved in the project gained Chandigarh a certain notoriety and primacy in international discourse, so the city’s architecture was widely publicized and visited by the architectural elite.

Complementary to Le Corbusier’s city was also the somewhat prosaic Chandigarh, an infill of houses, parks, schools and public buildings designed to make the city actually habitable. Designed by Le Corbusier’s cousin, Pierre Jeanneret, and the British couple of Edwin Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew, this Chandigarh garnered less
attention initially, but in later years would go on to form a vital part of Chandigarh's built “heritage” of modern buildings and architecture (Joshi 20).

Within this context of history and built form, the Chandigarh project was subject to close scrutiny and documentation by a host of historians, sociologists, and architects. What emerges from a close reading of these sources is an overlapping image of the town project as one that jousts alternately between two epistemologies: the first is a reading that privileges “empire” and the primacy of the Eurocentric world; and the second rises from Indian domestic reporting and a nationalistic view of history. While constructing the textual discourse of this postcolonial city, it would be prudent to examine a “canonical” source as supportive of a tentative hypothesis and question: what is the “true” location of the discursive representation of a postcolonial city? What is the “true” origin of the postcolonial city project? And to what extent does an overlapping, close reading help us identify these location(s) and origin(s)? Answering these questions about the Chandigarh project would help us form a general hypothesis about the origin and location of the postcolonial modern city through a reading of the textual documents that accompany its production.

Creating a Canon: Norma Evenson’s Chandigarh

It was no surprise that Le Corbusier’s polemic architecture attracted a great deal of attention in the West. In 1966, when the Chandigarh project was well on its way to completion, Norma Evenson, then a historian of architecture at the University of Berkeley, wrote the first “outside” appraisal of the project that was consumed in the West. Titled simply Chandigarh, Evenson’s book went on to become in a way the canonical first resource on Chandigarh in the English language press for academics. It was in this work that Evenson laid the foundation for the appropriation of Chandigarh into the Western canon: a work built by Western architects according to Western principles of aesthetics and design.

What follows is an analysis of Norma Evenson’s book through the optic of a postcolonial reading: that is, an analysis of Evenson’s
text as a production of Western epistemological canons that seeks to locate the origin of Chandigarh firmly in the West, and that hypothesizes her work as a metaphor for “location” as much as it is an objective account of the architecture and planning of the new city. This study has potentially serious ramifications for the study of postcolonial capital cities, especially as they are or may be built by “imported” expertise in the form of architects, planners, and administrators. Similar, parallel examples may be found, for example, in Nigeria’s postcolonial capital city of Abuja, or Pakistan’s capital city of Islamabad.

The Curious Case of the Missing “Natives”

As later histories would show, the site for Chandigarh was acquired by displacing 22 villages that occupied the land (Kalia 34). Little is known about these villagers, or what they had to say about this forcible displacement, in Western histories of Chandigarh. To Le Corbusier and his associates, Chandigarh was a tabula rasa, a magnificent landscape of mountains, bullocks and peasants—a civilization that hadn’t really “invented an architecture for the machine age” (Boesiger 123).

Thus Chandigarh started with a latent revolt—a narrative that predates Le Corbusier’s Chandigarh and yet is curiously missing from Evenson’s book. Preferring instead to treat the city as a “pure” experiment in urban planning and architecture, Evenson arrogates to the city plan

…the gesture by which man takes possession of space, impressing on that space the ordering of his mind and devising a comprehensible man-made world for himself and his creations. By what gesture does man possess space? How does he make his mark in the natural world? ...Throughout history and human culture the town plan has become one of the universal signatures of man. It is a signature consistently legible, as the language is perhaps the oldest human language – visual order. (Evenson 1-2)

It is only in the second chapter (“The Creation of the City”) that Evenson alludes to the significance the project held for the Indian State. It is worthwhile mentioning here the paradoxical nature of the urban process in India, which went against the grain of key meth-
odological requirements of modern urbanism at the time—requirements that presume the availability of data on which to base design. Maurice Besset is of the opinion that the absence of data was not really problematic for the Indian authorities, concerned as they were by the city as a largely political problem (Besset 148). The process by which the city is created is described as follows: it is a consequence of political division, designed to recreate an administrative capital for the Punjab government and to rehabilitate millions of refugees from the new state of Pakistan. Here the symbolic nature of the city is mentioned in passing:

Of more significance than practical consideration in influencing the decision to build a new city, however, may have been the need at this time for a symbolic gesture. India, filled with new national pride, needed focal points for unity; the Punjabis needed a lift for their morale. The new city, coming into existence at a time of disorder and uncertainty, could stand as a tangible embodiment of the will to maintain a stable society.... The colonial yoke had been thrown off, and the moment had arrived for India to show the world that she could stand alone, that she could command her own destiny and govern her own house, and that against the brutality of nature and the vastness of her continent she could impress an ordered yet viable pattern of human life—proof that Indian civilisation, though ancient, was still vigorous and creative. (Evenson 6)

This analysis raises several questions. Firstly, there is the question of a new state filled with “national pride.” While this was undoubtedly true for a section of the population, it does not take into account the reactions of regional groupings that had not yet been integrated into the nation, or that of dispossessed minorities. Would it be more precise to say that a reason for creating a city was also to create national pride? The second assumption that the text makes is implicit: that ancient civilizations have, in one way or the other, frittered away their vigor, strength and vitality, and that proof contrary to this is necessary—in the form of a city. Much of this is Evenson’s imbrication in Orientalist assumptions of Eastern civilizations—effete and lacking virility, and by extension, lacking an architecture for the modern age.

Yet there is a section in Evenson’s book that pre-dates Le Corbusier. This part deals with the roles played by Albert Mayer, an American planner, and Mathieu Nowicki, an American émigré ar-
chitect, in their capacity as the original team hired by the Indians for the Chandigarh project. Prior to Le Corbusier, it was this team that gave shape to the city plan. It is interesting to note that Mayer was largely based in India before his work on Chandigarh. Did this fact “locate” him, for the postcolonial state, in a place unacceptably far from the colonial metropole? Was Indian familiarity with Mayer a reason that his plan was eventually put aside for that of Le Corbusier? Certainly Evenson does not think so: her analysis of Mayer and Nowicki’s contribution puts her on surer ground, along with her access to Mayer’s archives and letters on the project. Mayer’s approach to city planning is characterized as “empirical” rather than formal, associating by default an inherently organic nature to the Mayer plan. This may or may not have been a conclusion drawn from the material available; and it may also, one must not discount, be a hy-

Figure 1. Albert Mayer’s Plan for Chandigarh
It seems very obvious to me that some of our present judgements are based on the relation, first, to the inadequacies of our gridiron street system, and secondly, to the lack of diversity in the creation of modern architecture. We love irregularity because we have too much boring regularity around. Here the abuse of a notion is confused in our minds with the notion itself. We do not know how future generations will react to this problem. However, it seems to me that a city always has been and will be a ‘modular problem’ based on a regularity of design because there has been a regularity of purpose. Every conscious planning effort was to create an order. The clarity of this order was always admired by posterity and comprehended in the same way as it was intended by the planner. A perfect city was the result of time and I am afraid no planner can make it so without the help of time. I feel that it would be a mistake to attempt to create a perfect city incorporating in it a notion of diversity that the perfect city, as we know them, have. A logical and true city plan is always a modular diagram expressing a certain philosophy and principle of life (true for a certain period) applied to specific conditions. The amount of sensitivity in applying the diagram will be responsible for legitimate variations. But the main objective should be order and not diversity. It seems to me that only in this way can one achieve the highest standard and the uniqueness of a truly great plan.…. I have the opinion that none of our plans have approached this standard. (Evenson 15)

The difference in design philosophy between Mayer and Nowicki is already apparent. While Mayer advocates “empiricism” in his work, Nowicki stresses order and regularity even within a plan that gives apparent weight to “diversity” (Evenson 12-24). It is perhaps no surprise that Nowicki had his own version of an “ideal” city plan—a leaf-pattern that mimics the venous structure of the leaf in its circulation system—a projection of organic growth and structure within the confines of a visible order—the “legitimate variations” that he alludes to.

Evenson details the Mayer plan as composed of basic superblock or neighbourhood units. Mayer believed that the sense of community induced by the superblock made it particularly suited for Indian conditions, where community life was one of the keystones of semi-rural living, and indeed was manifested in most of the major
urban centers around the country. So Mayer’s superblock, in its final form, takes on the following characteristics: it accommodates about 1150 families each, and the superblocks in turn are grouped into three-block districts of 3500 families; each district is also designed
to be self-sufficient, incorporating housing, local shopping, schools and parks; the zones are stratified according to income type, from low to high income groups; and finally, the aggregated “urban” area occupies a maximum area of one hundred acres, with the superblock itself being about 3000 by 1500 feet.

In conclusion, Evenson offers a tentative analysis of the Mayer plan:

...one begins to feel that much of its form springs from what is almost an anti-urban aesthetic, and, although it might have been developed as an attractive and comfortable city, the overall plan somehow does not read as a monumental capital – as that positive act of possession by which a capital may symbolize the control of a people over their destiny.

(Evenson 18)

Matthew Nowicki, apart from illustrating children’s books and maintaining a design practice in the United States, had surprisingly little experience that would make him capable of designing the post-colonial monument. It is partly rhetorical to conjecture about the nature of a Mayer-Nowicki capital, especially as none of their efforts were ultimately realized. Still, Nowicki’s sketches and drawings for the capital bear testimony to his vision. Left to Mayer and Nowicki, there is every chance that Chandigarh would have gone the way of new towns in England or France in terms of architectural and urban fragmentation. Nevertheless, Evenson cites from Nowicki’s letters:

As important as the problem of each housing unit is the type of their overall relations. The low-cost housing occupies large areas of the town. If we are to avoid the drab appearance of the well-known refugee housing groups, the relations between houses have to be different from the monotonous repetition of a parallel block. The richness of perspectives within the areas of pedestrian movement is not resulting from the quality of architectural detail alone (in our case, strongly handicapped by the budget). It is the result of relations between the buildings which provide a frame for a particularly interesting view where color and silhouette are seen in shade, or strong projections offer diversified shadow pattern in sunlight. The change of those views, none of them large-scale within our residential area, should follow a well-planned sequence....Human well-being seems to depend on the emotional quality of space as much as on the sanitary factors of light and air. This fact explains why people become attached to crowded and seemingly uncomfortable conditions in many cities, and remain cold to some modern developments, sanitary as they may be. (Evenson 23)
Evenson attributes, finally, to Nowicki an almost prophetic sense of his own destiny and place in the world. In a letter to Mayer, two weeks before his death over Cairo, Nowicki writes:

I have found at last the exact words of Krishna. ‘Indifferent to pleasure and pain, to gain or loss, to conquest or defeat, thus make ready for the fight.... As do the foolish, attached to works, so should the wise do, but without attachment, seeking to establish order in the world.’ (Evenson 24)

Perhaps Nowicki, in some sense, foresaw his own fiery death. On August 31, 1950, TWA Flight 903 from Cairo to Rome, a Lockheed Constellation named “Star of Maryland,” crashed near Wadi Natrun near Cairo. All 55 passengers and the crew perished: the time was just a few minutes after midnight.1 It was time for the Indian administrators to select another team: the first had produced a plan, it was true, but with little direction on how to implement it, nor any clear vision of where it took its place within a changing world. Evenson’s chapters on the “second team,” once again, went almost without criticism into the canonical literature on Chandigarh. But who was Nowicki, and what were his motives for coming to Chandigarh? Why did he collaborate with Albert Mayer, and what were the techniques used by Mayer to convince Nowicki to participate? How did Mayer use Nowicki’s status as a recent immigrant from Poland—and his pending immigration application (sponsored by Albert Mayer)—as a tool to alternately cajole, bully, and persuade Nowicki? These answers and more are in the Mayer archives, a story that still lies waiting to be told. The drawings that Nowicki made of his proposals for Chandigarh are too disparate to offer any real sense of what the entire finished city might have looked like: certainly it is characterised by experimentation with vernacular Indian forms, Nowicki’s own tendencies to decorate surfaces, and a marked lack of true monumentality that would characterise Le Corbusier’s work.

1 “While en route from Cairo to Rome, witnesses observed the aircraft on fire. After turning back toward Cairo, it crashed and burned. Failure of the rear master rod bearing in the No. 3 engine led to an uncontrollable fire. The aircraft was named Star of Maryland.” From the Plane Crash Information Database. http://www.plane-crashinfo.com/1950/1950-37.htm (Accessed 1 December, 2007)
After Nowicki’s death and Mayer’s continued absence, the Indians lost little time in contracting for another team; already, the Mayer plan was close to being relegated to the past.

The urban myth that the story has become goes, roughly speaking, as follows: P.L. Varma and P.N. Thapar, able engineer and administrator, respectively, leave for Europe after Nowicki’s death to look for an architectural consultant. After much rambling around in the capitals of that fair continent, Varma and Thapar finally meet Fry and Drew, who recommend Le Corbusier and Pierre Jeanneret (for the second time). Le Corbusier, finally enticed by the possibility of not having to completely abandon Paris, inks the contract and, forthwith, on his first visit to India, makes changes to Mayer’s (and Nowicki’s!) master plan, altering it to his own taste in “less than four days.” Le Corbusier’s plan consists of the by-now famous systems of circulation, an anthropomorphic conception of the city, and finally (and perhaps for the future, most importantly) rules and regulations that govern the nature of the city, its future expansion, and its relation to the surrounding countryside. For Le Corbusier’s intervention and final contribution to the Capitol, Evenson says:

It is this monumental aspect of the city which obviously attracted Le Corbusier’s primary interest, and his efforts were directed toward the immediate development of a powerful capitol complex and toward giving the whole urban fabric the imprint of a monumental symbolism, drawing certain of its dimensions from the large-scale ordering of Paris. (Evenson 68)

The book’s following chapters analyze what Evenson calls the “dual character” of the city—its division, so to speak, into an overarching macro-order, that then branches down into smaller units, each with its own system and hierarchy of routes, spaces and built form. Evenson devotes a chapter each to the Sector, the Commercial Area, Educational and Cultural Areas, and finally the Capitol. Within the empirical analysis lies useful data, for example on the nature and quantity of plots sold, and zoning distribution of the city. For example, applications for plots were invited by 1948, with a final 62,729 respondents applying by the end of June 1951. The first phase of development had provisions for 23,000 residential sites, with about 70% reserved for private holding.
House types (especially government housing by Fry, Drew, and Jeanneret) were designated by number and type (from Type 14 to Type 1), and the first sector to be developed was Sector 22. Evenson, taking Jane Drew’s lead, criticizes the sector for its apparent lack of coherence. She quotes Fry:

...house design and sector layouts should have been considered as one, but there were not enough houses of any one type to enable us to design complete districts of our own type houses. Inevitably there was a mixing of interests and only an approximation to a comprehensive design was achieved.

(Evenson 47)

Evenson’s bias and training for analyzing a city plan is apparent in her treatment and critique of the sector, as well as in her interest in smaller details that may escape a purely “architectural” agenda. Witness, for example, her interest in chulhas and water closets, as well as her critique of the sectors as lacking any real “focal points for general community interest” (Evenson 68). This critique of the sector continues into the conclusion for the chapter:
For most visitors, the contrast between the architectural quality of the monumental building and that which makes up the bulk of the city is startling, and for many, those with hopes of finding a model city, disillusioning.... The designers of the Capital Project Office headed by Jeanneret appear incapable of producing anything other than augmentation of the established monotony. Far from being a center of creative thought, the project office has dwindled into a typical Indian bureaucratic establishment routinely grinding out its task, and Chandigarh has become merely another government housing project. (Evenson 61)

While Evenson’s depth and breadth of research is comprehensive, Maurice Besset, again, was more circumspect in his critique of the book. While appreciating the scholarship that goes into the chapters on the Capitol and Le Corbusier’s architecture therein, he calls
for a comparative analysis with other contemporaneous examples: the Villas La Roche and Savoye, La Tourette, or the Maisons Jaoul, Shodan and Sarabhai. He also underscores that Evenson steers clear of “succumbing to sentimental sociology” and that she is sufficiently convinced of the “instrinsic virtues of the plan” to conclude that it will overcome any shortcomings in design and execution (Besset 99). Evenson herself was less circumspect than Maurice Besset—though more cautious about Chandigarh itself—in her final verdict at the conclusion of the book:

At present, Chandigarh represents a generous investment of courage and hope, of talent and devoted effort, and it will continue to require such investments. If Chandigarh is to ever become a true city, however, it will be only when its people have given it a history, when it has become free of its planners to acquire a destiny of its own. Ultimately the people of Chandigarh must achieve the city they deserve. (Evenson 102)

It is important to understand the kind of ideological work that Evenson’s Chandigarh is actually doing. It is quite clear that Evenson uses essentialisms that are potentially problematic, but it is also quite apparent that these are inevitable in such a work that inscribes itself within a genre of positivist historical thought. Such essentialisms—in inscribing the Indian state as a homogeneous entity, conflating the political center with people’s intent, and more—are characteristic of Orientalist understandings of the East. Is Evenson’s Chandigarh a fundamentally Orientalist text? I’d argue that this question is wrongly posed. The basis of the Orientalist critique lies on the power of the text, as an ideological deployment, to capture and to consolidate the territory of knowledge, to lay a claim for the superiority of the West not only militarily and economically, but also culturally. The “objective” and “true” text is produced by the West, using Western scientific epistemology as its narrative basis. But this textual production is also designed to be consumed by the West, or at least by a homogeneous identity whose identity is close enough to the author’s to restrict, as far as possible, a multiplicity of meaning. There is no implied Orientalism in this gesture. This does not absolve Evenson of all critique: indeed, her failure to recognize the value of indigenous sources, or at the very least acknowledge this as
one of the limitations of her text, means that she lays claim (tacitly at least) to writing a true, and objective, and thus final, version of the history of the city. Much of this stems from her position within mid-20th century ways of writing architectural history, and the social and political hegemony that modernism claimed at the time.

Conclusion: Location and Canon

Over time, Evenson’s book became a canonical reference for Chandigarh’s architecture and town planning: the first stop for academics from around the world. The main argument of this article is that Evenson’s work is undoubtedly canonic: and yet it is an incomplete architectural and social history. There are missing voices inherent in the work: the Indians displaced by a Western “town planning” project, reportages from the local media, oral histories of the citizens, and so on. If Chandigarh was the project of a postcolonial state that sought to rediscover the sheen of power and identity, then, as a parallel, its canonical representation as evidenced by Evenson’s book is equally complicit in this project of locating Chandigarh within Eurocentric historiography.

2 Much of Evenson’s work inscribes itself within the ways and methodologies of writing art history, with architectural history as a subset. In the 1960s, there was a methodological change in the ways this was done. For an account of Continental institutions and the writing of architectural history, see Barry Bergdoll and Alice Thomine, “Teaching Architectural History in France: A Shifting Institutional Landscape” The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Vol. 61, No. 4. (Dec., 2002), 509-518. Nicholas Adams interprets, in an editorial for the JSAH, the change in architectural history from analogical comparisons with the past to critical commentary on modernist praxis. See Nicholas Adams, “History in the Age of Interpretation” The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Vol. 53, No. 1. (Mar., 1994), 5-6.
References

Resistance, Adaptation, 
and Transformation: 
How Global Forces Shaped 
Religion in South Asia

Koushik Ghosh, Central Washington University 
Dipankar Purkayastha, California State University, Fullerton 
Thomas Tenerelli, Central Washington University

Abstract
When different religious cultures come into contact with one another, adaptation is often the result. This adaptation can be viewed as a response to a perceived threat from an alternative religion trying to “compete” for patrons. That is, this adaptation can be viewed as a “competitive” response to an encroaching religion. Throughout history, trade among countries often provided a context for religious adaptation, and that adaptation helped facilitate trading relationships. This paper provides a theory of such adaptation. The United States can learn from this basic model of adaptation to integrate itself better with an increasingly globalized world.

Introduction
It was a long time ago. DP was waiting for dinner at the dining hall, or the “canteen,” of Jubilee Hall in Delhi, India. Jubilee Hall was the largest postgraduate dormitory of Delhi University, and it housed students specializing in all areas—from Master’s degree students in biochemistry, to PhD students in literature. DP had gone to Jubilee Hall to visit his friend who stayed at the dorm, and who was do-
ing an MA in Economics. Jubilee Hall was full of young energetic students—most of them between twenty-one and twenty-five years old. It was a fun place to be.

As DP and his friend lined up at the dining counter, DP spotted a peculiar man. He was much older than the students around him—probably in his fifties. He was not well shaven, and his graying beard was beginning to form a late evening shadow on his face. He was waiting patiently for his dinner plate. He looked utterly out of place among the younger students. He looked tired. He did not fit in.

“What is the old man doing here?” DP asked his friend. When you are twenty-one years old, a fifty-year-old man looks really old.

“Oh him!” the friend said. “That’s Mr. Vikas. He has been in this hostel for twenty years. He is the oldest student in the hostel!”

“He has been a student for twenty years? What is he studying?” DP asked. It was inconceivable that someone would take so long to complete a doctoral degree.

“His PhD is in Religious Studies,” said DP’s friend.

“Why does it take so long to complete a PhD in Religion?” DP wondered condescendingly. “There is so much religion around in India! What’s the problem?”

“Religion is not the problem,” DP’s friend said. “It’s his topic. For the last twenty years he has been trying to find the influence of Hinduism on Christianity. He hasn’t found much. I guess that’s why it is taking him so long to finish.”

Then the friend thought for a few seconds and said, “He could have finished his dissertation in two months if he wanted to find the influence of Hinduism on Buddhism, or even the influence of Christianity on Hinduism. There’s just no influence of Bishu (Vishnu) on Jishu (Jesus)!”

It is hard not to think sometimes of Mr. Vikas of Jubilee Hall. He must be a really old man by now. Is he still looking for the influence of Hinduism on Christianity, or for that matter, the influence of Hindi literature on English literature? Two of this paper’s authors have been in the United States for more than twenty-five years now. Sometimes they wonder if they are really Mr. Vikases in disguise, waiting for food at a First World Dinner Counter, and hoping to see
any influence of South Asia on this part of the globe.

Within the United States, in places like Hawaii, California, and New York, it is, of course, foolish to deny the influence of South Asia and other non-Western cultures. A large number of non-South Asians, non-Hawaiians, non-Mexicans, and non-Chinese, patronize Indian, Hawaiian, Mexican, and Chinese restaurants. Latin jazz, African beats, and Flamenco music have entered the American mainstream music. If you look carefully, you will find Mexican, African, and Asian motifs in Parisian fashion trends. “Karate Kid” and “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon,” are huge box office hits. America, as they say, is a melting pot.

Most of such “multi-culti” appeals, however, have two distinctions. First, they were introduced by the immigrant population themselves, and have remained somewhat of an exotic interest for mainstream America (think Peoria, Illinois). And second, many believe, although there are exceptions such as Diana Eck who argues for the impact of Hinduism and Buddhism on American religious practice, the influence of Asia and Latin America does not go very far in mainstream American culture. Despite the influence (albeit limited) of Asia on American pop-culture, the “multi-culti” brand never really altered the environment of the “higher” echelons of American culture—in particular, its Biblical religions. Although many mainstream religious groups do have yoga classes, taiji classes, meditation sessions, and so forth, the churches in New England, or in Utah, or in Europe, do not play voodoo-influenced music, nor do they display Taiji tu (ying and yang) symbols on their walls. In Europe, the global influence of Asian religion is even less. Although England and France have significant South Asian immigrant populations, one would be hard-pressed to find Asian influences on different denominations of Christianity in Europe.

A Westerner may dabble in Feng-Shui and yoga. Yes, there is sushi, there is chicken tikka masala, and there is chow-mein. But mostly, Asianization seems to begin and end with food. The way to a Christian’s heart may be through his or her stomach—but samosa never touches his or her Christian soul. The Holy Eucharist still must be practiced with unleavened bread and wine, never with
Religion seems to be an odd and unyielding player in the game of globalization. Religion is largely unaffected by the ethos and obligations that globalization presents to us.

Markets and Morals

One of the reasons for studying religious resistance, adaptation, and transformation is that religion plays a subtle role, but one of the most important roles, in our increasingly globalized world. In a global society where General Electric has thousands of employees in Bangalore, there may not be an overt conflict between Hinduism, and say, Christianity. However, the relationship between the Hindu employees and their Christian bosses is of great concern to the parent company, and to us, the global society’s citizens.

These days, there is a lot of talk about “the clash of civilizations” and “religious identities.” If civilizations clash, and if religious identities encourage mutual hatred, then religious diversity would seem incompatible with globalization. If this incompatibility is a real concern, then, with globalization reaching unprecedented levels, understanding how people of different religions interact seems imperative.

Starting from Max Weber, the relationship between religious ethics and capitalism has been the subject of great interest. If globalization is the latest chapter in matured capitalism, it may be insightful to extend Weber’s analysis to the study of Hindu/Buddhist/Confucian ethics and the spirit of global capitalism.

For several reasons, historical religious interaction along important trade routes provides a great starting point for studying Eastern ethics, global capitalism, and ultimately, religious resistance, adapta-

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1 To a lesser extent, the same is true in English literature. Once again, it is hard to find Asian influences in mainstream British or American literature. Although a handful of authors have received Nobel Prizes in literature outside the Judeo-Christian world, many Americans and Europeans cannot name a single author from Asia, Africa or Latin America. It is hard to make the best seller list if you are not from the West. From Jhumpa Lahiri to Amy Tan, there is of course a large offering of immigrant literature in the United States. But Lahiris and Tans are like Thai and Szechuan restaurants: one wonders whether the flavor of tom-yum-gai remains and whether the fortune cookie crumbles after you have tipped the waitress.
tion, and transformation. First, trade routes were not only a place of common religious interaction, but they were a place where that interaction was often peaceful. Second, trade routes were a place where religious adaptation was typically unfettered, that is, voluntary and not forced. Third, trade routes are a context particularly relevant to globalization.

Understanding religious interaction along trade routes starts with an understanding of the role of religion, ethics, and trust, in trade. Game theory informs us that fairness, trust, reciprocity, and reputation are the essential elements of an efficient market. Historically, successful trading relationships relied on reciprocal trust. But, trust required fairness, and fairness required an understanding of a trading partner's fairness standards. An understanding of fairness standards necessitated an understanding of moral and ethical values. Although it is perfectly plausible to have high morals based on atheism, religion served as the backbone of ethical views. Thus, understanding moral and ethical values in trade-related contracts was greatly facilitated by understanding of religious beliefs (See the figure on the next page).

The history of trade shows that merchants always understood the importance of mutual religious understanding in successful trading relations. Religion and culture were often transmitted by the traders. You have to share meals with other traders before you start trade negotiations. You pay respect to another trader by praising his god. He pays respect to you by praising your god. You pray together and then a deal is made. Global religions thus adapted and adopted in order to gain trust.

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2 See, for example, Durlauf and Blume (2009), which summarizes many of the primary tenets of Game Theory.

3 “It may be said that nearly all the great social institutions have been born in religion.” (Durkheim, 1995, p. 421)

4 Lambert (1975) and Bottero (2001) show that in early Mesopotamia, gods of different cities were related by blood. If a boy loved a girl, but they had different gods, it would be easy to proceed if the boy’s god first proposed to the girl's god. This is not possible between an Abrahamic God and non-Abrahamic gods. Muslim-Hindu marriages are very rare.
Buddhism changed along the Silk Route when it reached the Confucian territory. When Buddhism reached Japan, it brought with it nearly 80 “Tenbu” or Hindu gods and other Hindu mythical celestial creatures. These deities would then protect Japanese Buddhism along with the local Shinto deities. The story of Tenbu is an amazing story of religious adaptation. It shows how Buddhism established legitimacy in a third country (Shinto Japan) by convincing the locals that the gods of another religion (Hinduism) would protect them. Imagine Christians using Bat Mitzvah to spread female empowerment in Muslim societies. It probably would not go very well. But religious adaptation happened a lot in East Asia. Stories of cross-cultural and cross-religious reciprocity were common.

Buddhist traders in India changed Hinduism in profound ways, too. Buddhism softened the Hindu caste structure. Sikh and Jain religions in India influenced, and were influenced by, Hinduism. The oldest son in Punjabi Hindu families would traditionally become Sikh. To understand the new world, old mythologies were mixed, and new mythologies were created. Hindus had to deal with their internal rivalries, too. As Chand Sadagar began his trade in Bengal, upper caste Hindu gods mingled with indigenous local gods. Zoroastrians in South Asia became expert traders and entrepreneurs after they adopted the norms of their new homeland in South Asia.

In other words, various religions offered a Grand Buffet to the people in South Asia. People picked their personal gods and rituals mostly in relative peace, although there were violent exceptions. Buddha became the ninth Avatar in Hinduism, and Jesus became domesticated as Jishu. In spite of some opinions to the contrary, there are numerous cases of Hindu-Muslim religious reciprocities as well. From Salim Chisti, to Sufi saints, to Bahadur Shah Zafar—all were influenced by Hindu customs. Ramakrishna and Dayanand Saraswati were among the first to attempt to start an interfaith dialog in the 19th century.

The point is that throughout South Asian history, as the global community was built, religions were tolerant and accepting of one another. Acceptance, in the long run, often leads to assimilation. South Asia provides a great context for understanding religious resistance, adaptation, and transformation, because Hindu, Buddhist, Islam, and Christian powers have dominated the region for long periods of time. A large number of Hindus now name their babies “Siddharth,” which is a Buddhist name. Hindus regularly pray in Jain temples. Over the course of 2,500 years, people resisted, adapted, and transformed.

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6 For a modern version of the importance of mythologies in South Asian business, see the Ted Talk by Devdutt Pattanaik at http://www.ted.com/talks/devdutt_pattanaik.html.

7 At a basic and popular level, people in South Asia understood the gains from
Unequal Exchange

Over the centuries, compared to South Asia, the United States and its predominantly Christian culture have adapted very little to other societies within the global community. However, it should not come as a surprise to anyone that cultures do not always mix easily, and dominant cultures like that of the United States often adapt much less than their subservient counterparts. Religion is often not the point of contention either.

Mexico and the United States share a common religion, but that does not seem to have helped assimilation in a significant way. When author Octavio Paz visited Southern California in the 1950s, he found an extremely uneasy coexistence between the Mexican immigrants (“Pachucos”) and the local people. Paz writes in *The Labyrinth of Solitude*:

The *pachuco* does not want to become a Mexican again; at the same time he does not want to blend into the life of North America. His whole being is sheer negative impulse, a tangle of contradictions, an enigma. Even his very name is enigmatic: *pachuco*, a word of uncertain derivation, saying nothing and saying everything.... The purpose of ...[his] grotesque dandyism and anarchic behavior is not so much to point out the injustice and incapacity of a society that has failed to assimilate him as it is to demonstrate his personal will to remain different. (14)

globalization. In 1955, Raj Kapoor, a famous Hindu actor in the popular film *Shree 420*, lip-synched a song which was sung by a famous Muslim singer, *Mukesh*:

*Mera Joota hai Japani*
*Yeh Patloon Inglistani*
*Sar pe lal topi Rusi*
*Phir bhi dil hai Hindustani*

My shoes are made in Japan
These trousers are English
The red hat on my head is made in Russia
But even so, my heart is Indian.

Almost every Indian knows by heart, this song which has a very simple message: South Asia was ready for a give and take relationship. It was ready for globalization in 1955.

8 See, for example, Said (1979).
If a Christian Mexican has trouble being accepted in the United States, what is the experience for a Muslim American? If the handful of dominant players in the global village of diverse cultures refuses to compromise, members of non-dominant cultures run the risk of becoming perpetual Pachucos, adapting while resisting at the same time. Silk Route traders would likely view this dominant player “strategy” as being bad for business.

The real challenge of globalization is not that many cultures, religions, and their mythologies must learn to live together. Historically, they have in fact lived together and shared their mythologies in large swaths of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The real challenge, in more recent times, is for cultural exchanges to become more symmetrical and based on equal interactions.

In the United States, Native American and Native Hawaiian religions have receded to the background. In Haiti, indigenous religions have faced great threats. In Nigeria, Islam and Christianity have marginalized the Yoruba religion. Meanwhile, in South Asia, most people have learned to live with profound Western influences. The British introduced tea, cricket, the civil law, the English language, and a host of other seismic changes.

Some scholars have claimed that Hinduism borrowed its concept of monotheism and trinity from Christianity. Although the idea of a “Godhead,” or Brahma, always existed under Hinduism, Christianity may have forced Hinduism to focus less on its “pagan” beliefs, and more on its Brahma-the-Supreme-Creator belief. Hinduism started with the Vedic and Upanishad-based idea of Godhead Niguna Brahma (with the qualities of sat, chit, and ananda: existence, consciousness, and blissfulness). However, before the era of Islam and Christianity, it gradually evolved into Bhakti yoga or the concept of Saguna Brahman, with more “touchy-feely,” homey

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9 The current legislation impacting illegal immigrants in Arizona is the latest case in point.
10 See M.M. Ninan’s The Development of Hinduism where he claims that “If there is any evidence that shows the direct borrowing from Christianity by Hinduism [it] is the concept of trinity and monotheism.” Google Books. 186.
gods who behaved more like humans.\textsuperscript{11} Abrahamic religions forced Hinduism to revert back to the Niguna Brahma phase. The Brahma Samaj and Arya Samaj movements owe a lot to Christianity, which transformed Hinduism toward less idolatry and more Vedic monotheism.\textsuperscript{12}

It is not a stretch of the imagination to come to the conclusion that Christianity even influenced Hindu taboos regarding food. Many Hindus now eat globalized food items: garlic, onions, chicken, pork, and, in rare cases, beef. These were all taboo items before the Christians came to India. But how did British society itself change as a result of their long association with Indian culture? It appears not much.\textsuperscript{13}

So the question is: what explains the one-way influence in cultural and religious interaction? One way to view “unequal exchange” is as a paradigm of dominant cultures versus subservient cultures. But to economists, the dominance-subservience paradigm is an incomplete answer. It does not fully explain religious and cultural unequal exchange within the rational choice framework. We are left asking: what is at the root of the unequal exchange?

\textsuperscript{11} Polynesian societies have gods for every profession: fishing, net-making, house-thatching, medicine, singing, and even hairdressing.

\textsuperscript{12} Between Jnana-yoga, Karma-yoga, and Bhakti-yoga, Hinduism can adapt to monotheism, agnosticism/Deism (“shunyata”), and pantheism quite easily.

\textsuperscript{13} It is hard to see a need for Christianity to adapt to Hinduism given the hegemonic relationship that existed between the Christians and the Hindus in India. William Dalrymple (2006) comments on India in the 1850s: “... all British schools and colleges came to be regarded as covert organs of missionary activity. ...The new attitudes of the Evangelicals were only a part of a more widespread and visibly growing arrogance on the part of the increasingly powerful British.” Dalrymple also quotes Thomas Babington Macaulay’s (Supreme Council of India, 1834 -1838) famous opinion that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” Macaulay was instrumental in destroying the schools in India that taught in local languages, replacing them with English-medium schools that created “Macaulay’s Children,” who would rule India afterwards. The following claim by Macaulay shows that language, Christianity and Western values were part of the same package: “The languages of Western Europe civilized Russia. I cannot doubt that they will do for the Hindoo what they have done for the Tartar” (Dalrymple, 2006, 69). Colonization allows the colonizers to impose a penalty on the native religion of the colonized.
One of the simplest answers has been that cultural or religious domination is the result of military power. The victor of a war enslaves, proselytizes, and dominates. This story does explain adaptation as a rational act—the members of the defeated region choose to adapt (or convert) rather than die. The problem with this story is that it is less effective at explaining adaptation, then conversion, and it does not explain religious and cultural adaptation in the absence of a physical threat. It is true that the imperial power of Ashoka helped the spread of Buddhism, and the imperial power of Constantine helped the spread of Christianity. War, plunder, and royal patronage, may explain a large number of “assimilations,” but that leave a large number of stories unexplained as well.

Why are there so many Christians in Korea? What explains the amazing varieties of Pentecostal Christianity? There were long periods of Indian history when there were no indications of religious violence and forced conversion, despite religious adaptation. How did Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity, Sikhism, Islam, and Hinduism interact during those times? In the world of economics, agents compete for a desired goal. Why can’t we look at religion in the same way? In other words, we need a simple story of religious competition.

The purpose of the next section of this paper is to present a simple analytical model which attempts to shed light on the process of globalization, proselytization, adaptation, and assimilation, as a new “culture” presents itself to an old culture. The model is based on rational choice theory.\footnote{Gary Becker is one of the most outspoken proponents of rational choice theory. See Becker (1976) for some applications of rational choice theory.} Admittedly, the model trivializes some issues relating to religious identity. However, we believe that it addresses some important issues related to unequal exchange in the area of religion.\footnote{Using benefits and costs to explain religion may remind some non-economists of the medieval practice of phlebotomy or blood-letting. Regardless of the disease, the doctors almost always recommended phlebotomy. We admit that if we have a hammer, everything begins to look like nails. Many social scientists and}
better diverse religious experiences of the type seen in South Asia, especially India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

A Simple Model of Power and Patronage
Consider a society consisting of individuals who feel the need to belong to a religion. That is, individuals recognize that there are potential benefits that flow from membership in a religion. We can list a couple of them here. First, a religion may reduce the uncertainty people feel in life. For example, it may offer people answers to questions about the meaning of life, why they were born, what happens after they die, and whether there is an implicit moral code of ethics they and others should follow. Second, a religion may offer salvation, for example, through the promise of an afterlife. Third, a religion may offer social cohesion and stability.

In response to a desire for the benefits that religion can offer, religious institutions enter the “marketplace” to offer a “supply” of religion in an effort to gain “customers.” An obvious imperative for any religious institution (i.e., religion) is to “serve” members of the society by providing the benefits they seek.

Generally, it is not possible for a religion to provide the benefits that its followers seek without imposing some burdens on them. Religion comes at a price—we can name three primary burdens imposed by religions.

First, religions impose financial costs. Many of the services (benefits) offered by religions to their members require financial outlays. Priests are the core of any religion, and they require food, housing, and living expenses. Meeting places and places of worship, whether they are churches, mosques, temples, gurdwaras, or synagogues, incur building and maintenance costs. Costly propaganda material may be necessary both to recruit new members and to promulgate religious norms. Amenities and social services such as charity and education are another expensive component of religious organizations which require financial outlays.

scholars of religion do not agree with economists’ interpretations of religion, but many such concerns may stem from the obscure models that some economists have used.
Second, social cohesion and stability typically require non-negligible *behavioral constraints*. For example, a religion’s belief and rule system will typically impose constraints on behavior. Additionally, a religion may include lifestyle norms. These can infringe on personal choices and preferences, as well as potentially infringing on cultural beliefs and customs.

Third, inculcating beliefs and norms which additionally contribute towards social cohesion and stability often requires burdensome *time commitments*. For example, Christians are expected to go to church weekly; Jews are expected to observe Sabbath; Hindus and Buddhists are expected to follow their periodic rituals.

Therefore, all members of the religious group must accept some constraints, must demonstrate some commitments, and must pay to defray the cost of religious services and religious organizations. Commitments, constraints, and financial costs, or CCC for short, hold a religious club together. These CCC can broadly be thought of and referred to as the costs of religious membership, including both financial and lifestyle costs. They can also be thought of as the “price” of religious membership.

Therefore, insofar as potential religious members are concerned, a religion represents a collection of benefits and costs. The difference between these costs and benefits produces the net gain, or overall appeal, of a religion to an individual: Net Gain = Benefits – Costs. The net gain represents the value that a religion offers a particular, existing or potential, member of that religion. In the absence of competition, the decision to join a religion is determined solely by an individual’s net gain. If an individual’s net gain is positive, it makes sense for that individual to join the religion, because joining represents an improvement in one’s life situation. However, when there are competing religions, the rational choice is to choose the religion that offers the greatest positive net gain, for that religion will yield the greatest improvement in one’s life situation.

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16 Stark and Glock (1968) divide religious commitment into belief, practice, experience, knowledge, and consequences. We have added the pecuniary side.
If we assume that each member of a society is unique, then costs, benefits, and the implied net gain will each be individually determined, and will not necessarily be the same across all members of the society. Thus, for each member of society, we can think of an individual or personal net gain associated with each particular religion. This individual net gain will be based on idiosyncratic factors specific to each member of society. Insofar as opinions differ widely on the perceived benefits and costs of a given religion, the net gain can vary substantially across members of the society.

The above cost-benefit framework helps us to understand the existence of religions and leads us to several observations regarding religious patronage in a society. First, given idiosyncratic preferences, not everyone will actively patronize a given religion. Those who see a positive net gain (positive overall opinion of the religion)—that is, those who gain more than they give up by joining the religion—will find it worthwhile to join the religion. Alternatively, those with a negative net gain will not join the religion. Second, those with the highest net gain from joining a particular religion are the most sincere devotees of this religion. As such, they are quite willing to provide stronger commitments, accept more severe constraints, and/or pay more to patronize the religion. Third, those with the lowest (positive) net gains from the religion, the peripheral members of a religion, are not orthodox followers of the religion. This will often be the group most vulnerable to foreign religious threats.

The above cost-benefit framework also provides a structure for understanding competition for followers among different religions. For the moment, in discussing religious competition, let us ignore forced conversions by either an invading ruler or a local ruler who converts.17 Also, let us focus on analyzing religious competition from the viewpoint of an incumbent religion, that is, a religion currently being practiced within a particular society or region. If the society begins with an incumbent religion, and another religion emerges and attempts to attract adherents, call it the competitor or

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17 Rulers can convert for a variety of reasons, including personal preferences, military alliance purposes, and increased economic / trade opportunities.
invading religion, we do not expect that the incumbent religion will give up its “market share” without a fight.

One way for the incumbent religion to respond to the competitive threat is for it to adapt to the competitive threat. (Although it is possible that a competitor religion simultaneously adapts to the incumbent religion in an attempt to capture market share, our discussion will focus on competition from the perspective of an incumbent religion.) Here, adapting will be interpreted as offering a better religious “deal” by increasing the amount of benefits offered by the religion, or by “charging” a lower price for the religion.

By adapting, a religion has a greater probability of continuing to offer a higher net gain (better overall experience considering both benefits and costs) compared to the “market entrant,” that is, the competitor religion. Note that the greater the net gain the competitor religion offers to adherents of the incumbent religion, the greater the adaptation required by the incumbent religion to maintain its adherents. So, adaptation of a religion entails either increasing the benefits offered to members of the religion, or lowering the costs incurred (price paid) by members of the religion.18

An alternative way of thwarting a competitor’s advance is through resistance. Resistance can take several possible forms. One form is raising the cost to a member of leaving the incumbent religion. A second form of resistance, quite similar to the first, is raising the cost to a member of joining or being a member of a competitor’s religion. Finally, resistance can take the form of preventing the competitor religion from ever “entering the market.”

Ways of increasing the costs of leaving the incumbent religion and/or joining the competitor religion include ostracism and violence against converts, and religious taxes on the competitor religion. For example, it has not been uncommon throughout history for incumbent religions to banish religious converts and to humiliate converts’ families. Here the incumbent religion’s resistance will show up as added costs (CCC) for the competitor religion.

18 “Rice Christianity” is an example of offering religion at a cost.
Completely prohibiting entry of the competitor religion through threats and acts of violence, and/or by law, would perhaps be the most effective strategy to resist competition. However, the incumbent religion may not be in a position to enforce such a policy. Additionally, this type of resistance may go against the doctrine of the incumbent religion, and hence backfire by undermining the incumbent religion’s credibility.

So, for example, when faced with a generous and more liberal Buddhist philosophy, Hinduism changed to maintain its market share. When faced with the liberal social philosophy of the Jesuits right at its doorstep, the Hindu renaissance began. “Reformation” indicates religious reform. It can be the result of the adaptation of a religion to a competitor—a religion relaxing its CCC, and/or increasing it benefits. When adaptation occurs, a religion may begin to look more like the competitor religion in terms of CCC and benefits offered. When religious scholars talk about syncretism, this may not be what they have in mind, but this is one economic interpretation of syncretism.

**Monotheism vs. Polytheism**

A hallmark of religious competition is that both religions change as they interact with each other. Religious practices thus evolve, and often some restrictions are rejected or modified. But this theory does not seem to apply to Abrahamic versus non-Abrahamic religions. For one thing, as Mr. Vikas of Jubilee Hall found out, there was not much influence of Hinduism on Christianity. Although some Eastern Religions resisted, and then adapted, when they came in contact with monotheism, it seems that a fundamental transformation (wholesale conversion) is the historical norm. Monotheism did not adapt much.

The fact that monotheism and polytheism are incompatible, some would argue, would follow from the basic philosophy of each type of religion. A Hindu may not mind, and some Hindus would probably be gleeful about, anointing Jesus as another avatar. However, Christianity will have serious problems in co-opting Lady Durga as a divine colleague of their Christian Lord. Recall the first com-
mandment: Thou Shalt Have No Other gods Before Me. Adaptation seems to be out of the question, and the above analysis seems quite inappropriate for the problem at hand. The “Take it or leave it” feature of monotheism seems in direct contrast with the more syncretic Eastern Religions where Buddhism carried Hindu gods to Japan, and Shintoism adapted to include those Hindu gods.

Some scholars of religion have argued that both Christianity and Islam adapted to polytheistic religions in the initial phases, but hardened their stances as they matured. For example, there is evidence that Christianity co-opted polytheistic features, and even Muhammad may have acknowledged pagan divinity at least on one occasion (the Satanic Verses controversy). However, monotheistic religions appear much less adaptive than polytheistic ones. But why would this be the case?

One reason monotheism is much less adaptive than polytheism is because at the heart of monotheism is the idea of a Supreme God. Why did monotheism evolve to such a rigid doctrine which by its very nature seems vulnerable to polytheistic threats? Abrahamic devotees appear to be saying that you are “either with us, or against us,” which seems to violate the elementary propositions of Diplomacy 101. Why did these religions become so inflexible if the disadvantage of inflexibility, in terms of a reduced ability to respond to new religious market entrants, is so high?

While a lack of flexibility may seem to threaten monotheism, a rigid doctrine is not without its merits. That is, a monotheistic “business strategy” may offer some advantages to a religion. For example, if a religion forces its devotees to believe in one God, it drastically reduces the cost of the religion (the CCC). If a religion can make one size fit all, it can take advantage of economies of scale, and prepare for mass production. If a religion can then build a brand name, and tap into the network externalities, soon it will be a formidable monopoly in a society.

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19 Monotheism is similar to monopoly in economics.
20 See, for example, Hourani (1992).
the "boutique" religions such as Shinto, Yoruba, and localized Hinduism, are expensive because they cater to local society-specific needs. Most gods in polytheistic religions have local roots, and take on local characteristics. It is hard to sell local gods to faraway patrons. If you worship the god of your local forest to impress your local patrons, you likely have to offer considerable privileges to patrons who do not live near your forest. For example, the Bengali god of snakes, Manasa, may not be very popular in Ireland, where apparently there are no indigenous snakes. Because polytheistic religions cater to local needs, local aspirations, and local fears, they are supremely successful in many places. Sometimes localized religious needs are so strong that even Christianity has been forced to localize.21 Pentecostal Christianity is an example.22 Overall though, the lack of local specificity has presented challenges to Christianity for centuries—a white Jesus may not be popular in China or Africa and Jerusalem may seem like an exotic place if you are in Takamatsu. The difference between polytheism and monotheism from this point of view is like the difference between mom-and-pop boutique restaurants and McDonalds. McDonalds may have an upper hand because it produces standardized cheap products, but it does not cook home-made food. Accordingly, it’s less able to cater to specialized tastes. However, monotheism is not necessarily only about lower costs. Monotheistic religions may offer benefits, other than localized attributes, which many polytheistic religions may not be able to offer. For example, a monotheistic religion may offer the ability to become a member of a widely adopted religion, and thus offer the ability to share in that religion’s network externalities. If the benefits of a monotheistic

21 A religious version of “think globally, adapt locally.”
religion are comparable to an incumbent polytheistic religion, and its costs are lower, then when a competitor monotheistic religion emerges, unless there are severe penalties imposed on the converts, the traditional polytheistic religion will likely be displaced. We suspect that this combination of offering different (less localized) but meaningful benefits, and charging a lower price, may have been an important factor behind the success of Christianity and Islam.

Concluding Comments

Religious resistance, adaptation, and transformation seem increasingly relevant in a globalized world where cultural and religious interactions take place at unprecedented levels. We have attempted to use simple economic tools to explain religious resistance, adaptation, and transformation. The theory presented in this paper offers insight into what to expect when cultures and individuals come into contact with one another—cultures and individuals will adapt in an optimal way.

For example, along the Silk Route, traders adapted by understanding and sometimes by converting to their trading partner’s religion. For traders this was optimal due to the trust necessary between traders in a successful trading relationship, the link between trust and an understanding of one’s ethics, and the link between understanding one’s ethics and understanding one’s religion.

The relationship among traders should come as no surprise to those who think that identity is the basis of our interactions. Our identities are contained in the mythologies we accept, and the mythologies often come from our religions. As Amartya Sen (2006) and others have argued, identity may be a fluid concept. Although identity is bigger than religion, religion is an important part of a society’s identity. To understand globalization, we should understand the ethics behind the global markets. To understand the ethics, we should understand the identities and how they were formed.

Perhaps surprisingly, the mutual understanding of religious traders along the Silk Route is in express opposition to what we see among today’s global trading partners. In particular, cultural exchange between South Asia and the United States is extremely one-
sided. This has been a consistent theme for the United States when it comes into contact with foreign cultures. Rarely has the United States had a significant understanding of, significant appreciation of, or prolonged exposure to, an alternative culture or religion. Certainly it hasn’t exhibited anything akin to the cross-cultural exchange seen on the Great Silk Road.

It is not clear why the United States has been able to play such a significant role in the global economy without conceding its unwavering and dominant cultural status. One view is that it is due to changing economic incentives which necessitate a much lower level of cultural and religious understanding than existed along the Silk Route. Perhaps incentives have changed due to a more advanced international legal framework, which now acts as a substitute for trust among trading partners. Or perhaps incentives have changed because of today’s high level of technology, which allows trade to occur without the significant cultural contact which may be necessary to promote adaptation.

However, there is another view—that economic incentives have not changed. Rather, the United States and the West are slow to respond to an increasingly globalized world that requires increased two-way cultural exchange to continue to progress peacefully and successfully. Under this view, since modern globalization is still a young phenomenon, the cultural impacts on the United States are still in their infancy. This view also provides a context for understanding some of the recent trading difficulties that have arisen between the United States and its global trading partners, whether it is melamine in pet food or lead in children’s toys. The stakes are getting higher as the global economy is increasingly intertwined. Under this second view, the United States must adapt through a better engagement with the ethical dimensions of other cultures. Significant investment has been made since 1944 (Bretton Woods) by the United States and post-colonial Western countries in an interconnected global economic system which is intended to benefit all participants as it evolves. However, the benefits of this increasingly globalized economic system will be greatly emaciated without the understanding and adaptation that this paper explores.
This paper has been presented in the context of mostly South Asian societies. South Asia is fertile ground for religious adaptations. Interestingly, in the context of the United States, so is Hawaii. Hawaiian religious identity has been formed by Christianity, Buddhism, Shintoism and other religions. Global forces were at play when Jesus and Buddha competed with Kane (the creator), Ku (god of war), Lono, (god of agriculture and fertility), Kanaloa (god of the ocean), and Pele (the volcano goddess). The global village would be richer if cultural exchanges were more equal, and these mythologies became part of the global cultural order. As the newest phase of globalization evolves, the integration of cultures remains an imminent possibility.

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Visualizing War; Affirming Peace Provisions

Julia Quincy, Harvard Law School

There shall be a perfect, permanent, and universal peace, and a sincere and cordial amity, between the United States of America, on the one part, and the Empire of Japan on the other, and between their people, respectively, without exception of persons of places.

Commodore Matthew C. Perry
United States Navy, 1856

The films studied in the Japanese Law Film Series course at Harvard Law School have astute philosophical relevance to the global context of law. Leaders and citizens are considering accountability to their own constitutions and to those international treaties which connect fellow citizens beyond borders. Japan and America have been exceptionally, inextricably intertwined ever since the Treaty of Amity in 1858.

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2 Narrative of The Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, performed in the years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the command of Commodore M.C. Perry, United States Navy, compiled by Francis L. Hawks, by order of the government of the United States, 1856. Treaty of Amity, First Edition, inscribed “To Townsend Hughes with the kind regards of M.C. Perry, 1856.” As the Treaty of Kanagawa was the first formal instrument of the kind ever negotiated by the Empire of Japan, according to usages of international law, with any Christian nation, it has been thought advisable to preserve a facsimile in this Report of the original document.” Volume 2, page 415.
Today in America, a lens on war in terms of the right to wage war \[\textit{jus ad bellum}\] as well as the limits for acceptable wartime conduct \[\textit{jus in bello}\] has come to the forefront of policy and public debate writ large. In his 2009 Inaugural Address, President Obama called for a “new era of responsibility” as he harkened back to original documents like the Geneva Convention that undergird “sturdy alliances and enduring convictions”: “Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions…. As keepers of this legacy, we’ll work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat…”\(^3\)

In remarks delivered at Hradcany Square in Prague, Czech Republic in 2009, Obama recalled that 20 years ago . . . “the Velvet Revolution taught us many things. It showed us that peaceful protest could shake the foundations of an empire, and expose the emptiness of an ideology. It showed us that small countries can play a pivotal role in world events. . . [a]nd it proved that moral leadership is more powerful than any weapon.”\(^4\) Obama further stated that

\[a]\text{ the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone . . . . I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. . . . The voices and ghosts of 1968 remind us that it was the Czechs who helped bring down a nuclear-armed empire without firing a shot.}\(^5\)

This perspective on revolution along with Japan’s reflection on culture and war enlightens the examination of the three films discussed in this article. Through \textit{The Ballad of Narayama}, \textit{The Burmese Harp} and \textit{The Emperor’s Naked Army Marches On}, these ideas come to life.

In the film \textit{The Ballad of Narayama}, a lens is provided on the intimate values of both a family and a traditional Japanese village set high


\(^5\) See footnote 4.
in the remote mountains where snow is falling. Themes running through the film include the Japanese view of shame and cultural law.

Orin, a family matriarch, describes her husband who has run away because he was depressed. She asks: “Did he think he was the only one suffering? Shame!” Orin is embarrassed by her husband’s behavior “in front of the entire village,” where the system depends on everyone contributing to the whole; by running away, he failed to uphold this cultural norm, and thus he embarrassed his whole family in front of the village. “The law is the law,” uttered Orin. The law to which she refers is a cultural law.

A quality of Japanese uniqueness is the concept of shame as the most significant dynamic in social relations. Within a “shame culture” individuals are controlled by personal honor and reputation. Also within a village culture understood norms exist and are reflected in social attitudes of approval and disapproval: those behaviors which are acceptable and those which are not acceptable. Village culture is marked by the willingness to cooperate and abide by social norms along with the moral judgment that becomes intertwined with those norms. In contrast, anomalous, shameful or free-riding behaviors are choices which evoke sentiments contrary to group cohesiveness.

In addition to Orin’s husband’s desertion, shame is seen in The Ballad of Narayama when the pregnant woman who participated with thieves went to the rice pot without asking permission; thus “eating for two,” as the matriarch whispered, she was shameful and free-riding. Individual greed is not good for the group.

At the extreme other end of the spectrum is Orin’s decision “to go to the mountain,” Narayama, and end her life because famine threatens the village. She meets with the Council of Elders and participates in ceremonial sake sips while outlining her plan for departure. She is told: “It is hard to make the mountain pilgrimage. We appreciate your

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8 Sunstein 945.
9 Sunstein 903.
sacrifice.” Each of these acts is organic to the culture and context and indicative of a determination to control the situation.\textsuperscript{10}

In describing such social norms and social roles, Cass Sunstein opines that “the norm affects the belief, just as the belief affects the norm.”\textsuperscript{11} The elder matriarch was spunky and alert, and remained a capable fisherwoman, yet she felt her chronological age required that she follow the norm of going to the mountain to die. Perhaps to convince her son that her age made her ugly and dispensable, she smashed her teeth. There is a dark side to social controls.\textsuperscript{12}

*The Burmese Harp* is a film that allegorically portrays the indigenization of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.\textsuperscript{13}

In this film, the harp becomes a character, luring the listener, casting a spell. It is given life only when human fingers touch its strings. So too, Article 9 is given life and a constitutional culture that emerges only with the courage to preserve peace.

Carol Gluck describes a genre of August 15\textsuperscript{th} literature.\textsuperscript{14} An abundance of literature written immediately following the war is characterized by determination and optimism. *The Burmese Harp* lures the audience to place Article 9 – like the Burmese ruby of the film – at the centerpiece of this literature.

\textsuperscript{10} Sunstein 903.
\textsuperscript{11} Sunstein 931.
Bowing, and particularly bowing to bones, is a significant metaphor. Prayers of gratitude and gestures of bowing are the subject of postwar debate regarding the Shinto Doctrine.\textsuperscript{15} Yet in \textit{The Burmese Harp}, Mizushina instantaneously genuflexes, bows, and covers his eyes in horror at the sight of a pile of bones. There is urgency. This passionate antiwar gesture brought to mind the Websterian formulation of the use of force in going to war: it is justified by the necessity of self-defense and “should be confined to cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and [without a]... moment for deliberation.”\textsuperscript{16}

Henri Dunant’s horror of war on the battlefield of Solferino\textsuperscript{17} was similar, and as a result the law of geneva was born. Here, in \textit{The Burmese Harp}, Mizushina is told: “The soil of Burma is red. The bones of many foreign soldiers lie unburied,” to which he replies, “It’s a pity!” He bows.

Both scenes transcend national ties; all war death is a pity. To the contemporary eye, the pattern of genocide in Rwanda has elicited graphic horrors of skeletons; yet here, too, Tracy Kidder describes Emmanuel’s yearning to stay with the bones of the dead.\textsuperscript{18} For the Japanese, the complexities of war, grief, and a response to fallen soldiers remain intertwined in the controversy of the Yasukuni Shrine. Other countries empathize.

It was with prescient timing on Veteran’s Day, November 11, 2009, that the film class viewed \textit{The Emperor’s Naked Army Marches On}. In this film, a Japanese veteran of the New Guinea campaign embodies the vicissitudes of psychic damage inflicted by war. He asks “wise”


questions such as “What kind of man is a great man?” dedicates himself to “telling the truth for the sake of the dead,” and admonishes former officers that “the public has to know the truth” about cannibalism versus death for desertion.

Revolved that young people now think that war is “heroic,” the veteran dedicates himself to the ideal: “Everyone has the right to live in peace.” In a final act of self-righteousness, revenge, belligerency and twisted logic, he shoots former Officer Koshimizu’s son. The American tragedy of twisted logic and the massacre at Fort Hood, Texas, makes for eerie relevance.19

The visualization of war in The Emperor’s Naked Army Marches On creates a crescendo of passion for peace affirmation. Nations and civil society are examining the ethics of peacemaking provisions. The law embodied in Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan is supremely situated to serve as a model to the world today. Countries such as Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Bolivia are attempting to abide by such peace provisions.

Katayama Tetsu reported before the Japanese Diet for the Research Commission on the Constitution saying “[t]he renunciation of war is not a clause that was imposed on us, but a great idea that was present as an undercurrent in the hearts of the Japanese people.”20

A global public culture of visionary ideals is gaining momentum as evidenced by tribunals and Article 9 Societies.21 Our shared global context makes discussion of culture, nuclear catastrophe, and norms of leadership salient as never before.

Mayor Akiba Tadotoshi of Hiroshima, speaking before 5,000 attendees of the Peace Memorial Ceremonies in 2009, pointed to the relevance of Article 9: “The essence of this idea [was] embodied in the Japanese Constitution, which is ever more highly esteemed around


20 Final Report, Research Commission on the Constitution, The House of Representatives, Japanese Diet, April 2005, viii. This eight hundred page comprehensive document representing five years of evaluation in considering constitutional revision may be found at New York University Law School Library.
the world.” United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said that building a world without the threat of nuclear weapons was an achievable goal and called on all humanity to do our part in this common journey. “[A]n outpouring of new ideas from civil societies and governments are helping to put the great train of nuclear disarmament on the right track.”22

With sarcastic wisdom, John Dower has observed that the “great legacy” of the Occupation was the Japanese “acquiescence to the American imperium.”23 Now is the era to reverse that momentum. In 2008, then-Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, made the case for “increasing the capacity of America’s civilian tools of statecraft... combin[ing] the tools of ‘intimidation’ with the tools of ‘inspiration,’ also called smart power.”24

Graham Allison has alerted us with a cautionary tale in which brinkmanship evokes a tacit threat, as compared to the “seven yeses” on a road map to prevent nuclear catastrophe, which include global alliances, conducting humble foreign policy, creating intelligence capabilities, and constructing a multilayered defense.25 Restoring America’s basic goodwill and good sense and reputation as reflected in the origi-
nal documents such as the U.S.—Japanese Security Treaty\textsuperscript{26} would find global citizen support.

Nobel Peace Prize 1997 winner, Jody Williams, represents the tip of the iceberg of citizens who are making the time and have the chutzpah to make utopian fantasies of banning a weapon into a campaign which resonates vibrantly.\textsuperscript{27} In May 2008, 10,000 people gathered in Tokyo on behalf of retaining Article 9. It is timely to have this visual expression of the development of Japanese law \textit{vis-à-vis} war, peace, and international leadership.

We live in menacing yet fascinating times. Norms are sculpting new possibilities. The films discussed in this article have raised anew the consciousness of village cohesiveness, a global village, now set on a mountaintop of new horizons. When thousands attend a rally to protest a military base,\textsuperscript{28} it is appropriate to return to the original documents – the Constitution of Japan, specifically Article 9 – and honor the integrity therein.

Article 9 holds sway as the Earth’s most hopeful legal provision for global unity. It is a Treaty of Amity in a league of its own. It stands as a model to be emulated.

\textsuperscript{26} Allison 183.

\textsuperscript{27} Allison 208.

References


Critical and Popular Reception in China of Films on the Nanjing Massacre

Li Pu, Slippery Rock University

Abstract

This paper explores the press discourse and audience reception of three Chinese films about Japanese wartime atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre during World War II, and attempts to provide insight concerning the role of media and popular culture in shaping Chinese perception of Japan. Under the assumption that historical memories of the Japanese invasion of China continue to shape Chinese perceptions of Japan, this paper concludes that films about Japanese war-time atrocities play an important role replicating, perpetuating, and reinforcing negative historical memories of Japan in Chinese society.

Introduction

On May 30, 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao began his three-day official visit in Japan. In an interview with a correspondent from the Japanese public broadcasting organization, NHK, Wen described his trip to Japan as “successful,” saying “it had deepened trust, enhanced cooperation and consolidated the foundation for friendship

\[1\] I thank Dr. George Brown and Dr. William Boggs for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Special thanks to Dr. Jesus Valencia for his help with the statistical analysis in this paper.
between the two countries” (“Chinese Premier,” par. 1). One of the highlights of Wen’s trip was his extemporaneous speech at the welcome dinner hosted by seven Japan-China friendship groups. He emphasized the importance of historical issues in forging China-Japan relations: “We adhere to taking history as a mirror to guide the future. We never mean to continue the hatred but to cherish the hard-won peace and avoid the repeat of historical tragedy” (“Wen Jiabao,” par. 4). This speech evoked immediate responses in China. For example, www.163.com, one of China’s leading popular web portals, has more than 3,300 postings commenting on Wen’s speech. Most of the messages expressed anger about Japan’s unwillingness to apologize to the Chinese for wartime crimes. Messages such as “Forgetting history means betrayal”; “We won’t continue hatred, but we should not forget historical grievances between China and Japan”; and “Japan never relinquishes its ambition to conquer China” are ubiquitous on the website.²

These comments about historical issues between China and Japan illustrate the Chinese anger against Japan. Although almost forty years have passed since China and Japan normalized their diplomatic relations in 1972, anti-Japanese sentiment in China is still strong. It reached its peak in 2005 when massive anti-Japanese demonstrations swept major cities in China that were sparked by Japan’s bid for permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations (He 2007, 2). Why does this negative feeling toward Japan persist?

Scholars studying the vicissitudes of the China-Japan relationship from 1970s to the current time have similar views, namely that Sino-Japanese disputes over wartime history did not emerge until the early 1980s when the Chinese government produced nationalism as the dominant ideology that could counteract the “crisis of faith” in the post-Mao era (Wang 2008, 788). Criticism of Japan’s distortion of history and institutionalization of domestic history education are Chinese government strategies for using history for political purposes (He 2005, 47).

² Comments about Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s Japan trip in May 2010 can be found at: http://news.163.com/10/0531/00/67VJL7DQ000146BD.html.
Today, extensive literature probes issues of reconciliation between China and Japan, including: a textbook controversy in the 1980s concerning Japan’s failure to admit and apologize for its wartime atrocities toward the Chinese people; the Japanese government’s continuing visit to the Shintoist Yasukuni Shrine, which the Chinese see as a symbol of renewed Japanese militarism; East Sea Island sovereignty disputes; Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait issues; and competition for economic and natural resources. Among these contentious issues that confront China and Japan, I argue that historical memories of the Japanese invasion of China continue to generate friction in China-Japan relations.

During the past decades, popular media, in the forms of movies, newspapers, and magazines, were in a position to create an “imagined community” to promote national identity and interests (Anderson 1991). Walter Lippmann (1922), a pioneer in modern American journalism, addressed the “map-making” function of the press in *Public Opinion*. According to Lippmann (1922), people can’t understand the world directly; they rely on journalists’ interpretation of the outside world. In other words, media messages and images build national identities within the nation, and they create common images that nations hold of other nations.

The term nationalism can simply be defined as creation of a sense of belonging to a group of people who share common language, history, philosophy, culture, and religion (Burney 2002, 1). Scholarship on nationalism has noted that nationalism is not only a cultural and sociological product, but it is also ideologically constructed (Hallin 1986, 3-25; Smith 1986). Therefore, the use of popular media to reflect or promote national identities is an effective way to integrate citizens and ensure their loyalty because nationalism is created and replicated through generations via popular culture and other forms of ideological apparatus (Schudson 1996, 141-59).

Images of other nations and the role of mass media have been enduring subjects in the international communication field. Numerous content analyses show public perceptions of foreign countries are usually profoundly influenced by media-disseminated images of other nations (Chang 1993; Gerbner 1991). According to Klu-
ver (2001), the power of media lies in its ability to “create narrative frameworks that influence perception and subsequent responses to issues and events” (par. 5). What is the role of popular media in shaping Chinese popular perceptions of Japan? Have Chinese perceptions of Japan been influenced in part by the portrayal of these war-time atrocities perpetrated by Japanese military forces against Chinese people in feature films shown in China? Do negative images of Japan in China mainly come from the memories of the war, or are the enduring negative images just a product of media manipulation? To answer these questions, this paper examines three Chinese feature films about Japanese war-time atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre during World War II. It focuses on analysis of the discourse in the Chinese press concerning these films as well as audience online discussions about the reception of these films in China.

**Theoretical Framework**

Audience reception studies argue that media discourse may be received and decoded by audiences differently according to their personal background and social situation (McQuail 2000). Hall’s encoding and decoding model gives “theoretical force to the application of reception studies of media culture” (Real 1996, 95). According to Hall (1980), media text is polysemic in that it invites a diversity of appropriations: readings can be “dominant” (producer-intended meaning), “negotiated” (a mixture of acceptance and rejection producer-intended meaning) or “oppositional” (contrary to the producer-intended meaning) (122). In this sense, the meaning of a media text is not determined by the author, but it is the reader who constructs the meaning in the reading of it: “Reading is not the discovery of meaning but the creation of it” (Mailloux 1982, 20). As explained by Jesus Martin-Barbero (1993), “people are capable of decoding and appropriating received messages and are not necessarily duped by them” (225).

Research in reception studies provides substantial evidence that the audiences’ recreation of the encoded message logically implies that they may agree, somewhat agree, or totally disagree with the producer-intended meaning; therefore, the audience cannot com-
pletely be manipulated by “dominant meaning.” According to Hall (1980), there is a struggle between “relative autonomy” and “determinate moments” in reading. Thus, what we called “distortions and misunderstandings” arise “in the lack of equivalence between the two sides of production” (131). For example, after an in-depth study of how television has dramatically influenced and cultivated the cultural and political consciousness of Chinese people in large cities in the late 1980s, Lull (1991) concludes that “television does not just serve the government in China, and the manipulation of program content certainly does not guarantee that the people will interpret messages as they are intended to be understood” (1). Johnson (1993) argues that the growing privatization of everyday life embodied in media consumption is “equated with resistance”; “turned on” and “resistance” resemble Jesus Martin-Barbero’s explanation that “popular culture is a style...a way of living at home, of seeing television, a style of social interchange which becomes a place for technical inventiveness and moral resistance” (276). For example, “a wide range of humor and laughter, not only for entertainment and pleasure but also as expressions of opposition and challenges to the seriousness and well-structured value systems of the official world, are included in the obscure peasant mythologies” (Martin-Barbero 1993, 67).

Through the discussion of the similarities and differences between press discourse and public reception of the three versions of the Nanjing Massacre, this article provides an intriguing and interesting case study of how Chinese audiences understand, respond to, and criticize the film’s dominant hegemony.

Methodology

This study mainly employs textual analysis and content analysis. I look at newspapers’ and magazines’ coverage and commentary on three selected feature films about the Nanjing Massacre, including film reviews and letters to the editors. I also look at articles about the reception of the films posted on Internet BBS forums. Anonymous posting is the primary method of online communication in China, and anonymity is helpful to promote freedom of expression in this country because certain statements and opinions are taboo in public discourse. For example, anonymous communication is important for online discussions in China involving exposure of power abuse of the Chinese Communist Party, discussion of political pluralism, and human rights issues. Anonymity allows users to express their opinions candidly. Yang (2003) finds that the rise of the Internet discussion forum has facilitated the establishment of China’s public sphere for public debate and problem articulation. Without anonymity, these discussions could result in loss of employment or even legal action (454).

Data for these hypotheses were gathered through conducting a search on all articles posted on two major online communities for the Nanjing Massacre film reviews, including movie.douban.com (豆瓣电影) and tieba.baidu.com (百度贴吧). The search yielded 910 comments for two films: Massacre in Nanjing (屠杀血证) and Don’t Cry, Nanjing (南京1937). The film reviews about City of Life and Death (南京！南京！) are too numerous—126,932 messages posted on both sites—and almost impossible to code completely for the scope of this study. Therefore, the first 500 online postings regarding the film City of Life and Death were content-analyzed.

In terms of textual analysis, I examine the meaning of the content in press discourse and audience reviews of the selected films. Connell and Mills (1985) argue that textual analysis doesn’t simply analyze the “immanent structures” of the text; instead it emphasizes that text construction is a process of “objective production of social meaning” (41). That means text is “an element of in the currency of hegemony” (Connell & Mills 1985, 41). The meaning of text is clarified by analyzing the symbolic words, metaphors, and analogies
of the content because symbols carry unique and necessary information in the text (Grossberg, Wartella & Whitney 1998).

Empirically, I test the hypotheses by coding the key words of online postings. The unit of analysis is each message. A total of 1,539 messages concerning audience reception of the three films were analyzed for content. Based on the assumption that most feature films made in China about the Japanese war time atrocities, especially the Nanjing Massacre during World War II, have reinforced the negative memories within China, the following hypotheses are formulated:

**Hypothesis 1**

Viewers show anti-Japan sentiment after they watched the feature films about the Nanjing Massacre.

Hypothesis 1 analyzes the symbolic terms used in postings. These postings are grouped into three categories. (a) Yes. When a message contained demonizing phrases to portray Japanese, or supported anti-Japan protest in China, or called for rejection of Japanese products, or used unfavorable terms, such as “brutal,” “unfriendly,” “hostile,” “violent,” “inhuman,” “murderous,” and “cruel” to portray Japan’s image, it was classified into “yes” category. (b) Neutral. When a posting presented an anti-war viewpoint, not an anti-Japan viewpoint, or a posting criticized extreme anti-Japan sentiment in China, it was classified into “neutral” category. (c) No. When a message contained favorable terms, such as “rich,” “strong,” “modern,” “industrialized,” or “technologically advanced” to portray Japan, or presented a view that China should develop a friendly diplomatic relationship with Japan, it was classified into “no” category.

**Hypothesis 2**

Viewers reflect Chinese nationalism after they watched the feature films about the Nanjing Massacre.

Hypothesis 2 measures the frequencies of symbolic terms used in messages which reflect Chinese patriotism. These postings are grouped into three categories. (a) Yes. When a message contained symbolic terms such as “revive China,” “overcome the country’s hundreds of years of humiliation,” or “never forget about the history,” it
was classified into “yes” category. (b) Neutral. When a posting conveyed a message that criticized extreme Chinese nationalism, it was classified into “neutral” category. (c) No. When a message criticized the Chinese government for exploiting historical issues to legitimize its authority, or complained about China’s foreign policy against Japan, it was classified into the “no” category.

Hypothesis 3

Viewers are critical of Japan’s wartime atrocities and its unwillingness to apologize for its crimes in World War II after they watched the feature films about the Nanjing Massacre.

Hypothesis 3 also measures the frequency of symbolic terms used in messages. These postings are grouped into two categories. (a) Critical. The critical category includes postings that censured Japan’s wartime atrocities, or Japan’s unwillingness to apologize for its crime in World War II, or criticized Japan’s distortion of World War II history. (b) Neutral. The neutral category includes postings which presented an anti-war viewpoint, but not one that specifically criticized the Japanese army’s wartime atrocities. (c) Non-critical. The non-critical category includes postings which present a viewpoint that Chinese should forgive history, or presented a viewpoint that Chinese should have a more objective attitude toward the Sino-Japan war.

Anti-Japanese Films in China

Before the 1980s, the dominant themes of Chinese anti-Japanese films were the condemnation of Japanese evils and the rousing of national spirits to fight against the Japanese. Most of the anti-Japanese films, especially those produced in the 1950s and 1960s, such as Little Solider Zhang (小兵张嘎), Railroad Guerrillas (铁道游击队), and Land Mine Warfare (地道战), were artistically impoverished propaganda films. The plots of these anti-Japanese films were similar: short, foolish, and ugly Japanese soldiers were defeated easily by Communist Party-led Chinese people. The Communist Party was the only resistance force against Japanese invaders, while Chiang Kai-shek and his national government were traitors who pursued a
non-resistance policy towards Japan and even “actively collaborated with the Japanese aggressors” in order to suppress Communism (He 2007, 41).

Anti-Japanese films after the 1980s are significantly different from earlier versions in two ways: first, films began to emphasize the Nationalist Party’s positive role in fighting against the Japanese. For example, *the Bloody Battle of Ta’ierzhuang* (血战台儿庄), *the Lugou Bridge Incident* (卢沟桥事变), and *Don’t Cry, Nanjing* (南京1937), depicted vividly the heroic defense of the Nationalist generals and soldiers in major Chinese battlefields. Second, recurring themes of conventional anti-Japanese films, such as patriotism, determination, and indomitable spirits were supplanted by humanitarian examinations of human nature during wartime, the suffering of war, and the human relationship between Chinese and Japanese during the war. In *Evening Bell* (晚钟), the first Chinese film to win the *Berlin International Film Festival Silver Bear Award*, the anti-Japanese theme is secondary to the question of the nature of the war. *Devils on the Doorstep* (鬼子来了) premiered at the 2000 Cannes Film Festival and is still being banned by the Chinese Film Bureau for its controversial representations of Chinese villagers as fools and cowards when they deal with Japanese captives. *The Purple Sunset* (紫日), set in a remote village occupied by Japanese during World War II, is not anti-Japanese, but shows how war destroys human trust. It was reported by *Daily Yomiuri* that a Chinese film production company planned to make a movie based on a book by popular Chinese novelist Liu Zhenyun, *Remembering 1942*, which portrays Japanese soldiers in a very positive way in that they helped to save Chinese villagers from starvation. However, the Chinese government didn’t approve the film’s production.⁴

**Film Versions of the Nanjing Massacre and Press Discourse**

On December 13, 1937, Japanese troops occupied China’s capital city Nanjing. For the next six weeks Japanese army conducted a mass slaughter of Chinese civilians. The Chinese government estimated

300,000 victims of the Nanjing Massacre, but Japan complained that China has sought to intensify Japan’s guilt by inflating the numbers of victims (Kristof 1998, 39). Debate over the precise number of casualties continues today, but traumatic experiences caused by Japanese imperialists still remain inconsolable for most Chinese today.

However, the cinematic representation of the Nanjing Massacre has been very limited during the past years. There was no feature film reflecting the Massacre until 1987, fifty years following the incident, when the first feature film *Massacre in Nanjing* (屠城血证) was produced (Berry 2008, 124). One explanation could be during the period of 1950s through the early 1980s, anti-Japanese was not a dominant political agenda in China (He 2005; Wang 2008). Fried- man (2008) observes that China under Mao Zedong’s rule (1949-1976) “courted Japan as a partner against the U.S.S.R.” (390), so anti-Japanese nationalism almost disappeared during Mao’s era. By 2009, the Chinese had made several feature films about the Nanjing Massacre including *Massacre in Nanjing* (1987; 屠城血证), *Don’t Cry, Nanjing* (1997; 南京1937), *Black Sun: The Nanjing Massacre* (1997; 黑太阳:南京大屠杀), *Black Sun: Unit 731* (黑太阳: 731), and *The City of Life and Death* (2009; 南京!). There are a number of documentary films that address the Nanjing Massacre as well, but it is the feature films that have reached the largest Chinese audience. Although the anti-Japanese films concentrate less on battle scenes and demonic portrayals of Japanese after the 1980s, films about atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese against Chinese people, such as the Nanjing Massacre and biological experiments, still focus on graphic depictions of carnage and the brutality of Japanese aggressors. While Japanese soldiers have been less stereotyped, the common plots of these films—that the Japanese tortured, raped, and butchered thousands of Chinese—have not changed. These films continue to provoke strong negative emotional responses against Japan. The following section overviews the major feature films concerning the Nanjing Massacre and describes press discourse about these films.

*Massacre in Nanjing* (1987) was directed by Luo Guanqun (罗冠群) from the Nanjing Film Studio and was shown nation-
wide the next year. Zhan Tao, a Chinese doctor, initially had naïve thoughts that there would be a peaceful solution to the war. Japanese troops would act in accordance with international law and would not attack refugees at the International Safety Zone. He even persuaded the Nationalist soldiers to throw away their weapons. However, the Japanese not only massacred all unarmed refugees, but also forced Zhan Tao to observe his colleague, the nurse Bai Yan, being raped by the soldiers. Zhan Tao then abandoned all his original peaceful hopes about the war and joined the fighting against Japanese forces. In a battle to protect the photograph that demonstrated Japanese army’s barbaric holocaust in Nanjing, Zhan Tao sacrificed himself.

In an article published in 1988, the film director acknowledged that his trip to the Nanjing Massacre Memorial inspired him to make a film about this holocaust (Luo 1988, 48-50).

Every time I visit the Nanjing Massacre Memorial, when I see those horrible photos, written documents and even human skeletons, I can’t control my anger toward Japanese imperialists. As a Chinese filmmaker, especially a filmmaker from Nanjing, I have the responsibility to tell Chinese and our future generations about this stunning human extermination....This film is about war and peace, death and life, humanity and barbarity. I hope after audiences watch this film, they will know a simple truth: a weak country will be humiliated!

Most of the reviews and comments in newspapers and magazines on Massacre in Nanjing were positive, focusing on its historical significance as the first film in the fifty years to condemn Japanese war crimes. One article published in Film World, titled “Alarm Bell Ringing Loudly,” noted that Massacre in Nanjing broke new ground in Chinese film history by showing the national humiliations that China has suffered in the recent 150 years (Q. Yu 1988, 33-34). In another article in Film Art, the author saluted the film director (M. Yu 1988, 32):

The Nanjing Massacre is one of the most brutal war crimes in human history, but for some reason, it is almost unnoticed around the world. I will show my sincerest respect to the director for his bravery in making such a groundbreaking movie: the Japanese armies’ cruelty and brutality were finally exposed on the screen.
There was some slight criticism about the film from an artistic perspective, for example, the camera work, the lighting, and the plot structure.

The film received strong public responses after its release. It was seen by 1.4 million people in the first month, and it is the first Chinese film being translated into Japanese: “I want those Japanese to feel remorseful when they watch the film,” said the director Luo in an interview (“Interview,” par. 3).

In 1997, to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, two other films were produced: *Don’t Cry, Nanjing* by Wu Ziniu (吴子牛) and *Black Sun: The Nanjing Massacre* by a Hong Kong filmmaker, T. F. Mu (牟敦芾). Director Mu was born in Mainland China, raised in Taiwan, and started his career as film director in Hong Kong. However, his film version of the Nanjing Massacre was not shown to the public in Mainland China, as it was labeled “too bloody and violent” by the Film Bureau.

*Don’t Cry Nanjing* was underwritten by a Taiwanese company and the major cast and crew came from Taiwan and Japan. The film follows suit with Wu’s earlier war films and is based on a Japanese woman’s experience in the war. The family of a Chinese doctor, Cheng Xian, returned to Nanjing after the Japanese invaded Shanghai. His friends and neighbors did not want to offer any help because he had married a Japanese woman. Cheng Xian took his family to the International Safety Zone protected by British and American forces. He thought it would be a safe place. At the Safety Zone, his wife was attacked by Chinese refugees because of her Japanese nationality.

Wu is labeled a fifth generation film director in China, led by China’s most celebrated film directors, Zhang Yimou (张艺谋) and Chen Kaige (陈凯歌). Wu’s specialty is war films. Unlike many war film directors, Wu has no interest in showing spectacular battle scenes; he insists on probing human nature in war time. This is best exemplified in his film *Evening Bell* (1989), a film set in the context of anti-Japanese war. Despite the glamour of being chosen the best film at the *Berlin International Film Festival*, the audience did not buy it: the film had a very poor box office profile (Shu 2010).
Being a famous film director in China, Wu’s *Don’t Cry Nanjing* attracted considerable publicity. Even before Wu actually started to shoot the film, there were several reports about his dedication to this film: “I won’t produce anymore film if I cannot make this one good,” Wu told the press, and he had his hair cut to show his determination (“Brief Introduction,” par. 5). Similarly, Wu also mentioned his outrage over Japanese troops when he read the historical document and interviewed survivors of the Nanjing massacre (“About Film,” par. 2).

I cry every time I read historical documents about the Nanjing Massacre. I started shooting this film in August, the hottest and most humid month in Nanjing, and finished in deep winter at Changbai Mountain of Northeast China. The temperature is around – 40 C. I have never made a film in such extreme weather conditions. Whenever I think of those 300,000 Chinese victims, I am full of bravery. I should make this film to recount the truth of history.

The press discourse about *Don’t Cry Nanjing* was mostly positive in terms of its artistic quality and humanistic approach to representing the war. Many of the reviews compared Wu’s film with Spielberg’s *Schindler’s List* (1994). To many of the Chinese reviewers, *Schindler’s List* is a masterpiece of war film. Even Wu acknowledged that he was inspired by Spielberg’s work (Tan 1995, 10-12):

When I went to Germany for the Berlin International Film Festival in 1989, I had a chance to read some historical documents about the Nazi’s concentration camp for Jewish people during the World War II. I was shocked. Schindler’s list finally inspired me to make a film about the Chinese holocaust—the Nanjing Massacre, which is almost forgotten by many people of the world, but is one of the most horrible human exterminations in world history…. I do not mean to generate hatred between the Chinese and the Japanese. There are some things more valuable than hatred and resentment. I just want to tell my audience that war should be banned. Human love and friendship will transcend national boundaries.

*The City of Life and Death* (2009), directed by Lu Chuan, is the most recent Chinese made film about the Nanjing Massacre. Lu is considered “one of the most talented young film directors in China” (Wong 2009). His first two movies, *The Missing Gun* (2002) (寻枪) and *KekeXili* (2004) (可可西里), are widely acclaimed and set him apart from mainstream propaganda filmmakers. Unlike other
Chinese film directors who make anti-Japanese movies, Lu’s intention is not to teach the Japanese a lesson, but to “to make something powerful.” In an interview with the Chinese mainstream news organization, *Xinhua News*, Lu said he “studied in Nanjing and spent almost four years researching the script: outside China, nobody really knows this tragedy, so it was a dream for me to make this movie,” said Lu (“City,” par. 1). In another interview with the *New York Times*, Lu Chuan talked about his initial idea for this film: “I wanted to make something violent. And I wanted to analyze the relationship between man and the battlefield” (Wong 2009).

The film was shot in black and white, starting with a thirty-minute length of graphic images of battle scenes, raping, decapitating, and mass execution, recounting Japanese soldiers’ sustained atrocities against the defenseless Chinese civilians. These images are described by film critics as “some of the most harrowing images ever committed to film” (Vijin 2010). In interviews, Lu and his cast members expressed their depression during filming. For example, actress Gao Yuanyuan, who played a school teacher in the film, told CCTV that she “even thought about no longer living during the filming” (“Lu,” par. 5).

The film recounts atrocities through the eyes of both victims and perpetrators. An idealistic Japanese soldier, Kadokawa, came to occupied Nanjing filled with naive thoughts. Immediately, his ideals are broken when he witnesses the brutality of his fellows. On the Chinese side is Lu, a leader of Chinese guerrilla fighters, and Miss Jiang, a courageous teacher. Tang starts out as a selfish person who only cares about his own life, but at the end of the film he becomes a hero. The movie also depicts Westerners’ efforts to help the Chinese, such as those of John Rabe, who saves many Chinese civilians by hiding them in the International Safety Zone.

*City of Life and Death* received enormous audience attention. It is reported that the film’s first month release grossed over $23.7 million (“City”, par. 1). Reviews in international film festivals, such as Cannes and Toronto, were extremely positive for this film: Alan Bacchus (2009) wrote in *Daily Film Dose* that “Lu Chuan’s massive dramatic recounting of the atrocious Nanking massacre will prob-
ably become a new benchmark in historical cinema” (par. 1). Todd McCarthy (2009), writing in *Variety*, called it “one of the most powerful in a long time... an epic look at the Rape of Nanking in 1937” (par. 7). Similarly, film critic Betsy Sharkey (2009), writing in the *Los Angeles Times*, claimed the film is “truly a masterpiece in black and white and bound to be among the foreign films that will be headed to the Academy Awards” (par. 3). At the Seventeenth Hamptons International Film Festival, reviewers wrote: “This visually arresting realist masterpiece offers a genuine, affecting portrait of humanity in war” (“Hamptons” 2009).

The unanimous positive reception of *City of Life and Death* in international press lies in its balanced and sensitive representation of both victims and villains: the sympathetic portrayal of Kadokawa’s eventual suicide conveys a compelling message that both Chinese and Japanese were caught up in the tragedy of the war. This is a very brave choice for Lu in a film reflecting the national trauma, and it also has generated a lot of controversy in China. It is reported that Lu Chuan received death threats for an “alleged ‘sympathetic’ angle on the Imperial Army” (“City,” par. 5). In an interview with a *New York Times* reporter, Lu recalled the exact words of death threat email: “You are a traitor. I want to kill you (by dismemberment)” (Wong 2009, par.3).

**Textual Analysis of Audience Reception**

Chinese press coverage of the films (especially the film *City of Life and Death*) provides considerably different discourse from the national audience reception. This difference can be understood by Stuart Hall’s encoding and decoding model which observes that there is always a distance between the producers suggested meaning and the audience’s interpretation.

The textual analysis of Internet postings about the three film versions of the Nanjing Massacre reveals an interesting pattern of reception: Luo’s *Massacre in Nanjing* (1987) received unitary interpretation, while Wu’s *Don’t Cry Nanjing* (1997) and Lu’s the *City of Life and Death* (2009) invite multiple interpretations. There are three dominant themes regarding audience reception of the films:
First, they vehemently attack Japanese troops’ brutality during the Second Sino-Japanese war. The majority of postings are filled with demonizing phrases to portray Japanese; for example, one posting uses “blood-thirsty monsters” to label Japanese. Second is the theme of strong criticism toward the Japanese government’s denial of its wartime history. One posting wrote:

The Japanese never feel guilty for what they did to Chinese, Korean, Indonesian, and other Asian people. It’s appalling that there are people in Japan who deny that anything bad happened in Nanjing.5

Third is a strong expression of nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment. These postings include: “Revitalize China to overcome its century of humiliation”; “Be watchful of Japan. It now launches the third attack on China by using its economic power.” Some participants call for a boycott of Japanese merchandise in China.

Wu’s Don’t Cry Nanjing receives pervasive press coverage in China, but the positive audience response to the film is not as strong as the press response. The majority of the Chinese audience is not in favor of the plot structure of the film: the Nanjing Massacre was described by a Japanese woman: her experience of the tragedy is the main plot of the film. One posting wrote:

Don’t Cry Nanjing is just the director’s view about the Nanjing Massacre, but the majority of Chinese audiences, especially those who remember the national trauma well, are not willing to accept the director’s nuanced portrayal of the aggressors. The film received generally negative reviews from the public.6

Lu Chuan’s The City of Life and Death provokes an incensed and divided audience reaction in China. Some viewers say that the film has broken new ground by depicting the Sino-Japanese war in a more humanistic way: “The film does not seek to demonize the Japanese, and in fact portrays one particular soldier sympathetically....

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6 “Audience can’t agree with the director’s approach.” This posting is available at http://yule.sohu.com/20050829/n226810265.shtml. Accessed (June 24 2010).
This was a welcome attempt not to paint them as pure Evil.” However, numerous Chinese audiences express their discomfort with the storyline and sympathetic angle on the Japanese soldier’s sufferings in the war. These expressions reflect many of the Chinese audience’s points of view:

The crimes of the Japanese were much worse (than those shown in the movie). I especially cannot accept the image of Kadokawa. — 87-year-old Nanjing citizen Zhang Zhenqing. 8

Perhaps Lu Chuan is too young to understand our feelings. — Survivor of the massacre. 9

I agree that families of the Japanese soldiers suffered from the war and they were also victims. But as for the Japanese soldiers, they were not. They were the perpetrators. 10 —scholar

Lu’s film offers an excuse to Japanese for their wartime atrocities. I really want to ask Lu Chuan: was your hometown being occupied by the Japanese? What do you want to tell us at the end of the film? 11 —audience

Does your film represent historical truth that Japanese soldiers are human beings of conscience? Were they “forced” to slaughter Chinese? 12 —audience

Resistance to the dominant interpretations of the City of Life and Death is readily apparent. One posting titled “Don’t Use Hatred as Diplomatic Tool” criticizes that history is used by the Chinese government to take advantage of Japan in international affairs. It differed considerably from the majority of Chinese audience responses:

After I watched the Nanjing Massacre and Tokyo Trial, I began to hate Japanese. Sometimes I feel I am indoctrinated by the media. Many of those

7 For example, see “Film review of the City of Life and Death.” Available at http://tieba.baidu.com/p/574500608. Accessed (June 24 2010).
9 Same as above.
10 Same as above.
who hate Japanese did not visit the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall. Some of the photos about the Japanese slaughtering Chinese are fake....When a friendly Sino-Japanese relationship is necessary, the Nanjing Massacre is ignored; when China has disputes with Japan over the East Sea, textbooks become an issue.... In China, history is a political tool. Japan used to help China in history, and the two countries share similar philosophy and cultural backgrounds. There is no inextricable hatred between Chinese and Japanese. It is the war that is brutal, not Japanese.13

Content Analysis of Audience Reception

The content analysis of audience reception of three Nanjing Massacre films begins with the coding of symbolic terms in the online postings. It should be noted that some of the postings are aesthetic comments about the film, for example, regarding the lighting, the directing, the music, the storyline, and so forth. These comments are not included in this study. Only comments about Japan’s image, Japan’s attitude toward wartime atrocities, and Chinese nationalism or anti-Japan sentiment are coded.

The author designed a coding sheet to record each occurrence of symbolic terms. Before the actual coding process, an inter-coder reliability check was done to test the workability. A total of 26 stories were selected, 16 (45 paragraphs) came from www.tieba.baidu.com, and 10 (22 paragraphs) came from www.douban.com. The two coders coded the same stories for the test.

For the symbolic terms used to describe Japan’s image, both coders agreed on 42 out of 45 paragraphs; for criticism of Japan’s wartime atrocities and unwillingness to apologize for its crime in World War II, both coders agreed on 12 out of 13 paragraphs; for the symbolic terms containing anti-Japan sentiment or Chinese nationalism, both coders agreed on 29 out of 31 paragraphs. The percent of agreement between the two coders in the study was 93%, 92% and 94%. A 92% level of agreement is satisfactory according to researchers (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico 1998).

Results of Keyword Coding

Anti-Japan sentiment, Hypothesis 1: Viewers showed anti-Japan sentiment after they watched the feature films about the Nanjing Massacre.

A total of 911 messages concerning popular attitudes in China toward Japan were coded according to three categories—yes, no and neutral. Table 1 summarizes the results:

Table 1 Responses Showing Anti-Japan Sentiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Japan Sentiment</th>
<th>Baidu.com</th>
<th>Douban.com</th>
<th>Weighted Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \Pi \leq 0.5, Z \text{ value } = 26.86, P \text{ value } = 0.0000 \) (Ho : Prob (yes) \leq 0.5. H1: Prob (yes) > 0.5

As seen Table 1, 95% of the items portrayed Japan as “brutal,” “violent,” or “inhuman”; or expressed disappointment about the Chinese government’s tolerant attitude toward Japan; or supported boycotting Japanese merchandise or a nationwide anti-Japan protest. Only 3% of the items acknowledged Japan’s economic power or admired Japan’s achievements after World War II. Using the classical 95% level of confidence, I can say that I am 95% confident that the percentage saying “yes” is greater than or equal to 93.26%. These findings revealed that Japan’s image was negative in the articles and that the majority of Chinese hold this view after they watched the films.

Chinese Nationalism, Hypothesis 2: Viewers show Chinese nationalism after they watched the feature films about the Nanjing Massacre. 469 messages concerning Chinese nationalism were coded. Table 2 presents the details of the coding results:
Table 2 Responses Using Symbolic Terms to Express Chinese Nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Nationalism</th>
<th>Baidu.com</th>
<th>Douban.com</th>
<th>Weighted Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=458  N=11  N=469

Π ≤ 0.5, Z value = 24.87, P value =0.0000 (Ho : Prob (yes) ≤ 0.5. H1: Prob (yes) > 0.5

Table 2 shows that Chinese nationalism is a dominant theme in public discourse on Nanjing Massacre. 95% of selected items called for “reviving China” to “wipe away national humiliation,” while only 2% and 2.5% of the postings remained neutral in tone or criticized extremist nationalism. Results from the statistic test shows that I am 95% confident that the percent demonstrating nationalism is greater than or equal to 89.06%.

Criticism of Japan’s atrocities and unwillingness to apologize for its WWII crime, Hypothesis 3: Viewers were critical of Japan’s wartime atrocities and its unwillingness to apologize for its crime in World War II after they watched the feature films about the Nanjing Massacre. 159 messages concerning attitudes toward Japan’s wartime atrocities and unwillingness to apologize for its crime were coded according to two categories—critical and non-critical. Table 3 summarizes the results.

Table 3 reveals that I am 95% confident that the percentage critical of Japan’s atrocities and its unwillingness to apologize is greater than or equal to 70.34%. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is supported.

Discussion and Conclusion

Despite the sharing of common cultural and philosophical roots between China and Japan, Japan is a country which experiences its lowest popularity in China. Scholars from international relations disciplines argue that rapprochement between China and Japan in
the 1970s shifted toward a tendency of dispute, mistrust and even confrontation. Japanese imperialist history, the most controversial issue and one which has long existed between the two countries, has become more obtrusive and contentious in recent years (Hagstrom 2008; Roy 2005; Kazuko 2007). For example, the 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in China shows that “positive ratings for Japan are scarce” (16). This was amply demonstrated in China’s nationwide anti-Japanese protests in the 2000s.

This paper has attempted to provide insight concerning the role of media and popular culture in shaping Chinese perception of Japan. Under the assumption that historical memories of the Japanese invasion of China continue to shape Chinese perceptions of Japan, and that Chinese films about Japanese war-time atrocities play an important role replicating, perpetuating and reinforcing the negative historical memories of Japan in Chinese society, this paper has explored the press discourse and audience reception of three Chinese Nanjing Massacre films.

During the past decades, scholarship from reception studies, such as Stuart Hall, Peter Dahlgren, Stanley Fish, and John Fiske has offered compelling evidence that media texts are polysemic and invite diverse audience reinterpretations. The textual analysis of the film reviews and audience reception of three Chinese Nanjing Massacre films hints at the fact that negative images of Japan in China are
pervasive and may have turned into radical nationalism. Examples can be found in those messages that either demonized Japanese as “barbarians,” “dwarf pirates,” or “bloody monsters,” or simply displayed anti-Japan hatred. However, there are “negotiated” and “oppositional” readings, too. This is particularly evident in the audience reception of The City of Life and Death. A small number of messages expressed concerns that historical issues or memories were being distorted or manipulated for the government’s propaganda purposes.

Findings from content analyses of audience reception of three films about the Nanjing Massacre suggest that Chinese audiences show Chinese nationalism or anti-Japan sentiment and are critical of Japanese’ wartime atrocities after they watch films about the Nanjing Massacre, and thus the findings provide support for the hypotheses presented here. Therefore, it can be concluded that Chinese movies about Japanese wartime atrocities are ultimately a reinforcement of the negative attitudes of Chinese against Japanese.

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Imagery and Interiority of the “Real” Chinese: A Feminist Postcolonial Reading of Eileen Chang’s “Love in a Fallen City”

Bi-ling Chen, University of Central Arkansas

Abstract

Although “Love in a Fallen City,” the title story of a collection of Chang’s short fiction, has received much critical attention since its publication in 1943, Chang’s critique of British colonialism and contemplation upon its repercussions has not been systematically examined. Nor has any scholar explored the images related to Peking opera, the Great Wall, and ancient Chinese rituals and legends that the author appropriates to accentuate the dire need of the heroine, Bai Liusu, for self-reinvention and the vain search of the Chinese-Englishman, Fan Liuyuan, for an ideal China through her. Drawing upon Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s feminist theory of palimpsest and parody, as well as upon Homi Bhabha’s postcolonial concept of hybridity and Edward Said’s Orientalism, this essay aims to investigate how Chang employs culturally specific Chinese images to delineate her protagonists’ interiority and negotiate their identities.

Ever since C. T. Hsia revived Eileen Chang’s literary reputation in his A History of Modern Chinese Fiction (1961), her writings have been steadily translated into English. “Love in a Fallen City,” the title story of a collection of her short fiction and her most popular and arguably finest work, is included in the second edition of Norton Anthology of World Literature (2002)—a canonical college-
level textbook for general education—thus solidifying the author’s position in global literary studies.¹ Among scholars of Chang’s work after Hsia, Leo Ou-fan Lee and Rey Chow are the most influential. Approaching Chang’s aesthetics and world views respectively from the angle of a cultural historian and that of a literary feminist, both critics agree that, besides her sensuous rhetoric and intricate narrative style, what distinguishes Chang from the May Fourth writers is her disinterest in confronting politics and her obsession with the private desires of ordinary folks.²

While duly drawing our attention to Chang’s dexterity in amalgamating Chinese cultural elements with Western modernist techniques to express a state of mind, Lee and Chow have somehow obscured the fact that, although in Chang’s fiction political turmoil mostly recedes to the background, its impact on her characters’ sense of self and destiny has never been a minor theme. In his investigation of “Love in a Fallen City,” Leo Lee ignores the double cultural ambivalence endured by the Chinese-Englishman Fan Liuyuan, denouncing him as a mere “playboy with no sense of culture or history” (1999, 296). Fan’s endeavor to acculturate and recite Chinese poems is hence “out of sync with his character.” Intrigued but confounded by Chang’s frequently “unexpected flights into imagery and metaphor” (285), Lee claims that they are trivial digressions occasionally revealing Chang’s philosophy of life, but oftentimes “no more than a display of wit such as is also found in Somerset Maugham, P.G. Wodehouse, Aldous Huxley, and other English writers whom Chang admired.” Rey Chow, applying Naomi Schor’s theory in Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine (1987), defends Chang’s tendency to juxtapose imagery and metaphor that are seemingly irrelevant to one other. The “sensuous, trivial, and superfluous textual pres-

¹ All the quotes from “Love in a Fallen City” in this essay are from Karen Kingsbury’s English translation in the second edition of The Norton Anthology of World Literature (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), 2737-70.

ences” form an “ambiguous relation with some larger ‘vision’ such as reform and revolution, which seeks to subordinate them but which is displaced by their surprising return” (1991, 85). The subversive viewpoint of this critical method could help shed some light on the character of the heroine, Bai Liusu, in “Love in a Fallen City,” and on the political/social/cultural significance embedded in its recurring images and allusions; for example, Peking Opera, mosquito incense, the grey retaining wall at the Repulse Bay, classical Chinese poems and legends. But Chow is keener on allocating Chang into the sheer feminine and private realm in order to contrast her literary merits with those of her militant, ideologically clear and “correct” colleagues. Thus, it is “The Golden Cangue”—a brilliant but claustrophobic domestic tale—that receives Chow’s examination.

Chang’s critique of British colonialism and its repercussions in the lives of the Chinese, be they native-born or foreign-grown, female or male, traditional or modern, looms subtly but ineradically behind the love story of Bai and Fan. To understand better how the author manipulates the above-mentioned images to indicate Bai’s potential for self-reinvention and Fan’s internal struggle with his cross-cultural identity, a feminist reading of “Love in a Fallen City” is called for. Since Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s theory of palimpsest and parody overlaps but exceeds the scope of Schor’s aesthetics of the feminine detail, this essay will use the duo’s theory to explore Bai’s multi-layered operatic persona and consciousness. On the other hand, Homi Bhabha’s concept of hybridity and Edward Said’s Orientalism offer us keys to the Chinese Complex experienced by Fan—specifically, his preoccupation with authentic Chinese-ness and ensuing unconscious colonization of Bai as his ideal China.

In the second chapter of their ground-breaking book *The Madwoman in the Attic*, “Infection in the Sentence: The Woman Writer and the Anxiety of Authorship” (1979, 45-92), Gibert and Gubar argue that the female perspective in women’s writings always looks a little “odd” when evaluated by the standards of patriarchal poetics. “Dis-eased and infected by the sentences of patriarchy,” (71) such authors as Jane Austen, Emily Dickinson, and H.D. notwithstand-
ing managed to “transcend their anxiety of authorship by revising male genres, using them to record their own dreams and their own stories in disguise” (73). The strategies of palimpsest and parody afford them the means to work within the male literary tradition but at the same time to stray from it. The surface devices of their works “conceal or obscure deeper, less accessible (and less socially acceptable) level[s] of meaning,” creating a sense of “duality and duplicity that necessitates the generation of such doubles as monster characters who shadow angelic authors and mad anti-heroines who complicate the lives of sane heroines” (79-80).

Eileen Chang, though a Chinese woman writing in the mid-twentieth century, employs strategies similar to those of her nineteen-century British and American counterparts to overcome her patriarchal society’s restrictions. The fact that she names her first collection of short stories chuanqi (legend)—a genre historically dominated by male writers—suggests her ambition to update the literary form, to work inside as well as outside Chinese tradition, and to add a female outlook to the field. Appropriating three major female dans (role types) from Peking opera to portray Bai—qui yi (blue robe), hua dan (flower dan), and dao ma dan (martial dan)—Chang subverts the rule that every opera singer is supposed to play only the role type for which she is specifically trained.3 While identifying Bai with Chinese “legendary beauties who fell cities and kingdoms” (2769), the author, nevertheless, reverses the usual notion of femme fatale, making her heroine an accidental beneficiary rather than a fatal cause of the battle between Britain and Japan in Hong Kong. Even such a trivial gesture as lighting a stick of mosquito incense is made pregnant with Bai’s silent prayer for the extinction of her adversarial family members, violating the feminine virtues preached in Confucian teaching, as a “madwoman” would do.

3 Renowned opera singer May Lan-feng, whose artistry Chang admired, invented a fourth female role type, hua shen, (flower shirt), by combining the traits of the aforementioned role types, to enrich new characters he portrayed. Chang’s characterization of Bai might have been inspired by May.
Immediately in the beginning of the story, the reader sees Peking opera, a dramatic and musical genre with an ingrained formula, being transformed into a parodic metaphor for Chinese life in the 1940s, when all successful performers not only have to sing in tune and follow the beat but also improvise according to the demand of circumstances. The Bai household “couldn’t keep up with the huqin of life” (2737); hence, Fourth Master is unable to play out a happy melody; instead, his huqin wails, “pouring out a tale desolate beyond words.” Chang’s omniscient narrator, however, suggests that not everyone in this family has to be trapped in the outdated way of living. Life could be resumed and turned into a comedy: “A huqin story should be performed by a radiant entertainer, two long streaks of rouge pointing to her fine, jade-like nose as she sings, as she smiles, covering her mouth with her sleeves....” (2737). In other words, Bai Liusu, a twenty-eight-year-old divorcee no longer welcome to stay under her brothers’ roof after they squandered all her money on the stock market, cannot afford to live the rest of her life passively. She should start to exercise the skills of a “radiant entertainer” that have been dormant in her, attentive to every note she sings and meticulous about every dance step she takes, appearing to be free of such conscious calculation by smiling charmingly without letting her teeth show.

This demure yet flirtatious and potentially lethal image contains all the characteristics of a blue robe dan, a flower dan, and a martial dan. A blue cloth dan, due to her noble background, conducts herself with dignity and reserve; her hand gestures and foot-steps are refined, and her pensive looks are punctuated by her downcast head and eyes. But a flower dan is usually a maid, characterized by her penchant for fun, her lively physical movement, her wit and brio. A martial dan is a woman warrior, carrying more dignified manners than a flower dan but a less reserved temperament than a blue robe. Bai, with a status as a declined aristocrat and a habit to “bow her head” (2746, 2749, 2754, 2769), resembles a blue cloth dan forced by her ill fate to wrap a piece of blue cloth around her head (as a sign of poverty and modesty) while traveling to find a solution for her financial predicament. Nonetheless, Bai is also a flower dan, pos-
sessing a gift for dance and repartee that is bound to flourish when meeting its match in Fan’s skills. That she fights, while maintaining a classy demeanor, psychological battles with this whimsical suitor plus her unsupportive family, demonstrates her qualifications as a martial dan.4

Only by blending wisely these contradictory role types would Liusu have a chance to survive in a rapidly changing China. The task certainly won’t be easy. In the scene where the heroine examines herself in front of a dressing-mirror, Chang captures the fluctuating mental process through which Bai comes to realize her ability to maneuver among blue robe dan, flower dan, and martial dan:

She turned on the lamp, set it next to the dressing-mirror, and studied her reflection. Good enough: she wasn’t too old yet. She had the kind of slender figure that doesn’t show age—a waist forever thin, and a budding, girlish bosom.... Her cheeks had once been round, but now had grown thinner, making her small face even smaller and more attractive. She had a fairly narrow face, but her eyes—clear and lively, slightly coquettish eyes—were set wide apart.

Out on the balcony, Fourth Master started playing huqin again. Following the undulating tune, Liusu’s head tilted to one side, and her hands and eyes started to gesture subtly. As she performed in the mirror, the huqin no longer sounded like a huqin, but like strings and flutes intoning a solemn court dance. She stepped toward the right a few paces, then turned again to the left. Her steps seemed to trace the lost rhythms of an ancient melody. Suddenly, she smiled—a private, malevolent smile—and the music came to a discordant halt. Outside, the huqin still played, but it was telling tales of fealty and filial piety, chastity, and righteousness: distant tales that had nothing to do with her. (2743)

The mirror in which Liusu measures her self-worth is obviously tinged with Chinese patriarchal values. Beauty and youth being the only capital she owns now, she knows poignantly that, given their fleeting nature, these qualities have to be cashed in quickly. Just when the flower dan in her is ready to step out, her old upbringing intrudes. The moralistic tales of her fourth brother’s huqin music

4 For details about the traits of each role type, see Wichman-Walczak, Elizabeth, “Beijing Opera Plays and Performance” in Chinese Aesthetics and Literature, ed. Corinne H. Dale (Albany: SUNY, 2004), 129-52.
manage to subdue the coquettishness of her eyes and restrict the vi-
brant movement of which her supple physique is capable. The longer
she follows his tune, the more serious her expression becomes, so
much so that Liusu even imagines herself to be dancing in an impe-
rial ceremony of ancestor worship, accompanied by such majestic
musical instruments as strings and flutes, rather than by a huqin,
an instrument that ancient Confucian elites considered vulgar.  
By replacing the mundane (though virtuous) huqin melody with a
piece of regal/celestial music whose correct rhythms have long been
forgotten, Liusu almost entombs herself with all the deceased Bais,
whose fate she vowed to avoid just a few minutes earlier. But this
passage of Liusu’s bad faith—a fragmentary passage written in the
Western modernist style of stream of consciousness while detailed
with Chinese cultural imagery—turns out to be a parody of outdat-
ed temple rituals and numerous Peking operas in which blue robe
dans are protagonists. For, instead of dwelling upon those righteous
tales, Liusu suddenly smiles to herself duplicitously, as if realizing
that focusing on the blue robe dan will not lead her anywhere in
real life.

The significance of Liusu’s sudden “private, malevolent smile”
becomes clearer if we take a look at the literary sources from which
Chang draws but which she revises to distinguish her heroine’s char-
acter. Among legendary beauties who caused cities and kingdoms
to fall figuratively or literally, Madame Li of the Han Dynasty (206
BCE–220 CE) and Yang Guifei of the Tang Dynasty (618–908
CE) were especially known for their singing, dancing, and alluring
smiles. The poem about Madam Li’s beauty, written and sung by her
court musician brother, Li Yennien, in Emperor Han Wu’s banquet,
is a direct inspiration for the title of Chang’s story:

5 Confucius considered music a demonstration of virtue and objected to using
it as entertainment. He insisted that a ruler should have the right kind of music,
Yayue (elegant proper music), performed in the court. Sheng, xiao, and strings were
proper musical instruments used in state sacrificial ceremonies. One of the reasons
why the Zhou dynasty collapsed, according to Confucius, was because rulers at dif-
ferent ranks stepped out of the boundaries of rites and performed vulgar music.
For details, see Frederick Lau, “Music and Ideology” in Music in China (New York:
In the north of the country,
There lives a beauty,
Dazzling the living, the dead, and those yet to be born.
Her first smile at you would shatter your city walls,
And her second smile at you would dissolve your kingdom.
Do you know that crumpled city walls and collapsed kingdoms can be re-built,
But that a beautiful woman as such cannot be found again once you lose
her?6

Sister Li was summoned to become Emperor Han Wu’s “radiant entertainer” and eventually received a promotion from a maid to a Lady. In the first half of her life Yang Guifei enjoyed a similar fortune to that of Madame Li, but Emperor Tang Ming’s angry subjects demanded her execution when the kingdom failed to withstand foreign attacks. A famous Tang poem lamenting the beauty’s ill fate, “The Song of Everlasting Sorrow,” by Bai Chu Yi, has two much quoted lines about her smile: “A smile from you cast a hundred tons of charisma,/ paling the beauty of other ladies-in-waiting.”

These women’s stories have been burnt in the Chinese memory, and a popular Peking opera, “Guifei Drunken with Wine,” is, in particular, a showcase piece for singers specializing in the flower dan. Accordingly, it is safe to say that when Bai lapses into the moralistic tales of the blue robe dan, her flower dan predecessors come to her “rescue,” helping her realize that she would rather dance their kind of dance to win the favor of a king than perform a sacrificial rite to appease the dead. Not incidentally, this scene happens right before the matchmaking party for her half-sister Baolou, in which Liusu acts like a flower dan, casting a spell on Fan with her sex appeal and dancing expertise. Nevertheless, Chang is not content with making her heroine an heir of Madame Li and Yang Guifei. In contrast to their male authors’ emphasis on Li’s and Yang’s charismatic smiles in public, Chang highlights Bai’s wicked smile in private, preparing the reader for her unleashing of the martial dan within..

6 The English translation of this poem, and of the lines from “The Song of Everlasting Sorrow,” is mine.
The little triumph Liu Su rips from the matchmaking party teaches her that, in order to thrive rather than just survive, she should exercise her combat ability more. The rasping criticisms of her “shameless” conduct from her sisters-in-law fail to drive her to tears as they used to; instead, they reinforce her fighting spirit:

Liu Su squatted in the dark and lit a stick of mosquito incense. She had heard every word that was spoken out on the balcony, but this time she was perfectly calm. She struck the match and watched it burn, the little three-cornered pennant of flaming red flickering in its own draft, coming closer and closer toward her fingers. A little puff of the lips, and she blew it out, leaving only the glowing red pennant-pole. Then the pole twisted and shrank, curling into the grey shape of a fiend. She tossed the dead match into the incense burner. (2746)

In her article “The Departure and Return of a Damsel in Distress,” Mei Jaling briefly remarks that the whole passage smells like a bomb, and that Bai’s gestures signify “her declaration of war” (178). I would further argue that the “little three-cornered pennant” on the top of the burning match symbolizes a red war flag, and the lit-up mosquito incense functions as ceremonial incense that would carry Bai’s silent supplication to heaven. Hopefully, the deity of Justice would help her extinguish the larger and more annoying pests—her family, all of whom want her to obey the Confucian “law of family relations” and return as a widow to her late former husband’s household (2738). So determined to counterattack is the besieged heroine that she would throw herself and her enemies near the fire, risking being burned with them. But instead of allowing herself to become a victim of the patriarchal code of honor (as Yang Guifei did), Liu Su would retreat in time to save herself while leaving her disintegrated evil relatives in the cinerarium. The symbolic meanings of these images are brought into further relief in the scene of Bai’s final victory: “Liu Su crouched in the lamplight, lighting mosquito incense. When she thought of Fourth Mistress, she smiled” (2769). “Liu Su did not feel that her place in history was anything remarkable. She

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7 The translation of the title of and quote from Mei Jialing’s Chinese essay is mine. For details, see “Feng Huo Jia Jen De Chu Tsou Yue Hue Gue” in Yuedu Zhang Ailing, ed. Yang Tse (Gueling: Guangxi Normal UP, 2003) 172-87.
just stood up smiling, and kicked the pan of mosquito-incense under the table.” Since the biggest mosquito (her fourth sister-in-law) has already been expelled (she decided to follow Liusu’s example and divorce her good-for-nothing husband), this time the mosquito (ceremonial) incense is lit up to thank, rather than beg, heaven. As the burner (cinerarium) is no longer needed to contain the pest’s ashes, Bai naturally kicks the entire gear out of her sight. In so envisioning and executing this scene, the heroine adds the martial dan to her repertoire.

But which role does Fan think Bai plays when he says: “[Y]ou’re like someone from another world. Y ou have all these little gestures, and a romantic aura, very much like a Peking opera singer” (2756)? His rhetoric suggests an ethereal blue robe dan. Just as his previous statement that “[r]eal Chinese women are the most beautiful women in the world” and “never out of fashion” ignores the individuality of each Chinese woman and changing times (2751), this generalized comparison of Bai to a Peking opera singer obscures the respective traits of martial dan, flower dan, and blue cloth dan, all of which Bai embodies. Not that Fan is unable to appreciate Bai’s feisty side or is unaware of her calculating tendency; in fact, he quite enjoys her smart retorts and spares none of his arrows at female gold-diggers, of whom she is certainly one. But he has to compartmentalize her multiplicity and accentuate her disadvantageous circumstances so that he can play the role of a savior. “When I first met you in Shanghai, I thought that if you could get away from those people in your family, maybe you could be more natural. So I waited and waited till you came to Hong Kong.... Now I want to bring you to Malaya, to the forest of primitive people” (2756). Such an attempt to make Liusu purer by removing her from the China that has disappointed him is of the same nature as his urge to change her style in clothing, both of which contradict his earlier remark: “I don’t want you to change. It’s not easy to find a real Chinese girl like you” (2751). A forever elusive “real Chinese girl” who incarnates an equally intangible ideal China lies at the core of the Chinese Englishman’s inconsistency and frustration, all of which is a typical symptom of colonial hybridity, with its roots in British Orientalism.
Hybridity according to Homi Bhabha is the situation in which individuals or groups straddle more than one culture as a result of colonialism. Through colonial education, the colonized are bound to feel affinity for the values of their colonizers while simultaneously being torn by those of their native culture. In his essay “Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche, and the Colonial Condition,” Bhabha states: “The access to the image of identity [for the colonized] is only ever possible...through the principle of displacement and differentiation (absence/presence, representation/repetition) that always renders it a liminal reality” (1994, 118). Born in England of Chinese origins in 1909, when the hysteria of the Yellow Peril and the stereotype of Fu Manchu were prevalent, Fan grew up with his parents’ romanticized tales about China and thus imagined this country which he had yet to set foot on as his true homeland. Yet, because of his formal English schooling, his vicarious alliance with Chinese culture cannot escape a constant competition with the official ideology of white supremacy. His social image and sense of self indeed become “a liminal reality,” oscillating between that of a minority member/second-class citizen/colonized other, and of a wealthy, well-educated gentleman wearing a white mask over his yellow skin. Neither identity is able to register a full presence or absence of his existence.

When Fan finally visits China, his hybridity, his sense of displacement and difference in England, rather than disappearing, repeats itself, only with a slight twist. To the native Chinese, because he runs a multi-national business and carries airs of English modernity, he shares with the British in Shanghai and Hong Kong the status of colonizers. On the other hand, his limited experience living in China reduces him to the colonized status of an overseas Chinese lacking authentic local cultural currency. Fan’s insecurity about his Chinese-ness drives him to acculturate, attending Peking opera performances, memorizing classical sayings and poems, and more importantly, to find a “real Chinese girl” to fall in love with. But the sense of inadequacy embedded in his Chinese Complex is actually intertwined with a sense of superiority fed by what Edward Said famously names Orientalism—a set of skewed views about non-whites invented by white men to justify their colonization of the East. Being a product
of English education, Fan judges China and Bai according to a West-
erner’s civilizing mission and binary perception of the world. The
beautiful motherland from a distance becomes an ugly old hag in
person, from whose claws the tainted but intrinsically good Chinese
girl needs to be liberated and then reformed.

One major image that Chang employs to historicize Fan’s col-
onizing/colonized self, his persistent pursuit of an ideal China
through Bai, is the grey brick retaining wall at the Repulse Bay:

The wall was cool and rough, the color of death. Pressed against that wall,
her face bloomed with the opposite hues: red lips, shining eyes—a face of
flesh and blood, alive with thought and feeling.

“I don’t know why,” said Liuyuan, looking at her, “but this wall makes me
think of the old sayings about the end of the world. Someday, when hu-
man civilization has been completely destroyed, when everything is burnt,
burst, utterly collapsed and ruined, maybe this wall will still be here. If, at
that time, we can meet at this wall, then maybe, Liusu, you will honestly
care about me, and I will honestly care about you.” (2753)

To understand why the usually playful suitor suddenly takes on such
a depressive tone and bestows so much significance upon a piece of
retaining wall, we need to take a glimpse at the history of the Re-
pulse Bay first. Although the Chinese have always called this area
“Shallow Water Bay,” the British named it after HMS Repulse, the
first official British ship stationed in Hong Kong. Before its arrival,
however, other British merchant ships had already used Repulse Bay
as a base to smuggle opium to China. During the First Opium War
(1839-42), pirates of all nationalities, including Chinese, invaded
the bay area and took it as their post as well; all of them were even-
tually repulsed by the British Fleet. True to the spirit of colonizers’
cartography—charting, mapping, renaming, so as to transform
and control the territory they grabbed from other countries—the
English name of the bay, Repulse, was reconfirmed, and the place
was developed into a beach in 1910, while its namesake hotel was
built in 1920. Along with the artificially extended beach came the
extended retaining wall.8

8 For details of the history of Hong Kong, see Nigel Cameron, An Illustrated
Reminiscent of past and present Anglo-Chinese tensions, this site must arouse in Fan much ambivalence about both countries. The psychological force of the pull is such that the retaining wall, built to prevent erosion from the sea, becomes, in his hyperbolic vision, a formidable fortress shaded with war casualties. The old phrase, *di lao tien huan* (earth decrepit, sky deserted; that is, the end of the world), of which the wall-turned-fortress reminds him, is arguably an allusion to a well-known legend of endless love: “Meng Jianhu Wailed and Felled the Great Wall.” Politically, the Great Wall, expanded throughout different Chinese dynasties to ward off foreign invasions, is a symbol of national strength. The part of Fan that is resentful of the position of Colonial Other to which England subjects him could be regretting China’s present state and wondering whether it will survive World War II just as the Great Wall did various foreign attacks. Culturally, the story of Meng’s search for her husband Won Shiliang stands for wifely devotion. By Fan’s own previous admission, “a foreigner who’s become Chinese also becomes reactionary, even more reactionary than an old-fashioned scholar from the last dynasty” (2751). The ideal China in which he would like to live is, in other words, a country maintaining its past glories, a country where the Great Wall can withhold global chaos, whose collapse, if it happens, should be caused by the tears of such virtuous women as Meng Jiangnu rather than the smiles of a *femme fatale* like Yang Guifei. Although in his emotional outburst Fan sounds as if he has given up such a hope, the way he interacts with Bai suggests otherwise. If he has no control over world affairs, he can still try to control her, shaping her into his ideal colony. Consciously done or not, “wall-her-in” in various forms is exactly the strategy to which he resorts.

In depicting the development of their romance, Chang shows the intersection between colonial and patriarchal domination: circumscribing the subaltern not only politically but also psychologically. Fan’s Orientalist mystification of Bai parallels his androcentric

mistrust of her sex appeal, which in turn erodes her self-confidence. With his financial and social power, he lures her to Hong Kong, enjoys her colorful personality and lively company, but makes sure she understands that he won’t settle with a social butterfly. When she dances with other men he cuts in but denies his possessiveness: “Most men like to lead a woman astray...and reform her till she’s good. I don’t go around making so much work for myself. I think the important thing, for a good woman, is steady honesty” (2751). What underscores this statement is his dichotomous view of the female sex: good versus bad. Although Liusu sees through his hypocrisy and self-righteousness, he manages to leave her unsure about which category of women he puts her into: “I promise to treat you the way you should be treated” (2752). Since he behaves inconsistently, acting like a gentleman towards her when they are alone, yet like a playboy when other people are around, Bai, besides worrying about how he would judge her character, feels “very edgy, fearing that he would suddenly drop the pretence and launch a surprise attack” (2756). Chang, without making any authorial comments, vividly depicts her heroine’s paranoia in the sunbathing scene. Bai keeps naming the sand flies mosquitoes even after Fan explains their differences. If we connect this seemingly inconsequential detail with the mosquito incense scene in Shanghai, it becomes clear that deep down she is afraid that this gentleman could suddenly turn as pesky as her family, biting her witless. Their playful gesture of slapping each other’s back to kill the insects actually makes our feisty “martial dan” very nervous; whether he intentionally or accidentally touches her too intimately, her dread of being seen as a “bad woman” causes her to take offense and leave the beach abruptly. If she pretended that nothing had happened, he might advance further, felling her wall of self-protection.

In his psychological warfare with Bai, Fan has his share of erecting a mental wall, symbolized by the physical wall between their respective hotel rooms. Through the Chinese Englishman’s misquote of a poem from The Book of Songs, Chang subtly attributes his need to play the upper hand and his inability to express love to Bai’s face to his fragmented identity as a colonizer and colonized. During his
phone call to her, he cites the following poetic lines: “Life, death, separation—with thee there is happiness; thy hand in mine, we will grow old together” (2759). The correct version of the second line should be: “here is my promise to thee.” Although Fan has no doubt that Bai makes him happy, he is still too confused about who he is to make a commitment. Bai is not particularly literary, yet by listening to his interpretation of the poem, which reiterates the idea of the limitation of human agency in the midst of World War II, she understands his “I love you” will not lead to “will you marry me?” With a conventionally feminine mindset, Bai firmly believes that “spiritual love always leads to marriage” (2754). Without hearing a marriage proposal, the enraged heroine chooses to answer the dodger with his own rhetoric of indirectness: “Why else did I come to Hong Kong?” “If you really love me, why worry if I do?” (2759). Chang leaves her readers to discover for themselves that the speaker of the quoted poem, “Beating the Drum,” is a married soldier whose fate as a prisoner of war causes him to lament his failure in keeping the promise he made to his wife. By contrast, Fan, a free man with various women within his reach and inherited money at his disposal, is using life’s unpredictability as an excuse for his non-commitment. A huge blind spot in Fan is that he cannot accept Bai’s limitations while expecting her to accept his: “I don’t understand myself, but I want you to understand me” (2754). It has never occurred to him that by withholding a marriage from her, he is forcing Bai, a product of feudal upbringing, to become independent, and that such an accomplishment requires several years of modern education; moreover, an independent woman does not exactly fit into his ideal of “a real Chinese girl.” The Orientalist’s split personality is at its full display when he conveniently uses Mary Wollstonecraft’s feminist

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9 It is unfortunate that Karen Kingsbury, probably assuming that Chang was the one who had a slip of mind, corrects Fan’s misquote in her revised translation of this story when it was published with others of Chang’s stories also translated by her. See Love in a Fallen City (New York: NYRB Classics, 2006), 149. Chang knew the poem by heart, which is evident in her correct citation of the poem in her essay, “Writing of One’s Own” in Written on Water, trans. Andrew Jones (New York: Columbia UP, 2007), 15-22.
statement to insinuate that Liu is a whore in the making: “Basically you think that marriage is long-term prostitution.”

If a woman who has sex with a man to whom she lacks deep emotional attachment while receiving his legal financial support in exchange is a whore, then what is a woman who has physical and financial relationships with a man without receiving from him a lawful contract as long-term protection? A mistress—a stupid whore? Fan might not seriously think Bai would become the former in the event of their marriage, but after their quarrel he does take advantage of every opportunity to turn her into the latter. When strangers mistake them for a married couple, he says: “Don’t worry about those who call you ‘Mrs. Fan.’ But those who call you ‘Miss Bai’—what must they think?” “Since that’s what people think anyway, why not do it?” (2760). Although Bai refuses to give in and returns to Shanghai, she really has no alternative except to become his mistress when he sends for her a few months later. Going home empty-handed makes her Hong Kong adventure “whoredom twice over” in her family’s eyes (2761). But the “rescuer” is no less cruel than her family: the day after their consummation of love he announces his departure for England for a year! Doubtlessly, the virtue of his “real Chinese girl” will be truly tested during this period. Chang delicately parallels Fan with the British troops who bring in prostitutes while looting houses. They leave behind them “dirty marks,” “the scent of cheap perfume.” “It seemed that they had left in a hurry. The poor local looters had not been here; if they had, these things would not have been here” (2767). Since this after-bombing scene is depicted from Bai’s viewpoint, it indicates that their burgeoning mutual appreciation has not eradicated her residual feeling of having been treated like a cheap whore. In her injured heart and warped perception, poor local people, even when they steal, would still behave more decently than the wealthy and the powerful.

The fact that Fan returned to Bai in the midst of bombing proves that he does care about her and love her sincerely. His mental wall collapses as his character passes the test. The grey retaining wall at the Repulse Bay which he endowed with an apocalyptic significance now ceases to mean anything to him. His colonial/patriarchal in-
scription on Bai’s psyche runs deeper though; the wall still haunts her, as if their love continues to rely on its survival. Through Liusu’s nightmare, Chang portrays how her heroine struggles to realize that the marks she can make in Fan’s life are not limited to the fingerprints on the wall of their house, against which she, like a madwoman in the attic (to borrow the title of Gilbert and Gubar’s influential book), pressed hysterically after she saw him off at the harbor. Echoing the scene of Liusu’s first awakening, in which she decides to play more roles than a blue robe dan, Chang blends antique Chinese cultural elements with the Western modernist technique of stream of consciousness to portray her heroine’s nightmarish second awakening, thereby accentuating the difficult and elusive process of self-growth in the era when tradition and modernity, East and West, collide on a larger-than-life scale:

Then, at night, there were no lights, no sounds of people in that dead city; there was only the strong winter wind, wailing on and on in three long tones—oooh, aaah, eeei. When it stopped there, it started up there, like three grey dragons flying side by side in a straight line, long bodies trailing on and on, tails never coming into sight. Oooh, aaah, eeei—wailing until even the sky dragons had gone, and there was only a stream of empty air, a bridge of emptiness that crossed into the dark, crossed into the void of voids. Here, everything had ended. There were only some broken bits of leveled wall and stumbling and fumbling about, a civilized man who had lost his memory; he seemed to be searching for something, but there was nothing left.

Liusu sat up hugging her quilt and listening to the mournful wind. She was sure that the grey brick wall near Repulse Bay was still standing straight and tall. The wind stopped there, like three grey dragons coiling up on top of the wall, the moonlight glinting off their silver scales. She seemed to return in a dream, back to the base of that wall, where she met Liuyuan, finally and truly met him. (2768)

Together with the wall, the oooh, aaah, eeei sounds and the three grey dragons not only help to connect Bai’s past, present, and future, but also transform her into an emblem of everyman—more specifically, every Chinese—looking for lost traditions and new directions in the ruins of human civilization. Chang suggestively compares the oooh, aaah, eeei sounds of the winter wind to three musical scales (the “three long tones” in Kingsbury’s English translation of the sto-
ry). In Bai’s dreamy, subconscious attempt to recall how she arrived at the scene of the collapsed wall, the oooh, aaah, eeei could sound to her more like three long wailing tones let out by a Peking opera singer, resonating the desolate huquin music her fourth brother often plays. And although the expression of “flying grey dragons” is a common Chinese visual metaphor for tornado-like wind, Chang, delineating Bai’s search for something to hold on to, also evokes the cultural significance that Chinese people have associated with dragons since the beginning of their civilization: mystery, felicity, and nobility. Rather than allow the dragons to whirl her back to that depressive and oppressive part of Chinese culture, Bai hears them changing their tune, oooh-aaah-eeeing their blessings to her. With the kind of unfathomable power that separated Heaven from Earth, that ended Chaos and began the World, they also help her level the wall of her old grudge against Fan, inspire her to see things from a new light, and then disappear into the depth of the universe. After all, Fan, despite his male egoism, risked his life in the war zone and came back to fetch her. This action is as good as Meng Jiangnu’s search for Won Shiliang at the Great Wall, and as good as the promise of the soldier to his wife in the poem from The Book of Songs. Liusu’s vision that the retaining wall still stands high and upright, imbued with the mysterious creatures’ benediction under the moonlight, is hence not an unrealistic wish-fulfillment; it is her mental reconstruction—a necessary step to the mutual epiphany she and Fan ultimately achieve: in this chaotic world, nobody can afford to be an individualist; they are fortunate to have each other to depend on. When the mental walls between man and woman, between East and West, between oneself and the stranger within oneself collapse, the regeneration of a shattered civilization begins.

A resolution achieved through such a shared experience usually would give the reader a sense of closure and an illusion that Bai and Fan are totally transformed people. Yet, Chang is a realist looking at life with a cold eye. Bai, for all her ability to play blue cloth dan, flower dan, and martial dan, will maintain her aristocratic mentality that a lady, especially a married one, should not have to earn her own means. In fact, she never changes her marriage-oriented reason-
ing: “Who knows? Maybe it was in order to vindicate her that an entire city fell” (2769). Gilbert and Gubar’s theory helps us detect the nuances of Chang’s feminism and Bai’s feminist potential, but the author’s understanding of human nature is sophisticated enough that she resists overstretching her heroine’s progress. Bai indeed has a long way to go before becoming a genuine modern woman. Likewise, Bhabha’s and Said’s postcolonial theories help us unlock the complexity of Fan’s character, which has eluded critical attention until now. Fan’s ambivalence towards China and England will probably remain under his skin for the rest of his life. And to use Chang’s own words from her essay “Writing of One’s Own,” Fan’s commitment to Bai “steers him towards a more settled existence” (Jones 2007, 17); their marriage, however, is “prosaic,” “earthbound,” and “nothing more.” Fan will still keep his dandy persona outside the home, enjoying smart conversations with attractive and culturally indeterminate women like the exiled Indian Princess, and maintain his view that people basically cannot decide such things as “[d]eath, life, separation” (2769). Yet at least the consternation on Bai’s face brings out his thoughtful self-restraint as a spouse—he stops saying what he knows will upset her. If anything, “Love in a Fallen City” teaches a lesson that authentic selfhood, be it Chinese, English, or both, is a relational identity affected by others’ subjectivity, rather than an insulated autonomy that discredits those who benefit one’s existence, directly or indirectly.

References


Linking East and West: Shway Yoe’s Burman

Stephen Keck, American University of Sharjah

Abstract

This paper makes the case that Shway Yoe’s (Sir George Scott) The Burman: His Life and Notions serves as a good example of an attempt to create a deliberate hybrid text. Scott’s efforts should be understood in the broader context of writers who were discontented with their own intellectual traditions and practices. Scott used the pseudonym “Shway Yoe,” which in Burmese meant “Golden Truth,” in order to write the book from a non-Western perspective. As Shway Yoe he adopted an alternative narrative structure to explain the Burmese outlook on life. In the Burman he explored the impact of modernity, the tensions within contemporary Buddhism, and the status of ethnic minorities to present a detailed and sensitive picture of Burma. Yet, within his stress on sincerity and individualism, Shway Yoe betrayed his own Victorian perspective.

Shway Yoe’s (Sir George Scott) The Burman: His Life and Notions proved to be one of the most important books written by a Westerner about Burma. Scott’s book has engaged readers for more than a century, as his influence was immediately evident in the generation of British writers who now saw Burma through his eyes. Virtually every book written in “British Burma” reflected a close read of Scott’s pages, and it remained relevant in the 20th century: another edition of The Burman was published in wake of the 1962 coup that would ultimately bring Ne Win to power. John Musgrave’s introduction pointed out that the text “still has relevance for understanding con-
temporary Burma” (Musgrave, xvi). More recently, following the political turbulence of the 1990s, British journalist Andrew Marshall used Scott as the basis for exploring the country. In this last case, Marshall’s *The Trousers People: A Story of Burma in the Shadow of the Empire* (2002) traced Scott’s footsteps in the Shan States. Marshall explained that *The Burman* “was still consulted by Burma scholars” (Marshall 53).

**Sir George Scott (Shway Yoe)**

The combination of his life and writings has ensured that Scott remains one of the better-known figures associated with colonial Burma. A definitive biography of Scott remains to be written. Edith Mitton, Scott’s wife, published *Scott of the Shan Hills* (1936), which drew upon her knowledge of the subject to compile what amounts to a mere sketch of Scott (Mitton). Despite the existence of a large Scott archive at Cambridge, where his papers have been preserved, there has yet to be a successful scholarly study of Scott. Andrew Dalby surveyed Scott’s career as an explorer of Burma’s eastern border and a key figure in the British annexation of the Shan States (Dalby 108-157). In fact, it might not be too much to claim that Scott is one of the great undiscovered subjects of the British Empire because his achievements were significant. Scott served mostly in Burma, which could quietly be overlooked in the 19th century just as Myanmar could be in the 20th century. Scott could, after all, be easily identified with the larger than life characters who were usually, though not universally, advancing British aims across the globe. That is, were his exploits better known, Scott might be grouped with Cecil Rhodes, Richard Burton, James Hannington Speke, Alfred Russell Wallace, Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), T.E. Lawrence and other cinematic figures.

Working as a journalist, Scott came first to the Malay Peninsula where he was able to cover the reprisals for the murder of British Resident J.W.W. Birch in Perak in 1875 for the London paper, *Evening Standard*. After that, he went to both Rangoon and Mandalay, where he wrote for two London papers: the *Daily News* and *St. James Gazette*. Scott would stay in Burma for about seven years.
He not only wrote, but taught at a school. These experiences gave him the time and motivation to become fluent in Burmese. It was also during this stretch that Scott wrote *The Burman*, a book which could neatly and insightfully make great use of the division between Upper and Lower Burma. Scott would serve colonial administration in a number of capacities, including compiling the 1900-1901 *Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States* (five volumes that remain of use to scholars today) and participating in the Burma Commission which established the country’s borders with Siam and China (Thant Myint U 285). Beyond this extraordinary story, Scott is also remembered as the man who brought soccer to Burma.

While Scott may have been the Briton who produced the most widely read book devoted to understanding Burma, he was actually part of a group of British writers who attempted to make sense of their experiences in Southeast Asia by putting pen to paper and publishing. Within the world of colonial Burma, Scott was part of a genealogy of discourse which shaped British (and Western) perceptions of the country and the region. In Burma the publications of Scott, V.C. Scott O’Connor, R. Talbot Kelly, and Harold Fielding-Hall collectively produced a body of literature in the aftermath of the Third Anglo-Burman War which evinces not only a significant understanding of “imperialist mindsets,” but also attempts to go beyond the worst forms of colonial knowledge-making. That is, these figures for the most part understood that British colonialism might produce a deeply flawed comprehension of its subject peoples. It should be pointed out, as well, that while these writers were not professional academics and did not articulate their biases in a self-conscious way, they were men and women who often had access to the most information and the most superior materials. That is, they had all of the advantages which the colonial situation implied: they could travel, meet experts, interview key persons and be told which books to read about the country and region. Not surprisingly, without denigrating the overall imperial project, the better of these writers sought to understand and explain Burma differently than it was being represented in the press, superficial travelogues, missionary writings and military memoirs. Additionally, they were at once
sensitive to some of the ways in which colonial dynamics produced knowledge that could be problematic. Therefore, in recovering this strand of British or colonial discourse, scholars have the opportunity to explore a series of early attempts at cultural hybridity. The argument here will be that Scott as Shway Yoe represented a particular type of deliberate hybridity; it was based on the recognition that the production of colonial knowledge was deeply flawed, and its creation aimed at finding ways to understand a foreign culture within its own idiom; and, finally, its articulation was devised to translate this comprehension into terms recognizable to a wider metropolitan audience.

**Shway Yoe as Author**

In the early 1880s, metropolitan readers might not have understood or even found appealing a book titled *The Burman: His Life and Notions* by the unheard of author named Shway Yoe. The title page identifies him as a “Subject of the Great Queen” which situates the author as a Burman under British rule. In fact, a number of Britons were completely taken in by Scott’s gambit, as some exclaimed that the book was written by some Burmese who had a very impressive grasp of English (Marshall 53). More importantly, in adopting the pseudonym “Shway Yoe,” which in Burmese meant “Golden Truth,” Scott was attempting to engage Western (principally British) readers as a Burman might. Unlike so many other British accounts of Burma—many of which can be easily mined for orientalist stereotypes—Scott’s would attempt to present the subject from a Burman point of view, making non-Burmans into those who would be alien, foreign and, ultimately, “other.”

The very structure of *The Burman* reveals a striking degree of sensitivity to the nearly habitual misunderstandings of the country. Victorian intellectual achievements have frequently and seemingly easily been traduced—the 19th century now looks naïve for its empiricism, scientific naturalism, liberalism, and emerging secularism. The age is also remembered for its racism and many forms of chauvinism. But it should be pointed out that British thinking in the 19th century was hardly monolithic. For instance, key British
intellectuals struggled with the conditions under which knowledge was produced. In fact, these anxieties were central to iconic figures such as Thomas Carlyle and John Ruskin. No less famously, Charles Dickens attacked crude empiricism in *Hard Times*. With respect to “colonial knowledge” the examples of W.S. Blunt and Lucy Duff-Gordon serve to remind us that associating intellectual orthodoxies with the Victorians is hazardous at best. For our purposes, when Scott devised *The Burman* he was at once working within some of the firmest intellectual traditions of his age and simultaneously at variance from a sizeable portion of colonial knowledge. As we will see, Scott’s literary device would not be completely sustainable, but it did contradict virtually every other attempt to make sense of the country.

**Narrative Structure of *The Burman***

The narrative structure of the *The Burman* was at variance with much colonial writing because it was not in any way organized around the theme of travel; instead, Shway Yoe explained the Burman outlook by concentrating first on the beginnings of life and then the end of life. Along the way Scott explained Burma’s religious outlook, drama, music, marriage, domestic life, games, patterns of social organization, history, treatment of minorities, and the arrival of British rule. It should be pointed out that what might appear to be a book organized along ordinary themes actually represented a significant departure for most of the British writing about Burma. The vast bulk of British books devoted to the subject were written as memoirs and travelogues. As such, the books normally began and ended with the experience—often replete with orientalist stereotypes—of the author, leaving the treatment of Burma and its peoples as secondary. To begin with the birth and end with the death of a Burman was a significant move away from the norms of most British writing about the country. Scott did this without either sentimentalizing his subject or engaging in a steady encomium about the progressive nature of British rule.
Scott engaged nearly the full gamut of Burman life, and he did this by contrasting it to British understandings (frequently misunderstandings) of the subject. While he was interested in showing how many things in Burma had British or Western counterpoints, his larger concern was to portray the way in which the two cultures frequently misread each other. Scott was especially clear about the difficulty which his countrymen had in simply learning the language. Scott recognized, as well, that there was an intellectual laziness which accompanied power: the colonizers could rely on their privileges to flourish in Burma. More interesting, Scott also was sensitive to ways in which the very effort made by Burmans to accommodate the British tended to produce misunderstandings. For example, in discussing drama Scott observed the way in which Burmese behavior changed if the audience had British or Europeans in it:

There is no nation on the face of the earth so fond of theatrical representations as the Burmese.... A large shed has indeed been erected in Rangoon, nightly performances take place, regular troupes are engaged for a definite period, and money is charged for admission; but the idea is an English one, and opposed as it is to ancient custom and the old free attractions elsewhere, meets with barely enough support to keep it going.... It is an undoubted fact, if scarcely complimentary, that the clown has much more to do in the play and is very much broader in his jokes when Englishmen are present than when there is a purely national audience. The prolongation of the comic parts is due to a courteous desire to please the visitors, buffooneries being much more readily understood than high dramatic art, while the coarseness is unfortunately due to the same impression which makes a Burman always produce brandy and beer for the refreshment of the white man, the idea namely that that is what he likes best. None of the higher class troupes, more especially those in Upper Burma, will, however, condescend to this sort of thing. (Scott 286-289)

Ironically, the Burman effort to provide hospitality actually produced a different kind of result—one in which orientalist and racist stereotypes could take hold.

Exploring the themes of modernity, Buddhism, minorities, and “the Burman Question” reveals that Scott addressed these issues through a particular hybrid combination of Burmese and British eyes. That is, the presentation of these issues tended to compare and
contrast British and Burman understandings of these subjects. Scott was a sophisticated author: he did not construct this work in a textbook fashion, but it is clear that the need to describe and explain meant that he developed a bi-focal or hybrid vision as Shway Yoe the author.

**Burmese Life: ‘Changing with Modernity’**

The encroachment of modernity is one of the underlying themes of *The Burman* because Scott ran into evidence everywhere he looked. Writing before the annexation of Burma, Scott found it in the transformation of marriage customs, the running of feasts, Burmese consumption patterns, commercial networks, medical practices, Chinese and Indian immigration, and ultimately in British rule itself. References to “Upper Burma,” “Lower Burma,” “Rangoon,” and often “Mandalay” all could be signifiers for modernity on the one hand and “old Burma” on the other—as epitomized by traditions, religious practices, and rural life.

Despite the fact that Scott understood modernity in progressive terms, he was not entirely comfortable with its presence in Burma. On the positive side, modernization (which Scott often associated with British rule) meant better health care, freedom from crime, the abolition of slavery, and general increase in material living standards. Yet, these gains came with a cost: Scott cited a number of examples where “old Burma” was under threat from modernizing momentums. Again, it is notable that Scott did not formulate his discussion around a travelogue because he sought to examine these transformations from a Burmese point of view. In contrast, V.C. Scott O’Connor and Talbot Kelly wrote about Burma and used their travels as the basis of much of their narration. Their travels were also exercises in charting the progress of modernization.

For Scott, modernity was at once large (Burma was now firmly connected to global commerce through the Indian Ocean) and yet also evident in the smaller workings of everyday life. Scott made the point of explaining the Burman cosmology and calendar. More important, however, was the manner in which the Burmans experienced time. Scott contrasted the ways in which (especially in rural
areas) some Burmans measured time with the way it was done in the modern, industrial world:

Many can tell their own time simply by looking at their own shadow. Burmans, not being affected by this ‘age of machinery,’ as Carlyle calls it, are quite satisfied with equally simple methods of indicating the duration of time. Athet ta-daung, “a breath’s space,” serves to denote a moment; “the chewing of a fid of betel nuts, the boiling of three pots of rice,” do not imply too great an effort of mental arithmetic. The simple rural Burmans understand as little of the English system of horology as they do of the nayas, and bizanas, and pads of the royal astronomers—measures of time which nevertheless appear in all their horoscopes. (Scott 555)

We have then a fairly nuanced view of what comprises modernity. Yet, modernity was not a major factor in religious belief. Scott believed that Buddhism was so deeply a part of Burmese life that it would withstand massive amounts of social and political change.

**Buddhism: A Living Religion**

Possibly the most famous sentence of *The Burman* articulated a non-British point of view: Scott explained: “the best thing that a Burman can wish for a good Englishman is that in some future existence, as a reward of good works, he may be born a Buddhist and if possible a Burman” (Scott 96). Scott’s discussion of Buddhism appeared at once intimate and multifaceted. He explained the Buddhist cosmology in detail, but also explored the way that the religion is lived. Readers of *The Burman* learned about the national religious festivals, the routines of the monasteries, the widespread motivation to achieve merit, and the realities of pagodas and their slaves. More interestingly, perhaps, Scott presented Buddhism not as an “other,” but in tension between two conflicting schools of interpretation. Buddhist behavior, more than belief, was what lay at the heart of the tension between the Sulagandis and the Mahagandis. Scott believed that “Sybaritism” itself reflected the impact of a number of commercial and modernizing forces and that it was central to the antagonism which defined the relationship between these two groups (Scott 33). There are no “heretical doctrines in dispute; it is simply a question of greater adherence to the strict rule of the Order” (Scott 149). He identified Lower Burma—because of its great commercial
activity—as the place where this dispute developed. Accordingly, Scott explained that “many laxities” have crept into the behavior of the monks (Scott 149). The Sulagandi were quick to denounce what they understood to be loose monastic discipline. Scott drew upon the religious strife which engulfed Britain in the wake of the Reformation when he labeled the Sulagandi as the “Puritan” party (Scott 149). Scott recounts some of the disputes:

The Puritan party...denounce the habit, which is becoming very frequent, of wearing silk robes. The Kammawa sets forth that the thengan should be stitched together of rags picked up in the streets or in the graveyards, and such panthagu thengans the Sulagandis wear and glory in. The Mahagandis, on the other hand, have been gradually becoming more and more luxurious. At first new cloth was torn into regular pieces, and then sewn together. Latterly it has been considered sufficient to tear a corner and stitch it up again, or perhaps only to rip a portion of a seam, and from this to the wearing of silk garments was no great step. The Puritan party declare that this is simply scandalous playing with the letter of the law. Again, the Sulagandis eat out of the alms-bowl as it comes in from the morning round, whereas the Mahagandis empty out the thabeit into plates and make as palatable a meal as possible from their collections, which, on the face of it, is pandering to fleshly weakness. (Scott 149-150)

Scott cites still another example of the “Sybaritism” which defined the difference between the two groups. He patiently explained to his readers:

Others, much more bold in their backsliding, do not hesitate to have a special meal cooked for them every morning by the Kyaung-tha-gyi, and sit down to it smoking hot, after their morning’s perambulation, while the begging-bowl is handed over to poor people staying in the monastery, or emptied out for the benefit of the dogs and crows. No sophistry, one would think, could explain away this Sybaritism, but the Mahagandis have the assurance to try to make a merit of it, saying that the money expended by the Kappiya-dayaka on the materials for the breakfast is the proceeds of the sale of previous offerings of the pious—rugs, blankets, lamps, and so on—and by thus making use of it, not only do the people gain merit for their gifts of food, but the monks themselves are enabled to extend their charity to the poor or the birds of the air. That is a severe straining of the command that the Ariya should live by alms. (Scott 150)

The tension between these two schools of Buddhist behavior illustrated its power, but also the encroachment of modern life. Buddhism flourished in Burma, but not without its challenges. How-
ever, Scott also showed that even if Buddhism was well established, it also had to resist the even older nat worship which predated it. Scott explained that for many Burmans, nat worship was at least as much a part of their everyday lives as was Buddhism:

It is undeniable that the propitiating of the nats is a question of daily concern to the lower class Burman, while worship at the pagoda is only thought of once a week. For the nat may prove destructive and hostile at any time, whereas the acquisition of kutho at pagoda is a thing which may be set about in a business-like way, and at proper and convenient seasons. It is just the difference between avoiding a motor car and avoiding the circular saw in a timber mill....The worship of nats, of the spirits, then, has nothing to do with Buddhism, and is denounced by all the more earnest of the pyin-sin as being heretical and antagonistic to the teachings of Lord Buddha. King Mindon, who was a true defender of the faith, and possessed of a deeper knowledge of the Pali texts than many members of the Assembly of the Perfect, fulminated an edict against the reverence paid to the nats, and ordered its discontinuance under severe penalties, but the worship was never really stopped, and can no more be stopped than refusing to dine thirteen at table, to walk under ladders, to cross knives, or to refrain from throwing spilt salt on other people's carpets. (Scott 231-232)

Nat worship might be formally incompatible with Buddhism, but understanding it went a great way to explain the daily rhythms of the country. More importantly, perhaps, Scott repositioned the discussion of nat worship away from primitive religion (which carried orientalist stereotypes) into a form of life which might be easily identified with superstitions which affect English modes of behavior. In other words, nat worship was no different from the superstitions which many British people accept and act on. Despite the realities of nat worship, Scott was clear that Buddhism would long be dominant in Burma, as his remarks about the likely inability of Christian missionaries to gain conversions from the population indicate.

The “Sad Bully”: Minorities in Burma and the Burman Question
If Scott underestimated the importance and diversity of minorities in Burma, he certainly understood their problematic status. Burman national identity depended partly on negating the significance of others. Scott had argued that this was ordained through Burman interpretations of Buddhist cosmology, sustained by palace rituals
(as the British had long known) and maintained by the treatment of indigenous ethnic minorities:

It must be acknowledged that the Burman is a sad bully; but the white strangers could reduce him to civility, if nothing else, very speedily. It is different with other races—some perhaps aboriginal, some invaders of Burma as much as the Burmese themselves. (Scott 441-442)

The treatment of the Kachins, Karens, and Chins could be viewed as indicative of the worst feature of the Burman character. Scott claimed that the Burmans habitually oppressed the Kachins, and Burmese “tyranny made most of them dangerous savages” (Scott 443). With the Karen, Scott relied on their early religious mythology:

When Yuwa created the world he took three handfuls of earth and threw them round about him. From one sprang the Burmans, from another the Karens, and from the third the Kalas, the foreigners. The Karens were very talkative and made more noise than all the others, and so the Creator believed that there were too many of them, and he threw another half handful to the Burmans, who thus gained such a supremacy that they soon overcame the Karens, and have oppressed them ever since. (Scott 443)

The Chins had a similar story in their national religion; Scott drew on these mythologies to illustrate the oppressive side of Burmese domination.

If the Burman could be a “sad bully,” Scott was not oblivious to the impact of immigration on both Lower and Upper Burman. In the later editions of The Burman, he addressed “the Burman Question”: this issue focused on the future of the Burmans, given their relative failure to compete effectively on economic terms with Indian and Chinese immigrants. The archaeologist and civil servant, Taw Sein Ko, would address the problem, projecting that many of these immigrants would be Burmanized, but other critics were not so confident. Scott redefined the issue by trying to exhibit what it looked like from a Burman point of view.

Scott acknowledged that “malicious people have decided that the only things a Burman does well are steering a boat and driving a bullock cart” (Scott 244). In discussing the rice crop Scott answered that the Burman soil was so rich that farming was easy—making it
possible for farmers to be lazy. More importantly, he painted a vivid picture of the Burmans who served as migrant workers—coming from Upper Burma to Lower Burma as they followed the seasonal harvest (Scott 245). Scott noted that it “has come to be considered an axiom that the Burmese are irredeemably lazy” (Scott 383). He understood that what would become “the Burman Question” pre-dated the influx of sizeable numbers of Chinese and South Asian immigrants. Scott connected the prejudices which were extant against Burmans to earlier colonial authors (Bigandet and Sangermano) to show that these prejudices were at least partly based on cultural misunderstandings. For example, Scott also explained that Burman behavior might be answered with respect to the cultural habit of designating particular days as luck and unlucky:

With all this the Burman is in a very considerable difficulty between lucky and unlucky days. If he declines a piece of work because it is his unlucky season, or undertakes it, but delays commencing till his fortunate time shall come round, the foreigner accuses him of laziness in the one case and dawdling in the other. Yet many Englishmen would not sit down as one of thirteen to dinner. (Scott 388)

Scott recognized that the misunderstanding was not itself understood, but what foreigners remembered were frustrations that they might have encountered with porters or other workers. These arguments were extended to the discussion of measurements; he addressed the economic realities which had made the Burman Question increasingly relevant around the turn of the century. He compared the Burmans to the Chettiyars:

If the Burmans had the money-grubbing instincts of the natives of India it would have been done long ago, but as long as everybody gets enough to eat and there is an overplus, after offerings to the monks and the pagoda, wherewith to get money for new clothes, the Burman farmer cares very little what entangled sums in arithmetic have to be worked out by the unlucky purchaser. (Scott 556)

The nasty tone is similar to that which V.C. Scott O’Connor would employ in *The Silken East* when he castigated Indian commercial activity. There was certainly a romantic note when Scott extended this further by observing that the Burmans did not have any tradition of banking:
In native times there were exceedingly few who would have anything to lodge with such a personage. Those who have superabundant coin almost always disperse it in giving a kyi-gyin pwe, or in building a pagoda, a monastery, digging a tank, or some such work of merit. Whatever money there may remain over is turned into use or display in the shape of fat oxen, and silver and gold cups of jewellery. These are pleasant things to look at and easily convertible into money when necessary. Burmans detest hoarding. A miser is threatened with as terrible a hereafter as a parricide. The portion of both is awidzi, the lowest hell. (Scott 558)

Just as O’Connor and Fielding-Hall would later, Scott turned the Burman Question on its head, acknowledging that while the Burmans had not been as successful in the acquisition of wealth, it actually reflected their superior values. In a passage which probably comes from the later editions, Scott made this clear:

It is at least open to the argument that the Burman is philosophically right. He cares little for the troubles of the world and the manifold questions of the day which distract more cultural nations. His eyes are fixed uninterruptedly on the dark mysteries which surround our beginning, our end, and every moment of our life. The earth is only a camping-ground, in which it does not repay the trouble to establish one’s self firmly and comfortably. The rich man carries his gold and silver, the poor his last handful of rice, to the pagoda, and deposits it there at usurer’s interest for his future home beyond. Let the black coolie of India talk all day and dream all night of his filthy pice; let the greasy Chetty money-lender gloat over his bloated money-bags; let the English merchant delight in all the refined luxuries wealth can bring him: the Burman is content if he has enough to eat and remain a free man, happy if he accumulates sufficient to build a work of merit, or give a free festival to his less fortunate brethren. Who shall say he is not wise? (Scott 558-559)

Scott’s argument, which would anticipate those of O’Connor, Fielding-Hall and Kelly, could be gleaned to be a romantic one: the earlier, less developed and more pious civilization appears more attractive compared to at least some features of modernity.

Shway Yoe as Victorian

Shway Yoe explained Buddhism, everyday life, the monarchy, social change, and many other aspects of Burmese culture to a British audience. He spoke as a Burman and, yet, he was very clearly a Victorian in his interests and outlook. Obviously, Scott was an advocate of
empire and the text is replete with references to the various museums which helped to enshrine stereotypes about colonial subjects or non-Western peoples. It is in a less straightforward way that the Burman, with its vast amounts of description, fascination with social change, and implicit and explicit challenge to conventional treatments of the subject, reads as a quintessentially Victorian text.

In seeking to make Burman life understandable to Britons, Scott had produced a work which was uniquely hybrid—adopting another voice (in this case a Burmese voice) both to explain a foreign culture and to establish a very different point of view—one which might look back on British culture as “other” in order ultimately to show that they had more in common than might be realized. It was in his explanation of Buddhism—particularly as it was practiced in Burma—that Shway Yoe betrayed his Victorian roots. He was impressed by the depth of conviction which accompanied the basic Buddhist activities. Scott explained:

All assemble according to their rank in the morning, and together intone the vespers. When the last sounds of the mournful chant have died away in the dimly-lighted chamber, one of the novices, or a clever scholar, stands up and with a loud voice proclaims the hour, the day of the week, the day of the month, and the number of the year. Then all shikho before the Buddha thrice, and thrice before the abbot, and retire to rest. None who have experienced the impressiveness of the ceremonial, called the Thaithana-hlyauk, will readily forget the powerful effect it has on the feelings. It is the fit ending of a day full of great possibilities for all. If the same routine gone through day after day becomes monotonous and loses some of its power for good, yet the effect of such a school, presided over by an abbot of intelligence and earnestness, must infallibly work for the good of all connected with it, and especially so in the case of an impulsive, impressionable people like the Burmese. (Scott 37-38)

While the description is relatively straightforward, it should be remembered that the changing status of religion (normally Christianity) and its ability to impact believers was a major concern for 19th century British thinkers. In addition, scholars such as Lionel Trilling and Walter Houghton observed nearly two generations ago that the Victorians were nearly obsessed with sincerity (as well as authenticity) and earnestness (Houghton and Trilling). To some extent, these were virtues which were becoming more valuable precisely because
commercial activity and industrial conditions seemed to be producing mass behavior which made their existence in behavior increasingly unlikely. Not coincidentally, Scott emphasizes these features in the context of the monastery routines. Tellingly, Scott added that Western missionaries were likely to be frustrated because their teachings would have “little power to shake the power of Buddhism over the people” (Scott 38). However, with its “intelligence” and “earnestness” Buddhism was not really an “exotic other” but instead the “moral truths of both Christianity and Buddhism, are practically the same” (Scott 38).

Another way in which Scott domesticated Buddhism was by portraying it with a vocabulary which would be very appealing to his contemporaries. He sought to engage the orientalist stereotype which located the religion as the product of a lower and inferior civilization:

There are few things which more irritate an educated Burman than to assert, or as most English do, calmly assume, that the Burmese are idolaters. The national idea is that idol worship is especially the characteristic of the lowest savage tribes, and even fetishism is considered a superior faith. Therefore the accusation of bowing down to sticks and stones is intolerable, and the implication is combated with feverish energy. Where there are no prayers, in the technical sense, there can be no idolatry. No one, not even Shin Gautama himself, can help a man in his strivings to lead a holy life. None but the individual in his own person can work out his special salvation, and he tries to do so by setting a splendid ideal before his mind. (Scott 184)

These descriptions would almost certainly have appealed to the author’s late Victorian audience because they moved Buddhist religious practices away from those associated with primitive religion toward individualism. It is worth recalling that individualism—which could be made manifest in many ways—was an issue for the Victorians, with philosophers such as John Stuart Mill forcefully advocating it, while some critics feared its impact upon British culture. At the same time, Scott’s tone here is that of a preacher—whose sermon’s insistence on the individual responsibility for his or her own salvation would have found echoes with a number of different strata of Victorian Christianity.
Buddhist individualism, as such, extended to worship practices. Scott pointed out to his readers that bells at temples are not used to call worshippers to prayer because there is no formal service. Every man is responsible to himself for his religious state; no one else has anything directly to do with him, or can give him help. The monks themselves display but little concern in the spiritual state of the laity. If a man is to attain a favourable change in a succeeding existence, it must be by his own exertions. He knows the regular duty-days, and on these and on the special feast-days he goes to gain kutho for himself and better his chance towards a new transincorporation. If he is a fond man, he parcels out the merit acquired by his devotions among the members of his family or friends who have not been to the pagoda. The use of the bells is to direct attention to the fact of the lauds of the Buddha having been recited. (Scott 204)

Scott also observed that Buddhism is “thoroughly democratic” because a man “is only what he is through his actions in past existences” (Scott 407). The political language was extended to the claim that Buddhism had a “republican tendency” because it promoted social egalitarianism. He made this explicit by noting that rank “does not confer such a wonderful hold on the people” (Scott 407). Again, Scott found Buddhism attractive because it helped inhibit social divisions. He observed that this “feeling extends beyond the ordinary order into ordinary life. The religion brings all men down to the same level.” He pushed this further into an argument about virtue which might have been easily recognizable to Victorians who had subscribed to the secular doctrines of self-help and improvement. Social differences were “established by superiority in virtue” (Scott 407). The Burman is written (and rewritten) during the decades in which the demand of equality for women became a strong political force. Scott argued that it was this commitment towards equality which affected women in Burma:

The state of women among Buddhists is so very much higher than it is among Oriental peoples, who do not hold by that faith. The Burmese woman enjoys many rights which her European sister is even now clamouring for. (Scott 407)

Ironically, then, Buddhism was now domesticated: it could be identified with many things—individualism, democracy, republicanism,
social equality—dear to many men and women in late 19th century Britain. Buddhism (and Burma) could now appear not as an “other” but as an attractive form of life fully compatible with best of British values. Most important, perhaps, the very strategy of making a foreign culture agreeable to a metropolitan audience was itself a fundamental Victorian impulse. The idea of taking new or less attractive ideas and commodities and domesticating them—that is, making them safe for private consumption—was one of the deepest and most formative cultural experiences in 19th century Britain.

What, then, did Scott’s “Victorianism” matter to people in Burma and Southeast Asia? Scott wrote a handbook for Burma, but it would not be hard to show that The Burman proved to be essential reading for British administrators. This is evident because the The Burman became something of a touchstone for writers such as V.C. Scott O’ Connor and Harold Fielding-Hall. More important, it almost certainly informed British policy making; with its picture of contented Burmans under British rule (yet another instance of Victorianism), it may have inhibited the British from understanding the emerging nationalism which became evident during the first decade of the 20th century. In addition, Scott did show the Burmans to be both sad bullies and threatened by immigration, but he almost certainly underestimated the consequences of both realities. The Burman presents the country’s many ethnic minorities as on the fringe of Burmese life, but in so doing it foreshadows the inadequate way in which the country has been understood. That is, for the independent, newly formed nation, situating non-Burmans has been a significant problem. By developing a sensitive depiction of Buddhism as absolutely central to Burmese life, Scott unintentionally neglected many other forms of social identity. To state one of the most obvious, there is almost nothing in the text about Islam in Burma; yet, with its 1824 citizenship law and the civil strife in Arakan and the sustained persecution of Muslims in Burma, the omission from Scott’s text appears to be a bit more significant. In producing one of the most widely read and deeply sensitive accounts of a people exposed and exploited by British colonialism, Scott may well have adjusted his subject tightly to fit his agenda.  

More broadly, the
book also points to a larger ambiguity for the region: namely, situating Myanmar into Southeast Asia. Despite his other experiences in the region, The Burman reveals a very particular place—clearly not a part of India, but not really belonging to anything other than “the Orient.” In a peculiar way, then, despite the fact that The Burman is written as a book which aimed to produce cultural engagement and overcome the colonizer’s misunderstandings, it actually foreshadows the isolation which would bedevil modern Myanmar—especially after 1962.

Conclusion
The deliberate hybridity which defined The Burman is nothing less than an attempt to bring two very different cultures (and religions) together into one large text. Scott’s achievement was at least to make Burma, Buddhism, and possibly some aspects of the political economy of the region comprehensible to metropolitan readers. Scott was able to move beyond simple travelogues, war memoirs, and missionary literature to create a work which not only presented Burma for Britons, but literally forced careful readers to evaluate their own biases. It should not be forgotten, as well, that Scott’s effort took place amidst the “high noon” of Western imperialism. Not only were travelogues written with “orientalist” mindsets, but they were part of a colonial project which legitimated itself by invoking its “civilizing mission.” Scott, always a believer in the British Empire, aimed at something very different: a book which would enable Western readers to understand Burma (and other aspects of Southeast Asia) and its peoples on their own terms. Sensitive students of the book might come to apprehend something more: that many of their own prejudices were being challenged by the presentations, descriptions, and arguments of Scott’s book. To be sure, Scott had some romantic impulses, but he was unsparing of things which might be criticized in

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Burma. For instance, his treatment of the monarchy did not evince the nostalgic notes that defined Harold Fielding-Hall’s presentation of the last years of the Konbaung era. Scott began with the premise that a Burman could and should be critical of many things in Burma. Yet, the more dominant impulse was to connect East to West to overcome the flawed perceptions which the colonizing power possessed of its Burmese subjects. After all, to see and think with the Burman was to recognize not only the limitations of British knowledge, but to see and understand at once the sagacity and frailties of Burmese life.

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Book Review


The seventeen essays that comprise *A Talent for the Particular* continue the critical conversations and the changes in perspective encapsulated in recent criticism on Narayan. The response to Narayan’s works has undergone a dramatic shift in the last decade or more, with current criticism highlighting the fissures and uncertainties in Narayan’s world rather than his depiction of an unchanging and spiritual India. In addition, while international interest in Indian fiction in English continues unabated, the addition of new authors and their widely differing sensibilities has pushed Narayan to a more marginal position in the canon. However, since Narayan remains eminently teachable and captures in his works almost a century of the particularities of India in its most transitional stage, a new collection of essays on Narayan, especially one which includes an international body of scholars, is welcome both for teachers and students of Narayan.

The brief introduction by Frontain that opens the collection seems particularly relevant for undergraduate students and non-specialists as it sets up the terms of critical debate on Narayan. Sankar Sinha’s essay, “Negotiating Tradition: The Complexity of R. K. Narayan’s Postcolonial Position” then takes up the challenge and leads the reader into an investigation of Narayan’s “preoccupation with hybridity” in *The Guide* (1958). Focusing on the impact of the
railways and western education on the world of Malgudi as well as the constantly changing and enlarging contours of this universe in successive novels, Sinha argues that the “hermeneutics of nostalgia is thus an inexact formula to analyze and understand R. K. Narayan’s novels” (Sinha 17). Baisali Hui’s essay similarly resists an attempt to locate Narayan within an unchanging, traditional Indian locale. In her examination of Narayan’s first novel, *Swami and Friends* (1935), Hui claims that Malgudi’s appeal is contingent upon a “certain indeterminacy of temporal, spatial and even emotional adherence” (Hui 22), an indeterminacy which allows for shared memories to provide the basis of pleasure, both within the novel and for the readers. This indeterminacy then leads to universality.

In contrast, however, Bhattacharya’s essay on *Malgudi Days* locates in Malgudi, Narayan’s fictional locale for this collection and fourteen of his novels, “the spirit and unmistakable touch of Indianness” (Bhattacharya 65), though it is very much a postcolonial India. Other essays in the collection similarly highlight Narayan’s final veering towards an Indian sensibility. Bryan Hull’s essay, “‘Why do you pretend?’: Performance, Myth, and Realism in R. K. Narayan’s *The Dark Room*” sees the characters in the novel caught in a much more basic struggle between tradition and modernity and opting for a pre-colonial “simplicity and uniformity” (Hull 59). Daniel Ross’s essay concludes that Narayan embraces traditional Indian values though without discarding some of the beneficial outcomes of a postcolonial modernity. Though they assert the primacy of traditional Hindu values in Narayan’s works, these essays argue for a more complex understanding of his commitment to the Indian spiritual landscape.

Narayan’s explorations of and dependence upon the Hindu religious texts in the constructions of his world receive direct attention in several of the essays in the collection, including Binayak Roy’s essay on sainthood in *The Guide*. Kalyan Chatterjee isolates *Vishnu Purana*, a cycle of stories celebrating Lord Vishnu’s victories over the forces of evil, as the framework for *The Man-Eater of Malgudi*. Basudeb Chakraborty charts the trajectory of the protagonist in *The Vendor of Sweets* to an ending point informed by a decidedly Hindu
vision of mysticism. Nancy Ann Watanabe reads the protagonist Krishna’s pursuit of right action in resisting colonialism in *The English Teacher* as the affirmation of the “pristine sublimity of Proto-Indian civilization” (Watanabe 88). In another essay in the collection, Nancy Ann Watanabe sees the references to mythology and religion in *The Vendor of Sweets* as modulated by “India’s national life” and its “responses to global events” (Watanabe 226). Frontain invokes the Ravana myth as a supplement to *The Man-Eater of Malgudi*’s much-discussed source in the Bhasmasura myth. According to Frontain, the novel “undercuts its generally light comic tone by offering, at heart, a dark view of the human condition,” (Frontain 184) though it denies the possibility of tragic action. Even though they are charting fairly traditional categories of analysis, most of these essays historically contextualize Narayan’s texts in order to arrive at complex readings of the intersections of myth and historical reality in his works.

Awareness of multiple modes of oppression and their linkages informs the two essays in this collection that are based on feminist insights. Chirantan Sarkar’s analysis of patriarchy in *The Dark Room* sees sexism as the psychological foundation upon which class and caste inequalities subsist. In calling attention to Savitri’s strategy of passive resistance in opposing the tyrannical violence of her husband towards their son, Sankar also comments the struggle for independence that provides the context for the novel. The failure of the Gandhian movement to challenge the patriarchal structures during the struggle for independence allows the multiple oppressions to continue. In the second feminist essay, Urmila Chakraborty focuses on Narayan’s uncertainty regarding the role of women in the modern society instead of the repressive force of patriarchy. Her short essay examines Rosie in *The Guide* as a representative of “a new group of educated and emancipated women emerging in such a number in the post-independence Indian Society” (Chakraborty 131).

Commitment to current critical thinking also characterizes the three essays that range beyond the examination of Narayan’s fiction, the two essays on Narayan’s non-fiction and the one on the film *The Guide*. The bibliography at the end is a valuable resource for educa-
tors in particular as it extends the one found in John Thieme’s 2007 monograph on Narayan. As it stands, the collection is useful pedagogically, but it could have done with some careful editing and a more extensive editorial apparatus. Grouping of related essays would have made it more navigable, particularly as this collection seems aimed at undergraduate students and their non-specialist educators.
16th National Conference of the Asian Studies Development Program

June 29-July 1, 2010
East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii
Host Institution: Kapi‘olani Community College

Tuesday, June 29

Arrival and Check-In at Aqua Waikiki Wave conference hotel, 2299 Kuhio Avenue

12pm-3pm ARCAS Board Meeting, The Pacific Club (van pick-up at hotel, 11:30am)

Wednesday, June 30

8:00 Bus pick-up at Aqua Waikiki Wave conference hotel for trip to EWC

8:30-3:00 Registration and copies of the Program. Keoni Auditorium, Imin Center

8:30-9:00 Continental Breakfast, Keoni Auditorium, Imin Center
9:00-9:20 am Keoni Auditorium, Imin Center
Traditional Hawaiian Blessing
Opening Remarks: Charles Morrison, President, EWC
Leon Richards, Chancellor, Kapiolani Community College

9:30-10:30 Keoni Auditorium
Plenary Session: The Future of Asian Studies: Building on Accomplishments, Moderator: Betty Buck, Co-Director ASDP
Leon Richards, Chancellor Kapi’olani Community College
Roger Ames, Co-Director ASDP, Professor of Comparative Philosophy, University of Hawaii, Manoa
Ned Shultz, Dean, School of Pacific and Asian Studies, University of Hawaii, Manoa

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break, Keoni Auditorium
All Panels Will Be On The 2nd Floor Of Imin Center

10:45 - 12:00 Session One
Kamehameha Room
Studies and Teaching of the Silk Road, Chair: Andrew Colvin, Slippery Rock University

“Suna” – A Possible Chinese Version of Some/Haoma-A
Study of Early Contact between Indo-Iranians and Chinese
He Zhang, William Paterson University

The “Classics of Go” as Evidence of Past and Present Globalization
Robert W. Foster, Brea College

Playing Telephone: Translating the Silk Road both Literally and Figuratively to Undergraduates
Jacqueline Moore, Austin College

Sarimanok Room
Building and Developing Asian Studies, Chair: James Deitrick, University of Central Arkansas
Working to Develop Democracy Skills: A Collaborative Approach
Sheri Moore, University of Louisville

Working to Develop Democracy Skills: A Collaborative Approach
Janet Tan, Taiwan, China

Building Asian Studies at PCC
Sylvia Gray, Portland Community College

Can China’s Prosperity Continue? Reporting From a Title VI B Project
Fay Beauchamp, Community College of Philadelphia

Tagore Room
Asian Environmental Issues, Chair: George Brown, Slippery Rock University

Yarkand, Where Silk Roads Intersect
Lawrence Butler, George Mason University

Shock Sensitivity and Resilience: Lessons Learned from the Ocean Tsunami Victims in Tamil Nadu, India
Thamana Lekprichakul, Research Institute for Humanity and Nature

Home is where the Heart Is—The Earthen Buildings of Fujian
Howard Bodner, Houston Community College

12:15-1:30 Lunch Student Union Ballroom A
Guest Speaker: James Castle, Founder of CastleAsia
Indonesia: Economic Development, Democracy, and the Role of Asian Studies for America-A View from the Field

1:45– 3:00 Session Two

Kamehameha Room
Creating a Shared Discourse for Tibet-China Problem Solving Through ADR, Chair: Howard Bodner, Houston Community College
Between Conflict and Unknown Potentials: ADR for Tibet-China Truce
Maorong Jiang, Creighton University

The Use and Potential Misuse of Western ADR Approaches in the Tibet-China Context
Arthur Pearlstein, Creighton University

Tolerance: Hope from Both Sides for Tibet-China Peaceful Settlement
Jinmei Yuan, Creighton University

Sarimanok Room
Issues in Modern Asian History, Chair: Jacqueline Moore, Austin College

Writing the Asian Diaspora into a History of Overlapping Diasporas
Annette Palmer, Morgan State University

Becoming Writers: The High School Literary Magazine in Japanese American Internment Camps
Stacia Bensyl, Missouri Western State University

An Expensive Lesson: Thoughts on Japan’s Siberian Intervention, 1918-1920
Paul Dunscomb, University of Alaska

The Human Security and Development Impact of Japanese Strategic Aid Assistance
Brendan Howe, Ewha Woman’s University

Tagore Room
Sex and Gender in an Asian Context, Chair: Yu Liu, Niagara County Community College

Confucianism and Feminism: Possibilities for the 21st Century
Joanna Crosby, Morgan State University

On the Threshold of the Dao: Liminality and the Lives of Daoist Women
Jeffrey Dippmann, Central Washington University
Re-envisioning Homosexuality within Daoism—Expanding the Sexual Dimensions of Yin and Yang
Bruce LeBlanc, Black Hawk College

3:00-3:15 Coffee Break, Keoni Auditorium

3:15-4:20 ASDP Alumni Chapter Business Meeting, Keoni Auditorium, David Jones Presiding

4:30 Reception at the Doris Duke Estate, Shangri-La, A Center for Islamic Arts and Culture

THURSDAY, JULY 1

8:00 Bus pick-up at Aqua Waikiki Wave Hotel

8:30-9:00 Continental Breakfast, Keoni Auditorium

9:15-10:30 Session Three

Kamehameha Room
Water, Environment, and Minority Peoples across Northwest China, Chair: Lawrence Butler, George Mason University

China’s Wild, Wild West, Controlling the Last Economic Frontier
Richard Mack, Central Washington University

Water Resource Management Issues in Northwest China from an Environmental, Historical, and Sociological Perspective
Roberta Soltz, Bloomsburg University

Redrawing Pastoral-Agricultural Boundaries: PRC Agricultural and Development Policies in Qinghai
James Cook, Central Washington University

Tagore Room
Cultural Interactions-Globalization, Chair: Maorong Jiang, Creighton University
Confucius Copyright in China: Is Stealing Books an Elegant Offense?
David Moser, Belmont University

Chinggis Khan on Film: Globalization, Nationalism and Historical Revisionism
Robert Eng, University of Redlands

Resistance, Adaptation and Transformation: How Global Forces Shaped Religion and Literature in South Asia
Koushik Ghosh, Central Washington University

10:30-10:45 Coffee break

10:45 – 12:00 Session Four

Kamehameha Room

Discovery and Praxis: Essays in Asian Studies, Chair: David Jones, Kennesaw State University

Working for Choice: Women and Islam in Malaysia
Michele Marion, Paradise Valley Community College

First Contact: the Earliest Western Views of Daoism in Matteo Ricci and the Jesuit Mission
Ronnie Littlejohn, Belmont University

16th Century Jesuit Attempt at forming a Bridge between Confucian and Christian Thought on the Subject of Lord on High (Shangdi)
Joe McKeon, Central Connecticut State University

Sarimanok Room

Reflections Integrating Religious Philosophies
Chair: Dennis Arjo, Johnson County Community College

Buddhist Interdependence as an Explanation of Cosmic Fine-Tuning
Matthew Rogers, North Central College

Meditation within Activity: Mindfulness and the Unconscious
Robert Feleppa, Wichita State University
The Integration of Asian Religious and Philosophical Traditions into American Popular Discourse through Children’s Television Programming
Jim Deitrick, University of Central Arkansas

Tagore Room
Representations of Asia, Chair: Nancy Janus, Eckerd College

The Chinoiserie Garden Pavilion and the Chinese Bridge, Part II
Susan Clare Scott, McDaniel College

Beyond the “Other”: A More Hospitable Approach to Intercultural Understanding
Michael Hembree, Johnson County Community College

Representations of Infanticide in China and Japan in Early Modern European Travelogues
Rachana Sachdev, Susquehanna University

12:15 -1:00 Lunch Student Union Ballroom A
1:00 – 1:30 Kenny Endo Taiko Ensemble Student Union Ballroom A
1:45-3:00 Session Five

Kamehameha Room
Asia Expressed Through the Arts, Chair: Robert Eng, University of Redlands

Creating Portland’s Classical Chinese Scholars’ Garden
Ray Olson, College of DuPage, Emeritus

13 Bridges: Connecting Music and Cultures in Asia through Compatible Hardware (Japanese koto) and Software (Indian raga).
Timothy M. Hoffman, Keio University

Sarimanok Room
Intersections of Asia and Christianity, Chair: Robert Feleppa, Wichita State University
The Complexities of a New Faith, Xu Guanggi’s Acceptance of Christianity in the Late Ming Dynasty
Yu Liu, Niagara County Community College

Is There a Christian/Catholic Contribution to Contemplative Science?
Stephen Laumakis, University of St. Thomas

Till Death Do Us Part?: Buddhist-Christian Discourse on Marriage
Violeta Polinska, North Central College

The Problem of Evil in Christianity and Buddhism
Robert Lehe, North Central College

Tagore Room
Issues with Teaching and Learning, Chair: Fay Beauchamp, Community College of Philadelphia

Mental Health Services in Cambodia
Nancy Janus, Eckerd College

Taiwan’s Physical Education and Its Challenge
Chi Liu, Taiwan Chienkuo Technology University

Service Learning in Asia
Nancy Janus, Eckerd College

3:00 – 3:15 Coffee break

3:15-4:30 Session Six

Kamehameha Room
The Japanese Invasion of China in Documentary and Feature Films, Chair: Susan Claire Scott, McDaniel College

The Sino-Japanese War and the Construction of Memory: an Analysis of Films on Japanese Wartime Atrocities
George Brown, Slippery Rock University

Analyzing Films on the Japanese War in China: Themes, Character, Images, and Stories
Renee Gerard, Slippery Rock University
Critical and Popular Reception in China of Films on the Anti-Japanese War
Li Pu, Slippery Rock University

Sarimanok Room
Contemplations on Philosophical Traditions, Chair: Lawrence Butler, George Mason University

Shame: Destructive Self-Loathing or Constructive Self-Regulation
Dennis Arjo, Johnson County Community College

Effortless Action (wuwei) and the Art of Blending: A Comparative Analysis
Andrew Colvin, Slippery Rock University

Aesthetic Immediacy and I: Uniqueness and Radical Individuation in the Zhongyong
David Brubaker, University of New Haven

Tagore Room
Educational and Pedagogical Issues, Chair: Annette Palmer, Morgan State University

The Reality of the Virtual
Dona Cady, Middlesex Community College

Asian Studies, the Liberal Arts, and the Wabash Gentleman
Chonghyun Christie Byun, Wabash College

Follow the Money, Infusing Asian Economics into the American Writing Curriculum
Margaret Cullen, Ohio Northern University

4:40pm- 4:55pm Keoni Auditorium, Closing Remarks, Joe Overton and David Jones

5:00pm Bus leaves for Aqua Waikiki Wave Hotel
Plenary Speakers

Charles E. Morrison has been president of the East-West Center since 1998. He has been associated with the Center since 1980 in various capacities, including heading its former Institute of Economics and Politics. A U.S. Senate aide early in his career, he has also been a research associate at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Morrison has served as the international chair of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council since 2005, and is a member of other national and international bodies that promote trans-Pacific security and economic cooperation. His PhD is from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where he also once taught on Southeast Asia. He speaks and publishes widely on U.S. Asia policy issues and the countries of the region, and gives special emphasis to regional cooperation, particularly the APEC process. Publications in recent years include: Four Adjectives Become a Noun: APEC the Future of Asia-Pacific Cooperation; An APEC Trade Agenda? The Political Economy of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific; Leadership Succession and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implications for East Asia; Japan, ASEAN, and East Asia from an American Perspective; Community Building with Pacific Asia (report to the Trilateral Commission); ASEAN: Forum, Caucus & Community; Asia-Pacific Crossroads: Regime Creation and the Future of APEC; Development Cooperation in the 21st Century: Implications for APEC; Asia-Pacific Security Outlook (annual from 1997).

James Castle is the founder of CastleAsia, a business consultancy specializing in market entry strategies, economic and political analysis and public policy advocacy, in association with PT Jasa Cita. In over thirty years of work in Southeast Asia, Mr. Castle has advised in the establishment of numerous foreign direct investment projects. He has acted as a consultant to many of the world’s largest corporations as well as many of Indonesia’s and Southeast Asia’s largest business groups. In addition to his experience with private sector clients, Mr. Castle has also been consultant to numerous projects for governments and international agencies including the World Bank,
IFC, ADB, USAID and the Indonesian government. He was an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in 2008.

He currently serves as a member of the Board of Commissioners of motorcycle manufacturer, TVS Motor Indonesia, and of Jaring Data Interaktif which operates two satellite television channels in Indonesia. He is on the Advisory Board of Coca-Cola Indonesia and is the Indonesia Advisor to the New Zealand Trade and Enterprise Corp Beachheads Program that supports New Zealand trade and investment abroad. He was appointed by the Minister of Finance as the only non-Indonesian member of the Indonesian National Team to Review Tax Law Changes in 2005. He was one of two foreigners appointed to Indonesia’s Tripartite Forum on Industrial Relations in 2001. He has convened numerous conferences and seminars on economic reform, sectoral opportunities and public policy issues. He appears frequently on CNBC, CNN and BBC as a commentator on Indonesian business and politics. Mr. Castle earned a Master’s Degree from the University of Hawaii as an East-West Center student and a Bachelor’s Degree from the University of Michigan. As a PhD candidate from Cornell University, he conducted research as a Fulbright Doctoral Research Scholar at Universitas Pajajaran (Bandung, Indonesia) and the Koninklijke Instituut (Leiden, The Netherlands). He was an East-West Center visiting scholar at Mindanao State University, Philippines, and Gajah Mada University, Indonesia. He was a USAID intern in Washington DC. He also studied in Tokyo at Sophia University. He has lived in Indonesia since 1977 and is fluent in Indonesian.
List of Participants

Ames, Roget T., University of Hawaii, Manoa
Arjo, Dennis, Johnson County Community College
Beauchamp, Fay, Community College of Philadelphia
Bensyl, Stacia, Missouri Western State University
Bodner, Howard, Houston Community College
Brown, George, Slippery Rock University
Brubaker, David, University of New Haven
Buck, Elizabeth, East-West Center
Butler, Lawrence, George Mason University
Byun, Chonghyun Christie, Wabash College
Cady, Dona, Middlesex Community College
Colvin, Andrew, Slippery Rock University
Crosby, Joanna, Morgan State University
Cullen, Margaret, Ohio Northern University
Deitrick, James, University of Central Arkansas
Dippmann, Jeffrey, Central Washington University
Dorn, Dean, Pacific Sociological Association
Dunscomb, Paul, University of Alaska, Anchorage
Dykstra, Yoshiko, University of Hawaii
Eng, Robert, University of Redlands
Farland, Julien, Middlesex Community College
Feleppa, Robert, Wichita State University
Foster, Robert, Berea College
Gerard, Renee, Slippery Rock University
Ghosh, Koushik, Central Washington University
Gray, Silvia, Portland Community College
Hembree, Michael, Johnson County Community College
Hoffman Tim, Keio University
Howe, Brendan, Ewha Women’s University
Janus, Nancy, Eckerd College
Jiang, Maorong, Creighton University
Jones, David, Kennesaw State University
Kadel, Carolyn, Johnson County Community College
Laumakis, Stephen, University of St. Thomas
LeBlanc, Bruce, Black Hawk College
Lehe, Robert, North Central College
Lekprichakul, Thamana, Research Institute for the Humanities
Littlejohn, Ronnie, Belmont University
Liu, Chi, Taiwan Chienkuo Technology University
Liu, Yu, Niagara County Community College
Lopez, Sandy, Trident Community College
Loughlin, Philip
Marion, Michele, Paradise Valley Community College
McDonald, Tony Hal, University of Central Arkansas
McKeon, Joe, Central Connecticut State University
Moore, Jacqueline, Austin College
Moser, David, Belmont University
Nakamura, Tamah, Chikushi Jogakuen University
Olson, Ray, College of DuPage, Emeritus
Overton, Joseph, Kapi’olani Community College
Palmer, Annette, Morgan State University
Pearlstein, Arthur, Creighton University
Peoples, James, Ohio Wesleyan University
Polinska, Wioleta, North Central College
Pu, Li, Slippery Rock University
Richards, Leon, Kapi’olani Community College
Rogers, Matthew, North Central College
Sachdev, Rachana, Susquehanna University
Schaefer, Weirong, Missouri State University
Schiltz, Elizabeth, College of Wooster
Shultz, Edward, University of Hawaii, Manoa
Schwerin, Ed, Florida Atlantic University
Scott, Susan, McDaniel College
List Of Participants

Soltz, Roberta, Bloomsburg University
Tan, Janet, National Chengchi University
Yuan, Jinmei, Creighton University
Zhang, He, William Paterson University

Acknowledgements

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Staff, CELTT, Kapi‘olani Community College
Kalani Fujiwara, Honda International Center, Kapi‘olani CC
Shawn Yacavone, Honda International Center, Kapi‘olani CC

Printing
Gene Phillips, Kapi‘olani Community College

Cover and Folder Designs
Warren Houghtailing

Catering
Kapi‘olani Community College’s Culinary Institute of the Pacific,
Dave Hamada, Chef
David Miyamoto, Catering Manager
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We especially thank Deborah Pope, Executive Director, and Carol Khewhok, Program Manager, for making it possible for ASDP to hold its 16th annual conference reception at Shangri-La.
Submission and Journal Information

*Editorial Office.* Correspondence regarding manuscripts and editorial matters should be directed to David Jones, Atlanta Center for Asian Studies, #2206 1000 Chastain Road, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591. The editorial phone number is (770) 423-6596. Electronic correspondence is preferred: djones@ksuweb.kennesaw.edu.

*Book Review Office.* Correspondence regarding reviewing books should be sent to Ronnie Littlejohn, Book Review Editor, Fidelity Hall 313, Belmont University, 1900 Belmont Blvd. Nashville, TN 37212-3757. The phone number is 615-460-6494. Other contact information is 615-460-6914 (Fax) and <littlejohnr@mail.belmont.edu>. Reviewers are responsible for obtaining their own copies of any books they wish to review.

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Papers should also include a Reference section that follows immediately after the conclusion. References should be listed with author’s family name first, followed by given name, publication date, book or article title, publication place, and publisher:

Articles should use inclusive language, and use the author-date system of citation. Submissions with either (or both) a content or theoretical pedagogical focus are welcomed. All communication between the editor and authors will be done electronically, including sending and receiving attachments. Send papers to:

David Jones, Editor
East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies
djones@ksuweb.kennesaw.edu

**Statement of Purpose.** East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies provides an official record of the annual national conference of the Asian Studies Development Program of the East-West Center in Honolulu as well as making available a forum for scholarly activity. The journal also provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and findings of Asian Studies content related materials and theoretical pedagogical techniques and curricular contributions. The journal is endorsed by the Association of Regional Centers of the Asian Studies Development Program.

**Sponsoring Organizations.** East-West Connections sponsoring organizations include the Asian Studies Development Program, the Georgia Philosophy Series, and the 20 regional centers of the Association of Regional Centers: Black Hawk College (Moline, Illinois), Belmont University (Nashville), City College of San Francisco, College of DuPage (Illinois), Eckerd College (St. Petersburg, Florida), Kapi‘olani Community College (University of Hawai‘i), Middlesex Community College (Bedford, Massachusetts), Missouri State University, Morgan State University (Baltimore), Paradise Valley Community College (Phoenix), Community College of Philadelphia, Portland Community College, Slippery Rock University (Pennsylvania), Trident Technical College (south Carolina), Tulsa
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